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STELLINGEN 
1. Handel in emissierechten voor niet uniform verspreide emissies moet op 
één of andere manier gerestricteerd worden om hoge lokale vervuilings-
concentraties te voorkomen. 
2. De depositiedoelen voor verzuring in Nederland zijn impliciet gebaseerd op 
kosten baten analyse. 
3. Er is sprake van een opmerkelijke paradox in internationale milieu over-
eenkomsten: naarmate internationale samenwerking noodzakelijker is, is 
deze moeilijker tot stand te brengen. 
(Scott Barrett, 1990, The problem of global environmental protection, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 6, pp. 68-79) 
4. Om consumptiepatronen in een milieu-vriendelijker richting om te buigen 
moet de overheid in haar beleid veelvuldiger gebruik maken van fmanciële 
prikkels. 
5. Indien Nederland streeft naar een substantiële participatie van vrouwen in 
het parlement, is het beter om het kiesstelsel van evenredige vertegen-
woordiging te handhaven in plaats van over te stappen op een distric-
tenstelsel. 
(Joyce Outshoom, 1995, Het hardnekkige verschil: de ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen 
in politiek en besluitvorming. In: Goldschmidt etat, 1995, Féminisme en Wetenschap, 
Teleac/Prometheus, Utrecht/Amsterdam) 
6. Flexibilisering van de arbeidsmarkt is in veel gevallen een eufemisme voor 
verslechtering van arbeidsvoorwaarden. 
7. Voor het économie onderwijs aan le jaars Studenten aan de Landbouwuni-
versiteit die gekenmerkt worden door een uiteenlopend kennisniveau met 
betrekking tot économie, is een individueel studiesysteem een geschürte 
onderwijsvorm. 
8. Hardlopen bevordert zowel de lichamelijke als de geestelijke gezondheid. 
9. Om de verraiming van winkelsluitingstijden op werkdagen ten voile te 
kunnen benutten, dient het sluitmgstijdstip van de fietsenkelder van het 
LUW-gebouw de Leeuwenborch aangepast te worden. 
10. Voor wie niet wil trouwen maar wel een feest wil geven, biedt een promo-
tie uitkomst. 
S. Kruitwagen 
An economic analysis of tradeable emission permits for sulphur dioxide emissions 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Increasing production and consumption have, in many cases, resulted in increased 
emissions of various pollutants which have led to large-scale damage to the 
environment. One of the major environmental problems in the 1980s and 1990s in 
Europe is acidification. Large-scale political and scientific awareness of this 
problem dates back to the early seventies. For years scientific research had 
indicated the seriousness of this problem, and abatement strategies were initiated 
both at the national and international level. In the past 25 years progress has been 
made, but acidification is still causing substantial environmental damage in parts 
of Europe, North America and Asia, and further reduction of acid rain seems 
necessary.1 
Acid rain is caused by the emissions of sulphur dioxide (S0 2), nitrogen oxides 
(NOJ and ammonia (NH3). The emissions of S0 2 and NO x are mainly caused by 
burning fossil fuels, and emission of NH 3 is largely due to agricultural production. 
Once these acidifying pollutants have been emitted into the atmosphere, they are 
transformed and dispersed. A substantial portion of the pollutants is transported by 
the winds up to 1500 kilometres before being deposited. As a result, a country's 
deposition partly originates outside its geographical area. The extent to which this 
occurs differs between countries, because countries differ in size, wind patterns 
are not uniform and emission sources are not uniformly spread over countries. 
This non-uniformity is a main characteristic of acidifying emissions. Damage 
caused by acid rain not only depends on the amount of emission but also on the 
location of emissions. 
Environmental damage caused by acidification depends on the level of acid-
deposition and the natural sensitivity of the environment. In recent years various 
'The term 'acid rain' is used, although acidification can be caused by dry, wet or occult deposit-
ion. 
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types of damage have been represented by one indicator: the critical load (Nilsson 
and Grennfelt, 1988; Hettelingh et al., 1991). A critical load is defined as the 
deposition level below which no significant damage to the environment is 
expected to occur according to present knowledge (Nilsson and Grennfelt, 1988). 
These loads differ from location to location. Currently, deposition largely exceeds 
the critical loads in Europe. Simulation with the Regional Acidification Informa-
tion and Simulation (RAINS) model indicates that, given countries' planned 
emission reductions, the critical loads will still be exceeded in the year 2000 in 
large parts of Europe (Amann et al., 1993). 
This thesis deals with an economic analysis of acidification in Europe in as far 
as it is caused by S0 2 emissions. Particular emphasis is placed on cost-effective 
abatement of S0 2 emissions. This single pollutant approach is used in the actual 
international policy on acidification and the choice for S0 2 follows from the fact 
that, Europe wide, SO z is the main contributor to acid rain. 
Because of the transboundary transport of acidifying emissions, acidification in 
Europe is an international environmental problem. Since countries are impacted by 
deposition originating abroad and because of reasons of effectiveness and effi-
ciency, countries should cooperate in reducing acidifying emissions. In Europe 
this cooperation has resulted in two international sulphur protocols. The first dates 
from 1985 and required all signatories to reduce S0 2 emissions by 30% of their 
1980 emission levels by 1993. The second dates from 1994 and is based on 
critical loads for sulphur the attainment of which would require a considerable 
emission abatement effort. This would result in high costs, since the cost of 
controlling acidifying emissions increase exponentially with increasing emission 
reductions beyond a moderate level of emission abatement (Alcamo et al., 1990). 
To minimize the total European abatement costs, the second sulphur protocol 
aimed at cost effective emission abatement. This resulted in differentiated national 
emission reductions. 
To determine the cost-effective emission abatement allocation to reach critical 
loads, full information is needed on national control options and costs, on the 
atmospheric transport and deposition of emissions and on the critical loads. In 
general, countries with low marginal control costs should abate more emissions 
than countries with high marginal abatement costs to reach cost-effective abate-
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ment. Because of the atmospheric transport, emissions of upwind countries may 
cause more damage, implicating higher reductions for these countries. Also 
differences in critical loads require differences in deposition reductions and 
consequently differences in emission reductions among countries. In calculating 
the cost effective allocation all influencing factors should not be considered 
separately. What is needed is an integrated analysis. Therefore integrated assess-
ment models, like the RAINS model can be used. The RAINS model was used in 
the negotiations on the second sulphur protocol. However, in spite of the fact that 
the protocol was partly based on cost-effective runs with the model, because 
during the negotiations the agreed emission reductions deviated from the simu-
lated cost effective abatement allocation, the actual cost effectiveness can be 
improved. This deviation varies between countries to a maximum of 60% in 
Bulgaria (see further section 1.5). 
Tradeable emission permits can be used to improve the cost effectiveness of 
S0 2 abatement. This is an interesting option since the second protocol allows 
countries to trade their emission reduction commitments. Moreover, in the United 
States a S0 2 permit trading system has already been introduced and based on first 
experiences, the system has been indicated as successful (Burtraw, 1996). 
A major issue of research in this thesis is the question whether a system of 
tradeable S0 2 permits can contribute to the cost effectiveness of SOz emission 
reduction.2 In the literature several systems for permit trading for non-uniformly 
mixing pollutants have been discussed, but for different reasons none of these is 
suitable for S0 2 permit trading in Europe. Unrestricted emission trading results in 
violation of deposition targets (Klaassen, 1995). For emission trading subject to 
rules, it is generally not clearly indicated how such rules should be implemented 
in separate trade transactions (Krupnick et al., 1983; Atkinson and Tietenberg, 
1982; McGartland and Oates, 1985). Emission permit trading applying offset rates 
is untransparant and complex (Klaassen and Amann, 1992). Therefore, in this 
thesis a new system of tradeable emission permits, indicated as guided bilateral 
permit trading, is developed. This system aims at reaching deposition targets and 
2Dispersion can be in water, soil and air. This thesis focusses on air pollution. For an economic 
analysis of tradeable permits for water pollution see for example Netusil and Braden (1995). 
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cost-effective emission abatement simultaneously, and trade restrictions are 
straightforward. Based on simulation results of guided bilateral permit trading for 
S0 2 emissions in Europe, this thesis indicates the consequences of this trading 
system. 
Before considering tradeable emission permits as a policy instrument for the 
acid rain problem in Europe, I first look at the characteristics of this problem. In 
section 1.2 attention is paid to the causes of acid rain. Section 1.3 deals with the 
atmospheric transport of acidifying emissions, while section 1.4 discusses the 
resulting damage. As this thesis deals with international acid rain policy, the 
history of this policy is discussed in section 1.5. The aim of the study is formu-
lated in section 1.6. The Introduction concludes in section 1.7 with a detailed 
outline of the study. 
1.2 Causes of acid rain 
The term acid rain refers to the transboundary environmental problem caused by 
the emissions of sulphur dioxide (S0 2), nitrogen oxides (NOJ and ammonia 
(NH3). After being emitted, these compounds are transported through the atmos-
phere and deposited in both wet and dry form on the earth's surface. The deposi-
tion of these compounds causes acidification of soils and surface waters. This 
section only takes account of man-made acidifying emissions, since they constitute 
the majority of the total emissions (and deposition) in Europe. Natural sources 
only have a minor share of total emissions in Europe and are considered to be 
exogenous because they cannot be influenced by environmental policy.3 
Emissions of both S0 2 and NO x are largely related to energy use. The emissions 
of NH 3 originate largely from the agricultural sector. 
S0 2 is formed during the combustion of fossil fuels (oil and coal) and emitted 
from stacks and exhausts. The main responsibility for S0 2 emissions lies with 
power stations, refineries and other industries. A small source of S0 2 emissions is 
'Although these sources cannot be influenced, the negative effects can be mitigated for example 
by liming. 
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traffic.4 The largest increase in emissions came after the 1950's as a result of the 
sharp increase in oil consumption. Figure 1.1 illustrates the European S0 2 
emissions from 1950 to 1992. Since 1980, S0 2 emissions have been decreasing as 
a result of S0 2 reduction policies mainly in West European countries. Although 
S0 2 emissions have been falling in Eastern Europe recently, Eastern Europe is 
still a main contributor to European S0 2 emissions. In 1990 its share of total 
European emissions amounted to 70% (RTVM, 1991). 
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Figure 1.1 Historical emissions of S02 in Europe (source: Thomas et al, 
1988; Tuovinen et al, 1994). 
NO x emissions are formed in all types of combustion. The amount of emission 
depends upon the N-content of fuels, boiler characteristics and the combustion 
temperature. At higher combustion temperatures, the NO x formation increases 
exponentially. NO x emissions mainly originate from traffic, power plants, indus-
tries and households (Ltlbkert, 1987). In Western European countries, traffic is the 
main source of NO x emissions, followed by power plants. In Eastern European 
countries, however, power plants are the main source of NO x emissions (Amann, 
1990a). Figure 1.2 illustrates the European NO x emissions from 1950 to 1992. 
Like S0 2 emissions, the NO x emissions increased greatly between 1950 and 1980. 
In the period 1980 - 1992, the sharp increase of NO x emissions levelled off. The 
increase in traffic in this period was counterbalanced by the introduction of 
catalytic converters (RIVM, 1991). In contrast to S0 2 emissions that mainly 
"For the sake of completeness it should be noted that S 0 2 is also emitted by the paper, pulp and 
iron melting industries. 
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originate in Eastern Europe, NO x emissions mainly originate in Western Europe. 
In 1990, 60% of the European NO x emissions originated in Western Europe 
(RTVM, 1991). 
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Figure 1.2 Historical emissions of NOx in Europe (source: Thomas et ah, 
1988; Tuovinen et al, 1994). 
Unlike NO x and S0 2 emissions, NH3 emissions are not related to energy use but 
originate mainly in the agricultural sector. NH3 is released during the storage and 
application of manure, during the grazing period and through the application of 
nitrogen fertilizer. A minor source of NH3 emissions (less than 2%) is the 
fertilizer and ammonia industry itself (Klaassen, 1991). Figure 1.3 illustrates the 
emissions of NH 3 in Europe between 1950 and 1992. Until 1970, NH 3 emissions 
increased only slowly. After that, they increased more sharply, as a result of the 
growing number of livestock. 
To analyse the relative contribution of the three compounds to acid rain, both 
the emission amounts and the difference in acidifying potential of S0 2 , NO x and 
NH 3 have to be taken into account. This latter is done by using the concept of 
acid equivalents. One acid equivalent is defined as 1 mol H + potential acid with 1 
tonne S0 2 being equivalent to 31,500 acid equivalents, 1 tonne NO x equivalent to 
21,500 acid equivalents and 1 tonne NH 3 equivalent to 59,000 acid equivalents 
(Erisman and Heij, 1991). The relative contribution of the three compounds in the 
total European acidifying emissions for the period 1950 - 1992 is represented in 
Figure 1.4. This figure is based on the emission numbers of Figures 1.1 - 1.3. On 
the basis of Figure 1.4 it can be concluded that the main cause of acid rain is the 
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Figure 1.3 Historical emissions of NH3 in Europe (source: Thomas et al, 
1988; Tuovinen, 1994). 
emission of S0 2 . According to this figure, the contribution of S0 2 in total acidity 
increased between 1950 and 1970, after which it slowly decreased. In 1992 the 
contribution of S0 2 to total acidity amounted to 54%. 
, 6 0 ' 5 5 ' 6 0 , B 5 7 0 7 5 W ) ' 8 5 , 8 0 « 1 I B 2 
Figure 1.4 Overview of total acidifying emissions in Europe between 1950 
-1992. 
1.3 Atmospheric transport 
As I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, acid rain is a transboundary 
environmental problem. Once the acidifying pollutants have been emitted into the 
atmosphere they are transformed and dispersed. Via gaseous or liquid phase 
reactions in the atmosphere, S0 2 can be transformed into sulphuric acid (SO2."), 
and NO x and NH 3 can partially be transformed into nitric acid (NOj). The 
8 Chapter 1 
availability of ozone (0 3 ) is of crucial importance in the transformation process 
(Environmental Resources Limited, 1983). 
A substantial portion of acidifying emissions is transported up to 1500 kilo-
metres by the winds. As NH 3 is emitted just above the ground, this pollutant 
disperses far less than S0 2 which is emitted mainly through high smoke stacks. 
Because of this atmospheric transport, many countries are confronted with export 
and import of acidifying emissions. Table 1.1 illustrates the domestic share of the 
deposition and the export of emissions for European countries in 1992. Obviously, 
the sum of the domestic and export shares is not equal to 100%, since the 
denominator for both shares differs as the domestic share is related to deposition 
and the export share is related to emission. Because of the atmospheric transport, 
a country's deposition is not equal to its emission. Note also that since the data in 
Table 1.1 are presented in percentages, no information is given on the pollutant-
trade balance of the countries. 
Table 1.1 shows that the domestic share of deposition varies between the 
different compounds. It is clear that NH 3 is less transboundary in character than 
S0 2 and NO x. Moreover, great variation exists between different European coun-
tries in the domestic share of any one compound. Consider for example S0 2 . In 
Scandinavia, the domestic share is relatively low, and because of the prevailing 
winds that blow in Northern Europe from the South West to the North East, these 
countries have a high import of acid rain. Moreover, the source strength in 
upwind countries is important. Countries like Germany and Poland, for example, 
have many large emission sources. Other countries like the United Kingdom, 
Spain and Italy have a relatively large domestic share in depositions and suffer 
less from the import of acid rain. This can be explained by the geographical 
location (the upwind outskirts of Europe) and by the size of these countries. Since 
the precursors of acidification are transported in the atmosphere over hundreds of 
kilometres, acid rain can be classified as a continental environmental problem, 
requiring a continental (i.e. European) acid rain policy.5 
'According to the categorization of environmental problems in the study Concern for Tomorrow 
(RIVM, 1989), continental scale problems are governed by the air circulation in the atmospheric 
boundary layer (0-3 kilometers altitude). Other categories that are distinguished in the RTVM study 
are: global scale, fluvial scale, regional scale and local scale. 
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Table 1.1 The domestic share in deposition and the export share in emissions 
of S0 2 , NO x and NHX in 1992 (source: Tuovinen et a l , 1994). 
Country Domestic Share in Deposition(%) Export Share in Emissions(%) 
so2 N O , NFL, S 0 2 N O x NH 3 
Albania 34 3 66 83 97 60 
Austria 7 5 44 78 95 51 
Belgium 40 11 57 80 97 57 
Bulgaria 56 13 82 77 94 57 
Czechoslovakia 51 19 66 74 93 54 
Denmark 30 9 82 89 98 60 
Finland 19 14 36 70 88 44 
France 43 36 83 66 84 42 
Germany 67 39 69 67 85 43 
Greece 30 32 55 84 94 61 
Hungary 52 9 67 74 93 57 
Ireland 39 14 91 82 94 48 
Italy 67 47 79 72 88 49 
Luxembourg 32 0 55 84 100 63 
Netherlands 17 14 81 84 96 55 
Norway 4 7 35 76 91 44 
Poland 51 19 69 66 87 47 
Portugal 57 27 82 78 93 56 
Rumania 53 24 75 68 90 49 
Spain 76 35 79 72 87 47 
Sweden 8 12 30 73 88 48 
Switzerland 14 10 51 71 93 46 
Turkey 23 10 74 68 65 62 
United Kingdom 86 60 78 72 91 46 
Belorussia 34 9 66 71 91 50 
Ukraine 47 18 6* 65 84 48 
Moldavia 19 2 61 80 97 63 
Russian Federation 43 31 71 52 65 33 
Estonia 35 3 54 86 98 59 
Latvia 14 3 54 81 96 58 
Lithuania 22 3 61 75 95 55 
Former Yugoslavia 40 7 50 75 94 55 
* This is caused by very low national emission. 
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Because of this atmospheric transport, the acid rain problem differs from global 
environmental problems like the greenhouse effect. Acidifying emissions are 
called non-uniformly mixing pollutants since their environmental impacts depend 
not only on the total (European) volume emitted, but also on the location of the 
emission. This has main consequences for policy making on acidification since a 
restriction to total emissions only may result in substantial local damage caused 
by this locational aspect. For greenhouse gasses like C0 2 , however, a policy on 
total emission reductions is satisfiable because the resulting damage depends only 
on total emissions and consequent concentrations and not on the emission loca-
tion. 
1.4 Damage caused by acid rain 
The wet and dry deposition of acidifying pollutants has various negative effects. 
Some damage is caused directly by the pollutants. However, they can also have 
indirect effects on flora and fauna by causing changes in soils or aquatic systems. 
The effects of acid rain are surrounded by uncertainty. It is, for example, difficult 
to estimate the effect of acid rain in relation to other environmental damaging 
factors, like climatic changes or other pollutants. Moreover, observable effects can 
take a long time to become apparent. In this section a short overview is given of 
the most important impacts of acidification. 
Acidification of lakes and streams involves extensive chemical and biological 
changes. Ultimately, acidification results in the death of fish and other aquatic 
life. Increase in aluminium concentration as a result of acidification is believed to 
play a major role in the disappearance of fish. The increase in acidification in 
thousands of lakes in Norway and Sweden has reduced or eliminated fish popula-
tions (Wetstone and Rosencranz, 1983; Alcamo et al., 1990). Not only surface 
water but also ground water is affected by acidification, which causes the release 
of heavy metals, thus affecting drinking water supplies (Environmental Resources 
Limited, 1983). 
Acidification of soils has various effects. If the soil is acidified and unable to 
neutralize acid deposition, sulphate and nitrate may leak through the soil and 
contribute to water acidification. Acidification increases the concentrations of 
aluminium and other (toxic) heavy metals in the soil which have harmful effects 
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on ecosystems (Berd6n et al., 1987). Acid rain also contributes to the deterioration 
of forests. Large-scale deterioration and death of forests is a serious problem in 
many parts of Europe. Apart from the negative effects of soil acidification on 
forests, the precipitation of acidifying pollutants on leaves and needles erodes the 
waxy, protective layer, affecting the vitality of trees. It has also been suggested 
that forest dieback is related to excess nitrogen (Alcamo et al., 1990). Not only 
are forests negatively affected by acid precipitation; agricultural crops and other 
plants also suffer (Van der Eerden et al., 1987). Another impact of acid rain is 
damage to buildings. The effect of acidifying pollutants on (historic) buildings 
depends on climatic conditions, the specific properties of exposed materials and 
the mix of pollutants. Examples of this kind of damage are the deterioration of 
the Acropolis in Athens and of the cathedral in Cologne (ECE, 1985). 
Since it is very difficult to provide a reliable quantitative estimate of monetary 
costs of the damage by acidification, this damage may be expressed in physical 
terms. For this purpose the concept of 'critical loads' can be used. Critical loads 
are defined as the deposition levels below which no significant damage to the 
environment is expected to occur according to present knowledge (Nillson and 
Grennfelt, 1988). Critical loads maps have been developed for Europe by the 
Coordination Center for Effects (Hettelingh et al., 1991, Posch et al., 1995). 
These maps show the critical loads for acidification in Europe at receptors of 150 
x 150 km. The difference between the current deposition and the critical loads can 
be used as a measure for damage. The larger this difference, the larger the 
damage is assumed to be. However, no information is available on the relevant 
shape of the damage function (Amann et al., 1994).6 
1.5 History of international acid rain policy 
As acid rain has a transboundary character, countries are subjected to the 
pollution of other countries. It is generally recognized that an international acid 
rain policy is therefore required. Cooperation within the United Nations Economic 
6It should be noted that acidification is direcdy linked with two other environmental problems: 
eutrophication and ozone formation. Both N O x and NH 3 contribute to eutrophication and N O x also 
plays a role in the formation of tropospheric ozone. However, these linked problems are outside the 
scope of this study. 
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Commission for Europe (ECE) has resulted in international reduction protocols. 
This section discusses the history of international European negotiations on the 
acid rain problem. 
The UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, 
might be regarded as a starting point for the international attention to trans-
boundary environmental pollution. Article 21 of the Declaration of this conference 
has played a central role in discussion and negotiations on transboundary air 
pollution. According to this Article, states have the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources, but they also have the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause any damage to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (UN, 1973). 
Initially, in the early seventies, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) was a centre for the study and discussion of international 
environmental issues. In 1972, two months prior to the UN conference, the OECD 
started an international study of the long range air pollution entitled The Cooper-
ative Technical Programme to Measure the Long Range Transport of Air Pollu-
tants, in which 11 countries participated.7 This study acknowledged the existence 
of the long range transport of sulphuric particles, as had already been pointed out 
by Swedish and Norwegian researchers. Although these findings were not 
supported by all the participating countries, the study did have an important 
impact on international policy discussions (Alcamo et al., 1990). However, since 
not all European countries are members of the OECD, this was not the appropri-
ate organization for further discussion and negotiations. Therefore, the multilateral 
discussion and negotiation shifted to the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (ECE), in which both Western and Eastern European countries 
participate.8 On the initiative of Norway, Sweden and Canada, discussions were 
started within the ECE in 1977, with the aim of reaching an agreement between 
ECE members to cut back emissions by a fixed percentage. 
'These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
8 Canada and the United States also participate in the ECE, and thus in the negotiations on 
acidification. 
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In 1979 the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollution was 
signed. All European countries and two Soviet Republics signed, as well as the 
United States, Canada and the European Community. The Convention should be 
seen as an important step towards improvement of the environment in both 
Europe and the United States. It stipulates that governments protect their people 
and the environment against air pollution, and that they restrict and, if possible, 
reduce it as far as possible. Moreover, policies and strategies should be developed 
to abate the emission of air pollution. The Convention also calls for further 
research and development. It entered into force in 1983, when 24 countries had 
ratified the Convention (Alcamo et al., 1990). Between 1979 and 1983 the 
Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range 
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) was initiated. The main task of 
the EMEP programme is to compile emission data, to measure air and precipita-
tion quality and to develop atmospheric dispersion models. Nowadays, the EMEP 
models are widely used, and its annual publications on country-to-country 
transport matrices of sulphur, nitrogen and ammonia are generally accepted. 
Ten years after the Conference of Stockholm, the signatories of the Convention 
came together again in Stockholm, this time for a conference on acidification of 
the environment. This meeting was a breakthrough in international efforts to 
reduce acidification. Firstly, Germany changed its attitude towards acidification as 
a result of pressure of the publicity in the media about the damage to forests. 
Secondly, a concerted international abatement programme was brought under the 
auspices of the ECE. As a follow-up to this conference, a number of countries 
proposed concrete steps for reducing S 0 2 emissions. During a ministerial meeting 
in Ottawa (Canada) in 1984, ten countries decided to impose a 30% reduction of 
the 1980 amount of S 0 2 emission by 1993. These ten countries were the Scandi-
navian countries, Finland, France, West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Canada 
and the Netherlands. They were called the '30% club'. In July 1985, 21 countries 
signed a protocol in Helsinki to reduce S 0 2 emission by at least 30% of the 1980 
figures, to be reached by 1993. 9 Among the countries that did not sign were the 
'These countries include the countries of the 30% club plus Belgium, Bulgaria, Belorussia, 
Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Ukraine and the USSR. 
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United Kingdom and Poland, two major emitters of S 0 2 . The United Kingdom's 
argument for not signing is worth mentioning. It criticized the arbitrary nature of 
the protocol, citing both the choice of 1980 as the base year and the equal 
percentage reduction of 30% as arbitrary choices. Moreover, the United Kingdom 
stressed the lack of connection of deposition levels with environmental impact. 
After the completion of the S 0 2 Protocol, a similar protocol was drawn up for 
NO x which, however, met the criticism of the United Kingdom. The NO x Protocol 
was signed by 25 countries, including Poland and the United Kingdom, in Sofia 
in October 1988. This protocol did not specify a reference year for reduction to 
relate to, but insisted that by 1994 N 0 X emissions would not exceed the 1987 
levels. Countries could also choose a reference year previous to 1987 provided the 
average yearly NO x emission per ten-year period (1987-1996) did not exceed the 
emission level of 1987. The NO x Protocol also said that countries should start 
negotiations for more stringent measures to push back NO x emissions, thereby 
taking into account internationally accepted 'critical loads'. A number of countries 
found that a 'stand-still' principle did not go far enough as a first step towards an 
NO x emission reduction. In an additional non-binding declaration eleven countries 
announced that, by 1998, they would achieve a 30% emission reduction compared 
to the level of 1987. 1 0 To realize a stand-still or indeed an emission reduction, 
national governments would have to adapt their policies. The protocol drew up 
national emission standards for new stationary, and new mobile emission sources. 
Suggestions for possible abatement measures for existing emission sources were 
given in a 'technical appendix'. The protocol indicated that these emission 
standards should be based on the best available technologies that were economi-
cally feasible. The NO x Protocol also indicated that future negotiations on 
emission reductions should be based on the effects of acid rain. 
In the early nineties, a further European S 0 2 emission reduction was negotiated, 
finally resulting in the Second S 0 2 Protocol in June 1994 (Oslo). This protocol 
was signed by most European countries. The flat rate reduction approach as 
applied in the First S 0 2 Protocol and the NO x Protocol was no longer favoured by 
'"These 11 countries were Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. Notably, in 1992 the average emission of NO, of these 
countries had increased by 2.3% compared to 1987 (source: Tuovinen et al., 1994). 
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the parties of the Convention. Alternatively, the allocation of emission reduction 
was based on the environmental effects of emissions. The long term aim was to 
reach critical loads. However, it is not possible to achieve critical loads every-
where in Europe since these imply very low deposition in some parts of Europe 
and such low deposition cannot be realized without drastic reductions in energy 
consumption (Amann et al., 1992a). Therefore, an alternative deposition target 
was aimed at. This deposition target, indicated by 'gap closure', reduces the 
difference (the gap) between current deposition and critical loads. The deposition 
target finally aimed at in the negotiations on the Second S0 2 Protocol amounted 
to a gap closure of 60%. This target aims at bringing all ecosystems in Europe 
equally closer to the full achievement of critical loads, taking into account both 
regional differences in the environmental sensitivities and some notation of 
economic efforts for achieving these targets, by considering the current gap 
(Amann et al., 1994). In practice however, this deposition target will only result 
in a gap closure of 60% at binding receptors and a gap closure of more than 60% 
at non-binding receptors, because realizing this gap at binding receptors requires 
such emission reductions that the gap closure is more than 60% at non-binding 
receptors. 
The cost-effective emission reductions to reach a gap closure of 60% were 
calculated by the RAINS model. However, this cost-effective emission abatement 
allocation was not complied within the protocol. The cost-effective abatement 
allocation was used as a basis in the negotiations, but for different reasons 
countries deviated from this allocation. One reason was that the associated costs 
of the cost-effective allocation are considered too high by countries. As a result 
the actual emission ceilings agreed on in the protocol deviate from the cost-
effective emission allocation (Wtister, 1994). Table 1.2 shows the cost-effective 
emission allocation and the emission allocation agreed on for the year 2000 in the 
protocol.11 Some countries agreed on further emission reduction for the years 
2005 and/or 2010. Belorussia, Belgium and Greece would reduce emissions even 
"The cost-effective allocation is calculated using the RAINS model, version 6.0. This version of 
the model does not yet take the new borders in Europe into account The country classification in 
Table 1.2 is taken from the RAINS model. This classification is not limited to countries but sometimes 
considers regions. 
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below the cost effective emission allocation. Italy and Portugal will achieve then-
cost effective emission level in 2005, Poland and the United Kingdom in 2010. 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia, France, Germany and Hungary 
will reduce their emissions further, but will not achieve their cost-effective 
emission level in 2010. Table 1.2 shows that only 9 countries will achieve the 
cost-effective emission level in 2000. 
The Second S0 2 Protocol provides two references on cost effectiveness. First, 
Article 2.6 explicitly states that parties are allowed to apply economic instruments 
to encourage the adoption of cost-effective emission reduction. Although econ-
omic instruments do not by definition result in cost-effective emission abatement, 
their use may contribute to cost-effective abatement. Second, Article 2.7 opens up 
the opportunity for a joint implementation scheme that is intended to work 
similarly to an emission trading scheme (UN/ECE, 1994). The Second S0 2 
Protocol was a major improvement in the international reduction policy on 
acidification compared to the flat rate approach in the former protocols on 
acidifying pollutants. The improvement was two-fold: emission reduction was 
based on the environmental impact of emissions and attention was paid to the cost 
effectiveness of emission reduction. However, not all European countries signed 
the protocol. 
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Table 1.2 Cost-effective S0 2 emissions (kt) and emissions according to the 
Helsinki Protocol for the year 2000 (source: Amann et al , 1993 and 
UN/ECE, 1994). 
Country Cost-effective SO, emissions Protocol SO, emissions 
Albania 132 * 
Austria 78 78 
Belgium 190 248 
Bulgaria 533 1374 
Czechoslovakia 868 1465 
Denmark 58 90 
Finland 116 116 
France 670 868 
West Germany 520 
} 1300 
East Germany 230 
Greece 595 595 
Hungary 523 898 
Ireland 131 155 
Italy 1026 1330 
Luxembourg 10 10 
Netherlands 106 106 
Norway 34 34 
Poland 1397 2583 
Portugal 294 304 
Rumania 1062 * 
Spain 1493 2143 
Sweden 88 100 
Switzerland 60 60 
Turkey 2887 * 
United Kingdom 1028 2449 
Yugoslavia 1014 ** 
Kola Karelia 271 * 
St. Petersburg 105 * 
Baltic Region 89 * 
Belorussia 456 456 
Ukraine 1696 2310 
Moldavia 231 * 
Russia 4440 4440 
* Did not sign the protocol. " Only Croatia and Slovenia signed the protocol. 
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Although it took more than a decade after the 1972 UN Conference, European 
cooperation in reducing acidification eventually consisted of single pollutant 
protocols. The first protocols on reducing NO x and S0 2 could be described as first 
steps in the right direction. The 1994 Protocol on further reducing S0 2 emissions, 
however, implied an improvement in reduction policy in both environmental and 
economic terms since the reduction of acidifying pollutants is based on their 
environmental effects and the cost effectiveness of emission abatement is taken 
into account. However, in this study it is shown that further cost savings can be 
reached. 
1.6 Aim of the study 
To improve the cost effectiveness of S0 2 emission reduction, the 1994 Protocol 
opts for the use of economic instruments and a joint implementation scheme. In 
principle this offers an opportunity for introducing a system of marketable permits 
in Europe. In the United States, such a system has already been introduced for 
S0 2 emission control of utility companies. In this thesis I discuss the possibility 
and the implications of an international system of marketable S0 2 permits among 
the European countries. The central question raised is whether a system of 
tradeable emission permits can contribute to a cost-effective European reduction 
of S0 2 emissions, taking into account prespecified deposition targets, and the 
conditions under which this is likely to happen. Before I can answer this question, 
three other research questions have to be examined. 
(I) What are the main economic aspects of a European acid rain policy? 
(II) What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a system of tradeable 
permits to implement a European acid rain policy? 
(III) What should a system of tradeable emission permits for a non-uniformly 
mixing pollutant look like in order to take deposition targets into account? 
The first of these questions, on the main economic aspects of acid rain policy, 
consists of three sub topics: (i) the cost effectiveness in an international context; 
(ii) the need for cooperation and the difficulties in achieving this and (iii) the 
choice of instruments for bringing about emission reductions. The second research 
question focuses in detail on the theory of tradeable permits. The difference 
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between emission permits and deposition permits, and the need to restrict trading 
of non-uniformly mixing pollutants is discussed. The initial permit distribution is 
also discussed. Elaborating on the second research question, the third question 
concerns the implementation of a system of tradeable emission permits from an 
empirical point of view. 
To answer the central question of whether a system of tradeable emission 
permits can contribute to a cost-effective European reduction of S0 2 emissions, 
taking into account prespecified deposition targets, I have made use of both a 
literature study and simulation. First, by means of a literature study economic 
aspects and the theory of tradeable emission permits in particular are examined. 
Next, taking the results from this into account, a theoretical concept of what I call 
'guided bilateral permit trading' is formulated. Finally, guided bilateral permit 
trading is analysed by means of a simulation study. 
1.7 Outline of the study 
The central theme of this thesis, the analysis of the applicability of tradeable 
emission permits for cost-effective SOz reduction in Europe is dealt with as 
follows. First an economic theoretical background is presented by reviewing the 
relevant literature. Second, integrated assessment models are presented and com-
pared. One of these models in selected for simulation. Third, after presenting 
these 'tools', a new permit trading systems is developed and analysed by detailed 
simulations of trading schemes, including their economic and environmental 
implications. 
Chapter 2 discusses some general economic aspects of pollution control. 
Attention is paid to the cost effectiveness of pollution control, to the international 
dimension of acid rain policy and to the need for cooperation. Here I come close 
to the area of game theory but only some general game theoretic concepts are 
reviewed. Another topic discussed in this chapter concerns the alternative policy 
instruments for emission control. In this thesis I focus on tradeable emission 
permits. Given this general economic background, the theory of tradeable 
emission permits is elaborated on in Chapter 3. In this chapter permit trading for 
pollutants that are non-uniformly mixing is thoroughly discussed and illustrated by 
some empirical studies. After discussing both emission permit and deposition 
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permit trading systems, alternative systems of tradeable permits for this kind of 
pollutants are examined. Two main aspects in examining permit trading systems 
concern (i) the kind of trading process assumed, involving the distinction between 
simultaneous multilateral permit trading versus bilateral sequential permit trading, 
and (ii) the initial distribution of emission permits. This thorough discussion on 
tradeable permits contributes to a better understanding of this policy instrument 
and sheds light on the implications of permit trading for non-uniformly mixing 
pollutants. The findings of this chapter indicate that a new permit trading system 
has to be developed. Chapter 4 describes and compares integrated assessment 
models for simulation of acid rain control. First, three integrated assessment 
models for the European acid rain problem are reviewed. To provide a complete 
overview of models, non-European models are reviewed as well. Secondly, the 
advantages and drawbacks of the different models are weighed up against each 
other, concluding in a selection of one of the European integrated assessment 
models to be used in the analysis of this thesis. 
The first four chapters provide all elements necessary for developing and 
subsequently simulating a new permit trading system for S0 2 emissions. Building 
on Chapter 3, Chapter 5 develops in steps the concept of guided bilateral permit 
trading. This system aims at cost-effective emission abatement given prespecified 
deposition targets, assuming that permit trading is a bilateral and sequential 
process. The need to restrict (guide) trade is extensively discussed and the 
implications of trade restrictions for a bilateral and sequential trade process are 
explained. In Chapter 6 guided bilateral permit trading will be simulated for S0 2 
permits in Europe. It is assumed that permit trading takes place among countries. 
First the simulation model is described. Next the simulation results for the base 
case and two variants are successively discussed. Since I assume that permit 
trading is a bilateral and sequential process special attention is paid to the trade 
sequence. By simulating different trade sequences the effect of the sequence of 
transactions is examined. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 conclusions on the use of tradeable emission permits for 
reducing S0 2 emissions in Europe are summarized and discussed, based on the 
theoretical and empirical findings in this thesis. 
2 THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES FOR ACID RAIN POLICY 
2.1 Introduction 
International acid rain policy stipulates to what extent and, occasionally, in which 
way countries should reduce their emissions. This allocation of emission reduction 
can take place according to several principles. These principles are dealt with in 
this chapter. As the allocation of emission reduction is an environmental economic 
question, the chapter begins with a brief review of environmental economic 
theory, in which I mainly focus on the environmental criteria approach.12 
The transboundary transport of acidifying compounds means that international 
aspects have to be taken into account. Section 2.3 shows how important internati-
onal cooperation is if optimal emission abatement is to be reached. Strategic 
behaviour, however, may hinder optimal coordination of abatement strategies. In 
discussing the international dimension of emission abatement allocation, attention 
is paid to some game theoretic concepts. 
Finally, section 2.4 raises the question of which instruments could be used by 
policy makers to reach a desired abatement allocation. 
2.2 Economic theory of environmental policy 
The interfaces between environment and economics are often called 'environ-
mental functions', referring to functions of the environment that are used for the 
satisfaction of human needs (e.g. Siebert, 1987; de Groot, 1992). In this interpre-
tation, Siebert distinguishes four functions. Firstly, the environment provides 
public consumption goods like fresh air and the recreational function of nature. 
Secondly, the environment is a supplier of resources like fuel, minerals and water 
that are used in the production process. Thirdly, the environment is a receptacle of 
emissions, the undesired joint outputs of production and consumption activities 
being absorbed by different environmental media: water, air and soil. Finally, the 
1 2This approach is also indicated by ecological approach. 
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environment provides space for location of industrial activity, agriculture, housing, 
infrastructure and recreation sites.13 Environmental functions compete with one 
another. Excess use of the environment as a receptacle of wastes negatively 
affects the environment as a provider of public consumption goods. Environmental 
degradation arises if the use of an environmental function exceeds the environ-
mental endowments. The competition for the use of the environment is a problem 
of scarcity. Therefore environmental problems can be interpreted as economic 
problems: how to allocate the environment between the competing uses. 
This question can be dealt with from several economic approaches. The neo-
classical economic approach explains the occurrence of environmental degradation 
by the discrepancy between the private costs and social costs of pollution. In the 
neo-classical line of thought, optimal pollution control occurs if marginal abate-
ment costs equal marginal benefits of pollution abatement. If so, maximum social 
welfare is achieved (see e.g. Siebert, 1987). In practice a main difficulty related to 
define optimal pollution control levels, is the measurement of environmental 
benefits of pollution control. An alternative view of the problem of environmental 
deterioration is the institutional approach. This approach stresses the importance 
of specific institutions and the historical framework for the functioning of an eco-
nomy. Property rights play a main role in this point of view (see e.g. Bromley, 
1991). Environmental pollution emerges in situations in which property rights are 
not (or ill) defined (Dales, 1968). The analysis of Coase (1960) shows that if 
property rights are well defined, negotiation between the polluter and the victim 
will result in an optimal pollution level. If acid rain in Europe is regarded as an 
international allocation problem, then the concept of property rights is applicable 
at the country level. If a country is entitled to a certain environmental quality, 
negotiating with countries affecting the environmental quality is principally 
possible. However, as the acid rain problem is a reciprocal externality, negotiating 
will be complex, resulting in substantial transaction costs. 
"De Groot (1992) also distinguishes four functions. However, his differ from those of Siebert 
(1987). De Groot distinguishes a production function comprising both the provision of public 
consumption goods and the provision of resources. As a fourth function he adds the information 
function, for example, scientific and educational information. 
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In this thesis the environmental criteria approach is followed since this approach 
is well suitable to the problem of acidification. In the environmental criteria 
approach, the level of emission abatement results from the criteria for the quality 
of the environment which are defined by the authorities. These criteria might be 
interpreted as limiting conditions for economic activity. These limits are based on 
scientific information as well as on prevailing social standards. In general, a 
higher priority is given to environmental goods by countries with higher welfare 
(Komen and Folmer, 1995). Using environmental criteria avoids the problem of 
monetary valuation of the environment. In the case of non-uniformly mixing 
pollutants, it is not the emissions but the deposition and the concentration caused 
by emissions are decisive for the environmental damage. Therefore it is appropri-
ate to define deposition targets for acidification. The assessment of a criterion for 
acidification in the Netherlands might be an illustrative example. From a scientific 
point of view, criteria are available for defining the maximum amount of annual 
acid deposition per hectare per year that does not cause any harm to the environ-
ment (that is critical loads, see section 1.4). A target load has been derived from 
this purely scientific criterion. This target load takes into account social economi-
cal circumstances. It allows more deposition than the critical load but, compared 
to the current deposition, it requires considerable deposition reduction.14 
Given environmental target loads, the aim is to meet these loads at minimum 
abatement costs. The resulting abatement allocation is said to be cost effective 
with regard to the specified target. This abatement allocation is no longer optimal 
since it is not known whether the environmental criteria determined result in 
maximized social welfare. 
Generally, environmental criteria can be expressed in terms of an emission 
target or in terms of a deposition target. If the environmental target is expressed 
"Numbers for the Netherlands are as follows. The critical load varies from 200 to 500 acid 
equivalents/ha/yr. The deposition in 1989 amounted to 4800 acid equivalents/ha/yr. The long term 
deposition target for the year 2010, the target load, amounts to 1400 acid equivalents/ha/yr. This target 
is based both on environmental and on policy considerations. A deposition of 1400 acid equiva-
lents/ha/yr will prevent the most serious damage to vital forest ecosystems. To realize this target the 
emission reduction in the Netherlands should amount to 70% (compared to 1980 levels). This reduc-
tion percentage is considered to be acceptable. Further emission reduction would result in extremely 
high abatement costs (IMP, 1984). In fact, an implicit cost benefit analysis is applied to derive this 
target load. 
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as a maximum amount of tolerated emission (E*), the cost-effective allocation is 
the solution to the following optimization problem (Tietenberg, 1985): 
Min J?J=J C/rj) 
s.t. ^,(Efrj)<E' 
0<rj<Ej 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
where: 
C/rj): abatement cost function of source j 
rf. emission reduction of source j 
Ef. initial emission of source j 
E*\ emission target 
The conditions for a cost-effective allocation follow from the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions: 
dC/rj)/drj -L>0 j = 1.....J (2.4) 
r} [dC/rj)/drj - L] = 0 j = 1.....J (2.5) 
^(Errj)<E* (2.6) 
L /IJL, (Efrj) - E'J = 0 (2.7) 
0<rj<Ej j = l,...J (2.8) 
L is the Lagrangian multiplier. The economic interpretation of L is as follows: it 
reflects the change in the optimal value of the objective function (2.1) if the 
environmental constraint (2.2) is relaxed by one unit. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
show that in a cost-effective abatement allocation, the marginal costs of abatement 
for each source equal I . ' 5 Consequently, marginal costs for each source are 
equal. In practice, condition (2.8) automatically follows from the abatement cost 
functions. The emission reduction is always less than the current emissions. 
If the environmental target is expressed in a deposition target and if emissions 
of different sources do not affect receptors equally, as in the acid rain problem, 
1 5This holds for those sources that reduce emissions, for other sources (dCj/drj > L) reduction will 
be zero. 
Theoretical principles for acid rain policy 25 
the optimization problem has to be reformulated. It is assumed that the relation 
between emissions and deposition is linear (Tietenberg, 1985): 
Min C/rj) (2.9) 
s.t. J%.j arfEj-rj) <<$ v / (2.10) 
0<rj<Ej (2.11) 
where: 
<£;. deposition target at receptor i 
a,/. a transport coefficient which translates the emission of source j to 
deposition at receptor i. 
The Kuhn Tucker conditions of this optimization problem are: 
dC/rj)/drj - Y.U afi, >0 j = J (2.12) 
rj [dC/rJ/drj - tfw atJLJ = 0 j = 1,...,J (2.13) 
VMaJErT}<<ti i = l / (2.14) 
L, [E^, atj (Efrj) - ctj = 0 i = /,...,/ (2.15) 
0<rj<Ej j = l J (2.16) 
According to these conditions, abatement is cost effective if the marginal costs of 
emission reduction for each source equal the weighted sum of the shadow prices 
(LJ for each receptor. Weights are the transfer coefficients from source j to the 
affected receptor i. The shadow price of a receptor reflects the marginal costs of a 
change in the deposition target for that receptor. 
A final remark considering the use of environmental standards relates to the 
issue of valuing environmental damages. Although valuing environmental damage 
is avoided in the environmental criteria approach, costs and benefits are implicitly 
balanced by policy makers in establishing environmental criteria, since in the 
establishment of these criteria, considerations on costs to reach the criteria play a 
role in the establishment. Criteria are set so that the resulting environmental 
damage is limited, while abatement costs are not excessive. 
Theoretically, using environmental criteria implies a special functional form of 
the damage function. One might regard these criteria as the upper limit for 
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allowed pollution. Translating this into a damage function suggests that as long as 
the environmental standard is not violated, the environmental damage equals zero 
whereas, if the standard is exceeded, the damage is infinite. This suggests that 
there is little damage associated with introducing pollution activities into previ-
ously clean areas as long as pollution levels do not exceed the standard. Accord-
ingly, in terms of an optimization problem, it holds that if a particular pollution 
constraint is not binding, the implied cost of a marginal environmental degrada-
tion is zero (see e.g. McGartland and Oates, 1985). 
2.3 International dimension: cooperation versus non-cooperation 
2.3.1 Cooperation 
As I explained in section 2.2, according to the neo-classical theory, abatement of 
emission is optimal if marginal abatement costs equal marginal benefits of 
emission abatement. However, acidifying pollutants are transported via the 
atmosphere to other countries in substantial measure (see section 1.3). 
A main distinction can be made for transboundary externalities between 
unilateral and reciprocal externalities (see e.g. Maler, 1990, Helm and Pearce, 
1990). A unilateral externality exists if country A affects country B, but country B 
does not affect country A. A classical example of a unilateral externality is the 
pollution of a river in which a downstream country suffers from the pollution 
caused by the upstream country. A reciprocal externality exists if a group of 
countries are at the same time the source and the victim of pollution. Generally, 
acid rain in Europe can be classified as a reciprocal external effect. Because of the 
transboundary transport of emission, emission abatement of one country can 
benefit other countries. This results in a discrepancy between national benefits of 
emission abatement and total benefits of emission abatement. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
this discrepancy and the consequences for optimal emission abatement. 
In Figure 2.1 marginal abatement costs (MC) are assumed to increase as emiss-
ion abates whereas marginal benefits are assumed to decrease as emission abates. 
Marginal national benefits (MBj) are defined as: MB} = aM MBC. In this equation 
MBj is the marginal benefit to a country whereas MBC is the total marginal benefit 
for all countries. The transfer coefficient aa represents the relative contribution of 
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Marginal Costs 
Marginal Benefits 
MBI 
MC 
* Emission 
Figure 2.1 Optimal emission abatement 
the emission of country j to its national deposition. The total marginal benefits 
(MBJ of emission abatement by country j are the sum of marginal benefits at all 
receptor countries: MBC = ai} MB}. The number of affected countries is I. If a 
country only takes national benefits resulting from emission abatement into 
account, the optimal level of emission abatement is represented by E*. This 
emission level is characterized by equalized marginal abatement costs and 
marginal national benefits. If countries take all damage caused both at home and 
abroad into account, the optimal emission abatement level results from the 
intersection of the marginal cost function (MC) and the total marginal benefit 
function (MBJ. In Figure 2.1 this is at E*c. Obviously, if countries internalize the 
benefits of emission reduction abroad, the optimum level of emission abatement is 
higher than national benefits only. 
Full cooperation in emission abatement, which implies minimizing total 
abatement and damage costs for all European countries collectively, results in 
optimal European emission abatement. However, although full cooperation results 
in minimized European costs, individual countries may not act accordingly. This 
can be explained by using the concept of the 'prisoners' dilemma' (see e.g. 
Folmer and Musu, 1992; Maler, 1991). Consider two countries A and B both 
emitting acidifying emissions. The emissions are transboundary: acid deposition in 
country A partly originate in country B and vice versa. Both countries may or 
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may not decide to cooperate in emission abatement. In this context, cooperation 
means that both countries take the damage caused in the neighbouring country 
into account. Cooperation results for both countries in an advantage compared to a 
situation in which countries do not cooperate. However, if country A (B) internal-
izes the damage done in the neighbouring country but country B (A) does not, 
then country B (A) has an advantage over country A (B). These results are 
summarized in the pay-off matrix in Figure 2.2. The numbers in this matrix 
represent the Active net benefits of emission abatement in country A and B for 
both strategies C and NC. The letter C stands for cooperation, indicating that a 
country takes the damage caused in the neighbouring country into account. The 
letters NC stand for non-cooperation, indicating that a country only takes its 
national damage into account. If both countries choose to cooperate, they both 
have a net benefit of 6. If one of the countries follows a cooperative strategy and 
the other does not, then the latter has an advantage as it benefits from the 
emission reduction in the neighbouring country, whereas it has fewer abatement 
costs. In this example, as presented in Figure 2.2, the benefits of cooperation are 
equally distributed between the two countries. In the real world, however, the 
benefits of cooperation will be very unequally distributed and can even be 
negative for some countries. A model study on acid rain in Europe by Maler 
(1989) indicates that the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain would loose from 
participating in a full cooperative abatement strategy. 
In the absence of a binding agreement, both countries will decide not to cooper-
ate. If country A follows strategy C, then country B will follow strategy NC, as 
this maximizes the net benefits of country B. If country A follows strategy NC, 
then country B will follow strategy NC too, as this maximizes the net benefits of 
country B. Likewise, country A will always follow strategy NC, independent of 
the strategy choice of country B, as strategy NC maximizes the net benefits of 
country A. This analysis illustrates that individual rationality hampers cooperation. 
Each country has an incentive to free wheel on the abatement efforts of other 
countries. If countries do not cooperate, the optimal international abatement 
allocation will not be reached. Instead, a country will abate its emissions so that, 
given the emissions reductions of the other countries, its deposition target is 
fulfilled exactly. 
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Although the theoretical arguments of the prisoners' dilemma indicate that 
individual rationalism does not result in cooperation, in practice, countries do 
cooperate in the abatement of environmental pollution. For example, international 
agreements exist for the abatement of CFCs (Montreal Protocol), of NO x (Sofia 
Protocol) and of SOz (Helsinki and Oslo Protocol). However, international 
agreement does not automatically result in optimal emission abatement. 
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Figure 2.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma 
Unlike the solution to the prisoners' dilemma, countries may have several 
reasons for cooperating. One reason is that in the real world the game is played 
repeatedly. This opens up the opportunity for punishing countries that do not 
cooperate. The punishment consists of increases in the emission of cooperating 
countries to increase the environmental damage in the non-cooperating countries 
(Maler, 1991). This threat provides an incentive for cooperation. Another reason 
is the occurrence of so-called interconnected games (Folmer et al., 1993). This 
term refers to a situation in which countries are involved in both environmental 
interdependencies and, for example, trade interdependencies. These linked inter-
dependencies provide the opportunity for imposing sanctions, thus providing coun-
tries with an incentive to cooperate. A final reason to cooperate is the opportunity 
of introducing side payments. This opens up the chance for countries that benefit 
from cooperation to compensate countries that are disadvantaged by cooperation. 
If these countries are compensated for their losses they may agree to follow a 
cooperative strategy. 
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Maler (1990) studied non-cooperation in the context of the acid rain problem. In 
a non-cooperative setting, each country tries to minimize its present value of 
future abatement costs and damage costs. Maler (1990) indicates that there is a 
Nash (non-cooperative) equilibrium whereby emissions will, in the long run, 
approach the levels that are compatible with the deposition target, for example 
critical loads. This conclusion is based on the assumption that each country 
formulates an abatement policy that it will follow for ever. That is, countries 
receive no new information on the emission abatement of other countries or on 
the deposition in their own country. However, this is a rather unrealistic assump-
tion. It is more realistic to assume that countries will adjust their emissions 
according to the information available on deposition levels. In this case, Maler 
(1990) indicates that if side payments are allowed to compensate countries that 
would lose from cooperation, an equilibrium exists that corresponds to countries 
choosing cooperating strategies. In the long run, this cooperation results in 
emissions that are in accordance with critical loads. In conclusion, if it is assumed 
that the damage depends on the stock of emission, both the non-cooperative and 
the cooperative abatement strategy result in emissions that are compatible with 
critical loads. However, Maler indicates that in the cooperative strategy the 
convergence towards the critical load emission level is faster and the resulting 
stock of sulphur is smaller (Maler, 1990). It is worth noting that side payments 
are required for reaching this cooperative strategy. But formal cooperation is not 
necessary as long as each country aims at critical loads. In a special case, the 
Nash non-cooperative solution coincides with the cost effective solution. This 
depends on the shape of the marginal damage function underlying these models. If 
it is assumed that the marginal damage costs is infinite for depositions exceeding 
the critical load and zero below that load, then the cost- effective solution 
coincides with the Nash non-cooperative solution (Maler, 1990). 
By assuming that environmental damage is a function of the cumulated deposi-
tions, an economic basis is provided for using critical loads. If it is assumed that 
actual environmental damage depends on the cumulated depositions, it is possible 
to show that along the optimal path, the deposition will converge to the critical 
load. In other words, in the long run, countries should aim at emissions that 
correspond to deposition levels not exceeding the critical load. This means that 
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there is an economic basis for using critical loads as a foundation for international 
agreements (Maler, 1991). 
Barrett (1990; 1991) demonstrated that if both the marginal damage function 
and the marginal abatement cost function have a steep slope, then there is an 
urgent need for international cooperation in pollution control. Although the 
framework developed by Barrett is not specifically applicable to acidification, and 
makes some rough simplifications on the real world, it is very suitable for illustra-
ting the issue of cooperation in international pollution control. Barrett considered 
mondial environmental pollution. He assumed a world with i = 1, .... N identical 
countries, emitting the same amount of pollution. All N countries have identical 
benefit functions. The benefit function of a country i is given by: 
B/R) = bfaR - R2 / 2N] (2.17) 
where: 
B,(R) : abatement benefit of country i 
R : global abatement 
N : number of countries 
a, b : positive parameters 
Parameter a can be interpreted as the amount of pollution in absence of abate-
ment. Parameter b is the slope of the global benefit function. Each country's 
abatement costs depend on its own abatement. The abatement-cost function of a 
country i is given by: 
C,(ri)=cr2/2 (2.18) 
where: 
r, : abatement of country i 
c : parameter representing the slope of the abatement cost curve 
The full cooperative solution aims at maximizing global social welfare. As 
indicated and explained in Figure 2.1, the social optimum occurs if each country's 
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marginal abatement costs equal the global marginal benefit. The full cooperative 
abatement levels are: 
In the non-cooperative solution, countries aim at equalizing national social 
welfare. The national optimum will occur if a country equalizes its marginal 
abatement costs to the national marginal benefit. The non-cooperative abatement 
levels are: 
The mathematical difference between global net benefits for the cooperative and 
non-cooperative levels defines the potential gains of cooperation. The cooperative 
solution demands greater abatement but gives to every country a greater net 
benefit. For a given size of N, the difference between Rc and Rnc can be shown to 
depend on the slopes of the marginal abatement benefit and cost curves (parame-
ters b and c). The difference will tend to be small, indicating that the need to 
cooperate is less urgent when the ratio c/b is either 'large' or 'small' (Barrett, 
1990). Pollution that does not cause very large damage but is very costly to 
control, and pollution that is very hazardous but very cheap to control do not 
cause problems. For the former, even cooperation will not call for large abatement 
levels. For the latter, a non-cooperative strategy will result in substantial abate-
ment. Cooperation is most needed if the marginal abatement-cost curve and the 
marginal benefit curve are both steep or both flat; i.e. damaging pollutants that are 
costly to control, and pollutants not causing serious damage that are inexpensive 
to control. Obviously, the former type of pollution causes the greatest concern as 
the cost of failing to cooperate in this case is very high (Barrett, 1990). Basing his 
conclusions on model simulations with large N and varying values for the 
parameters b and c, Barrett stated that it is difficult to reach an agreement if b 
and c are both large; i.e. if the need to cooperate is substantial. 
The situation for acidification can be typified as follows. The costs of abatement 
are relatively small (as percentage of GDP) whereas the benefits of abatement are 
Rc = aN2 / (N + (c/b)) rc = aN / (N + (c/b)) (2.19) 
R„c = aN/(l+ (c/b)) r„c = a/(l + (c/b)) (2.20) 
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substantial. In accordance with Barrett's analysis, it was not very difficult to reach 
agreement on international cooperation. Particularly at first, the agreement on 
cooperation was a confirmation of already planned national emission reductions. 
2.3.2 Full cooperation with side payments 
In the preceding section, I outlined the need for cooperation on pollution control, 
and the related difficulties. To encourage countries to participate in a cooperative 
emission reduction policy, financial incentives may be introduced. As the benefits 
of full cooperation can be very unevenly distributed among countries or even be 
negative, some countries might not be willing to sign an agreement on interna-
tional pollution control. To increase the number of signatories of an agreement, it 
might be necessary to introduce side payments. By reallocating the benefits of 
cooperation by means of side payments, both signatories and intended non-
cooperators might be better off. Signatories want non-cooperators to sign the 
agreement because this increases their net benefits, even if they have to pay 
compensation. For non-cooperators, receiving of compensation makes signing an 
agreement beneficial. 
Several criteria are available for introducing a system of side payments to 
reallocate the benefits of cooperation. For example, side payments can be based 
on the principle 'the victim pays'. This principle assumes that the contribution of 
a country to global abatement costs is based on the deposition in that country in a 
base year. Next to this, different kinds of shared responsibility are conceivable as 
principles for side payments. For instance, both the victim and the polluting 
country could pay an equal share of the global abatement costs or countries could 
contribute to the abatement costs according their level of economic development. 
Klaassen and Jansen (1989) studied the consequences of four cost distribution 
criteria and compared the results with the reduction plans of several countries for 
the year 2000. 1 6 The criteria considered were: (i) the civil liability principle; (ii) 
the polluter pays principle; (iii) the victim pays principle and (iv) the equally 
shared responsibility principle. It was assumed that countries prefer a criterion for 
, 6 The study is based on the efficient S 0 2 abatement allocation in Europe given predetermined 
target loads. The abatement costs are based on the RAINS model. 
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side payments if this results in fewer abatement costs and a lower deposition level 
compared to their current reduction plans. If the cost sharing scheme results in 
higher costs and no deposition reduction, countries will resist such a scheme. It 
appears that there is no one criterion that is preferred by all the countries. Klaass-
en and Jansen (1989) argued that agreement on an acceptable criterion for side 
payments is partly hampered by the fact that realizing the target loads implies 
high abatement costs. If an exceedance of these targets is allowed at some 
receptors, abatement costs are substantially reduced. 
Bergman et al. (1992) developed a system of side payments that, in contrast to 
the systems described above, is agreeable to all countries and consequently results 
in full cooperation. According to this system, countries contribute to the global 
abatement costs that correspond to their relative benefit of cooperation. Firstly, the 
minimum abatement costs (C,) of a country i are calculated in order to realize a 
deposition target (d*). This calculation assumes that countries act independently of 
each other. However, the abatement measures necessary to achieve d' at minimum 
costs can be taken both at home and abroad. The total costs to realize d* in each 
country i amount to C,. Secondly, to realize d', the minimum abatement costs 
(C*) are calculated assuming that countries do cooperate. The total costs assuming 
cooperation amount to C*. Since cooperation results in cost efficiency, these 
total costs are lower than ~£i C,. According to the side payment scheme, the 
contribution of each country to the total abatement costs (the fund) depends on C„ 
namely aC„ where a equals C* / C,. The parameter a is the same for all 
countries. Given this side payment scheme the benefit of cooperation compared to 
non-cooperation, amounts to (l-a)C," The amount collected, «C,, can be 
redistributed among the countries to bear part of the abatement costs of the 
countries. If each country receives C*, namely the abatement costs under cooper-
ation, the amount collected equals the payment, since aC, = C*. The net 
contribution of each country to the abatement costs amounts then to: aC, - C*. 
Obviously, countries that abate a relatively large amount of emission under 
cooperation, thus causing high abatement costs receive a substantial compensation. 
This makes it attractive for them to participate in the cooperative abatement 
'As l i C, exceeds % C', a is smaller than 1. 
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scheme. These countries are net receivers. Countries that are not required to abate 
a large amount of emission are net payers as for these countries aC, exceeds C*. 
However, cooperation is attractive for these countries as unilateral abatement of 
emission would be more expensive (Bergman et al., 1992). 
2.3.3 Uniform emission reduction 
Cooperative emission reduction can take place in different forms. This section 
discusses uniform emission reduction as it has been applied in S0 2 and NO x 
emission reduction protocols, and its implications are illustrated. 
An international emission reduction scheme based on uniform emission reduc-
tion implies that all countries have to reduce their emissions with an equal 
percentage, given a certain base year. For example, the Helsinki Protocol on S0 2 
reduction aimed at an equal percentage reduction of 30% compared to the 
emission levels in 1980, to be reached in 1993. A benefit of an equal percentage 
approach is that it seems to imply equity for all the countries concerned. As a 
result, this supposed equity will not disturb the differences in production possibil-
ities and costs. Given this equity, countries are more inclined to participate in a 
cooperative abatement scheme. However, this equity only appears to be real. The 
costs and benefits of an equal reduction scheme can vary substantially among 
countries. Costs may differ because of differences in energy use patterns and 
because of differences in implemented reduction measures in the past. The 
benefits of emission reduction differ between countries as a result of differences 
in the initial deposition level and the deposition percentage caused abroad. 
A main disadvantage of an agreement based on uniform emission reduction is 
that it does not result in cost effective emission abatement (Hoel, 1992). Since 
uniform emission reduction does not take the differences in marginal abatement 
costs among countries into account, an equal amount of emission could be abated 
at lower costs. Saving in costs will be achieved if there is a reallocation of 
emission reduction measures so that countries facing low marginal abatement costs 
increase their emission reduction, and countries facing high marginal abatement 
costs decrease their emission reduction. However, in the case of non-uniformly 
mixing pollutants, the reallocation of reduction measures influences the deposition 
pattern. It is possible that deposition will increase in some countries compared to 
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the uniform emission reduction, and this will cause the countries concerned to 
resist (von Weizsäker and Welsch, 1991). Another disadvantage of an equal 
reduction abatement scheme is that such a scheme is not attractive enough for all 
countries to participate. This mainly holds for countries not suffering from 
substantial imports of emission and facing high marginal abatement costs (Hoel, 
1992). Finally, a disadvantage of a uniform emission reduction agreement is the 
lack of an incentive for increasing emission reductions if the agreed uniform 
reduction has been implemented. In conclusion, a uniform emission reduction may 
look attractive because of its simplicity and its putative equity. However, for 
efficiency reasons this approach is not to be preferred. 
2.4 Policy instruments for controlling acid rain 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Having discussed several approaches for emission abatement allocation in the 
previous section, in this section I want to raise the central issue of which environ-
mental policy instruments policy makers can use to reach a desired emission 
abatement allocation. Environmental policy instruments aim at influencing the 
decisions of economic agents in an environmentally sound direction. Several kinds 
of instruments are available for environmental policy. In general three are 
distinguished: (I) regulatory instruments, (II) economic instruments and (III) 
instruments aiming at moral persuasion. Regulatory instruments aim at directly 
influencing polluters' behaviour, e.g. by setting standards, by regulating processes, 
or by abandoning or limiting discharges. Economic instruments aim at influencing 
decision making indirectly by means of financial incentives. Instruments of moral 
persuasion aim at increasing awareness of environmental problems in order to 
stimulate consideration of the environmental consequences of individual behav-
iour. In fact, this category of instruments aims at influencing the preferences of 
economic agents. 
The choice of instruments can take several criteria into account. Summarizing, 
the main criteria are: economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, incentives, 
flexibility, simple mode of operation, cost of implementation, integration in 
sectoral policies, distributional effects, political acceptability, and conformity with 
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international agreements (see e.g. Bohm and Russell, 1985, Siebert, 1987, 
Opschoor and Vos, 1989, Bovenberg etal., 1991, Barde, 1995). In the past 
environmental policy was, to a large extent, based on direct controls, where each 
polluter had to abide by rales that specified the allowable levels of pollution 
and/or abatement technology to be used (see e.g. Bohm and Russell, 1985, 
Meister, 1990). However, economists stressed that substantial cost savings would 
be achieved if economic instruments were to be introduced. In the next sections 
the advantages and disadvantages of different environmental policy instruments 
are reviewed. 
2.4.2 Regulatory Instruments 
Regulatory instruments directly influence the behaviour of economic agents. 
Regulation can take different forms. First, the amount of pollutant can be regu-
lated. Regulation can prescribe the maximum quantity of total allowed emissions, 
or can force a reduction of a certain amount of emission in absolute or relative 
quantities. Second, specific technology standards in abatement or production can 
be required by regulation. Third, product norms may define the quantity of 
pollutants which are contained in goods. 
Regulatory instruments are characterized by inflexibility. Polluters are forced to 
comply with the regulation. Within the category of regulation, performance 
standards are more flexible than technology standards, because performance stan-
dards allow the polluter free choice in how to fulfil these standards. The main 
advantage of regulation is that, if the instrument is properly used, the environ-
mental effect is certain. The impact on emissions is known in advance. This 
makes regulatory instruments very attractive. There are other arguments in favour 
of regulation. There is already a long standing experience with regulation in other 
fields of public concern. Regulation may provide an effective means of preventing 
hazards an irreversible effects (Barde, 1995). Regulation has no direct financial 
consequences for the government, and firms seem to prefer regulation to econ-
omic instruments (Bohm and Russell, 1985). 
A main disadvantage of regulatory instruments, however, is that in general they 
are not cost effective. This can be easily clarified by the example where different 
polluters with the same environmental effect per unit of pollutant discharge have 
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different marginal abatement costs for the performance standard assigned to them. 
Consequently, the environmental target is not reached at minimum abatement 
costs (see e.g. van Ierland, 1993). Only if marginal abatement costs are equalized 
for all polluters is.emission reduction cost effective. Another drawback of regula-
tion is that standards do not reflect a scarcity price of environmental goods 
(Siebert, 1987). Third, a drawback of regulating instruments is that they do not 
provide incentives to develop and adapt new abatement technologies. Finally, a 
drawback of regulations is that they may too easily be subject to bargaining and 
negotiations between public authorities and the private sector (Barde, 1995) 
2.4.3 Economic instruments 
Economic instruments aim at influencing the decision making of economic agents 
by offering financial incentives. Financial incentives can take different forms. In 
this section the economic instruments discussed are restricted to charges, subsidies 
and tradeable emission permits, as these are the key policy instruments.18 
Charges 
According to the neo-classical theory, applying policy instruments to control 
pollution should be aimed at reaching the optimum pollution level where social 
welfare is maximized. This optimum level can be reached by a Pigouvian tax, 
which must be equal to the marginal social damage in the Pareto optimal alloca-
tion. To reach the optimum pollution level, a unit tax must be attached directly to 
the polluting activity. However, as I explained in section 2.2.1, it is not possible 
to define this optimum without adequate knowledge of the monetary damage 
caused by pollution. One alternative in the absence of a measurable optimum is to 
determine policy targets for environmental quality (see section 2.2.3). 
Emission charges can be applied to reach these desired targets. Although 
charges do not result in optimal control levels anymore, they do result in the 
lowest cost method for achieving a desired reduction in total emission (Baumol 
and Oates, 1988). A simple example may clarify this. Assume environmental 
, 8For a complete overview of economic instruments see e.g. Bohm and Russell (1985) or Opschoor 
and Vos (1989). 
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policy aims at reducing sulphur dioxide emissions by 30% (performance stan-
dard). A possible way to achieve this goal is to require each source to reduce 
emission by 30%. However, if the marginal costs of reduction for some sources 
are much higher than for other sources, emission reduction will be much cheaper 
if sources with low marginal costs reduced more emission than sources with high 
marginal costs. In response to a tax, a cost-minimizing source will reduce its 
emission until the marginal cost of reduction is equal to the tax. Consequently, 
sources with low marginal costs will reduce more emission than sources with high 
marginal costs. A tax placed on emission at a level which results in a reduction of 
30% would automatically result in the lowest cost solution (Baumol and Oates, 
1988). This lowest cost feature is an attractive property of charges. 
Another advantage concerns dynamic aspects. Charges provide a continuous 
incentive to search for the adoption of new environment-saving technology. Such 
technology results in lower emissions, which, in the long run means a saving in 
cost through a lower tax. Nevertheless, charges have some serious drawbacks as 
well. Although they result in the lowest cost solution from a polluter's point of 
view, total costs for emission sources might be higher than the costs of regulation 
because of them. By using charges, the total costs for the polluter consist of the 
control costs plus the tax which has to be paid on residual emission, whereas 
regulation only results in control costs. However, from the point of view of 
society, the charge is a transfer payment. 
Another important difficulty of the use of charges is that the effect is uncertain. 
It is difficult to predict accurately at what level a charge has to be introduced in 
order to bring about a certain emission reduction. The environmental authority has 
no direct control over the quantity of emissions. Moreover it is doubtful whether 
efficient charges will ever be found. Inefficient charges result in additional costs 
(Bohm and Russell, 1985). A third drawback to the use of charges is that taxes 
have to be constantly adjusted because of economic growth and inflation. Inflation 
results in a lower real charge. In order to effect a similar emission reduction, the 
nominal charge has to be raised. At the same time, charges can add to inflation. 
Finally, in certain circumstances a charge might not be the most adequate 
instrument. Environmental problems do not always develop smoothly and gradual-
ly. The uncertainty associated with environmental conditions means that short 
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term adaptations might be necessary. Under the assumption that tax reform is a 
difficult and slow process, flexible direct controls are a main additional instrument 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
An argument sometimes raised against the introduction of charges is that, 
generally speaking, charges distort. Charges alter relative prices and consequently 
change the allocation of resources, causing excess burden. According to traditional 
welfare theory, fiscal policy should generally aim at influencing allocation as little 
as possible. However, as the aim of charging pollution is just to change resource 
allocation, a distortion in allocation is justified. A distortion (e.g. pollution) can 
be improved by adding distortions of the right kind (i.e. the charge) (see e.g. 
Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984; Boadway and Bruce, 1984). 
Subsidies 
The opposite of charges are subsidies. A subsidy per unit of emission reduction 
could establish the same incentive as a charge of the same magnitude per unit 
pollution discharge. Like charges, subsidies result in cost-effective emission abate-
ment, and provide an incentive to search for and implement new abatement 
technologies. The disadvantages of charges - uncertainty, sensitivity to inflation 
and economic growth - hold for subsidies as well. However, there are some main 
asymmetries between subsidies and charges. The first is the different implication 
for the profitability of production in a polluting industry. A subsidy increases 
profits whereas charges decrease them. Another asymmetry is that subsidies may 
cause an increase in the aggregated supply. Thirdly, subsidies may induce a firm 
to begin polluting more than it would otherwise have done, in order to qualify for 
a larger subsidy. Another issue is that, unlike charges, subsidies do not agree with 
the 'polluter pays' principle. For these reasons, subsidies are not a fully satisfac-
tory alternative to emission charges. 
Tradeable emission permits 
Tradeable emission permits are environmental quotas that, once initially distrib-
uted can be traded between the polluters. An emission permit gives the right to 
emit one unit of a pollutant. Tradeable permits emerged from Coase's work 
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(1960) as tradeable permits for pollution problems institutionalizes property rights 
in an artificial market. 
A system of tradeable pollution permits operates as follows. In order to emit a 
certain amount of pollution, a source is obliged to possess the appropriate number 
of permits. The environmental authority distributes a number of pollution permits 
according to the environmental standard agreed upon. Because of the tradeability 
of permits, a permit market develops and a market clearing price emerges. Cost 
minimizing polluters will buy permits as long as the marginal control costs exceed 
the price of permits. They will sell permits as long as the permit price exceeds 
marginal control costs. Consequently, like charges, tradeable pollution permits 
result in equalizing marginal control costs among sources. Equalized marginal 
costs is the first order condition for the lowest cost allocation of permits among 
sources (Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
According to Bohm and Russel (1985), tradeable pollution permits amount to a 
dual between emission charges: emission quantities instead of prices are set by the 
environmental authority, and prices instead of discharge result from the free 
choices of those subject to the system. In contrast to pollution charges, because of 
the ceiling set on pollution by a system of tradeable pollution permits, a maxi-
mum pollution level is guaranteed. This certainty is the main benefit of tradeable 
pollution permits over charges. Another benefit compared to charges is that 
economic growth and inflation do not cause complications. Adjustments in the 
permit price will take place automatically without an increase in pollution 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988; Howe, 1994). 
A third benefit discussed in the literature concerns costs. As I made clear in the 
previous section, charges might imply high costs on polluters. Consequently, 
tradeable pollution permits might be freely initially distributed (Baumol and Oa-
tes, 1988). However, free initial distribution has its drawbacks as well. First, there 
is the ethical question of whether to give polluters the right to pollute at zero 
costs. Moreover, it puts 'new' polluters at a disadvantage. Second, the initial 
distribution probably does not coincide with the lowest cost allocation. In order to 
reach this emission, sources have to trade pollution permits. Trading permits 
implies transaction costs. If pollution permits are initially auctioned, tradeable 
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permits have no cost advantage over charges. In conclusion, tradeable pollution 
permits may have a potential cost advantage over charges. 
In conclusion, both emission charges and tradeable emission permits result in 
cost-effective emission abatement. The crucial difference is that, from a policy 
point of view, permits give the environmental authority direct control over the 
emissions.19 
2.4.4 Other instruments 
Finally, some attention should be paid to a category of instruments which are 
neither economic instruments nor regulatory instruments. This category consists of 
the instruments education, propaganda and negotiation and is aimed at 
internalizing environmental awareness and responsibility (Opschoor and Vos, 
1989). These instruments are rather important in environmental policy. Increased 
consciousness of environmental problems might stimulate producer and consumer 
decision making in an environmentally sound direction. Another instrument that 
needs to be mentioned is that of voluntary agreements. These can be defined as 
deals between government and industry whereby an industry or a group of 
individual corporations agrees to reach certain environmental objectives within a 
defined time frame. The main advantage of this instrument is the flexibility, 
transparency and incentive it gives to industry. However, there is also a risk that 
voluntary agreements will reduce government control over industry (Barde, 1995). 
2.4.5 Instruments compared for non-uniformly mixing pollutants 
In the previous sections I outlined the advantages and disadvantages of different 
instruments. The most promising instruments are charges and tradeable emission 
permits. However, no attention has yet been paid to the specific circumstances in 
which these instruments are applied to non-uniformly mixing pollutants. As shown 
in section 2.2, cost effective emission abatement of non-uniformly mixing polluta-
nts is not characterized by equalized marginal abatement costs. Consequently, a 
uniform effluent charge is no longer an appropriate instrument. If charges are 
'Comparative characteristics are schematically summarized in Howe (1994). 
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applied, they have to be differentiated among sources. A system of tradeable 
emission permits also needs adapting if it is to take emission location into 
account. 
The established idea concerning the use of emission charges in the case of 
multiple receptors is that, to set emission charges which result in cost-effective 
emission abatement, the environmental authority has to know transfer coefficients 
and abatement costs of all sources (e.g. Bohm and Russel, 1985). This idea has 
been contradicted by Ermoliev et al. (1996). In their study they have shown that 
in the case of multiple receptors, by using an adjustment mechanism, the environ-
mental agency is able to implement charges step by step which results in cost 
effective emission abatement, without having information on abatement costs. This 
mechanism uses the difference between the actual deposition level and the target 
deposition level as a signal for the adjustment of emission charges (Ermoliev et 
al., 1996). 
If the environmental agency wants to set the appropriate emission charge at 
once, it needs to know the transfer coefficients and abatement costs of all sources 
in order to determine the shadow price of each receptor (k). These shadow prices 
follow from the solution of the optimization problem: 
A vector of shadow prices at receptors which corresponds with the vector of 
cost effective emission standards does exist (Tietenberg, 1978). The linear 
structure of the pollution transport equations allows to calculate a vector of 
emission charges. The emission charge for a source j can be written as a function 
of transfer coefficients and the shadow prices X„ (Ermoliev et al., 1996): 
Uj = ajjXj + a2jK2+...+a,jK, (2-24) 
However, if an adjustment mechanism is introduced, this prerequisite no longer 
applies. The adjustment mechanism uses a separation of the optimization problem 
as formulated by equation (2.21)-(2.23). The first stage is that the environmental 
authority, given the information on the discrepancy between actual depositions and 
s.t. 
Min. C/ej) 
X/ afJ ej < d* /=/,...,/ 
ej>0,j=l,...,J 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
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target depositions, has to decide on the initial levels of the emission charges and 
the adjustments of these levels. The second stage is that the individual cost-mini-
mizing polluters choose their emission level, given the emission charge that is 
imposed by the environmental agency. 
To explain the adjustment mechanism the Lagrange function of the optimization 
problem as formulated by equation (2.21) - (2.23) has to be considered (Ermoliev 
et al., 1996): 
L (e,\) = X, C/ej) +Tih(LJejay- d,) 
= l/C/ej) + (L Mj)eJ - I; M 
The Lagrangean L(e,\) has a saddle point: a pair (e',\*) exists so that L(e',\) < 
L(e,\*) < L(e,\"). This is true when C/eJ are convex functions as is usually 
assumed (Ermoliev et al., 1996). Given this assumption, a vector of optimal 
emissions for all sources is achieved by solving the I independent subproblems: 
Min. C/ej) + (Zi Mj)ej, e}>0 (2.25) 
where the values u*j = X, X*, av can be interpreted as optimal charges on emissions 
at sources. The subproblem which has to be solved by each emitter is how to 
minimize its individual costs on emission reduction and emission charges. 
The question now is how the environmental agency can identify X* and u 
without having knowledge of the cost functions of the individual sources. The 
answer is by the use of an adjustment mechanism for emission charges, which 
step by step results in the optimal charges. This adjustment mechanism works as 
follows. First (step k=0), the agency chooses a vector of shadow prices X*, for 
example based on the initial exceedances. Equation (2.25) translates the shadow 
prices X* to emission charges w*. Each polluter will adjust its emission level by 
minimizing total costs: C/ef) + uf ef. Next, the agency observes the deposition 
resulting from the emission levels e* and calculates the difference between actual 
depositions and target depositions. Then in a next step (k+1) the pollution charges 
are adjusted according to the formula: 
X*+/ = Max. {0, X*. + Pk (I, e/a„ - dj} (2.26) 
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According to formula (2.26), X, will increase in a next step if the actual deposition 
exceeds the deposition target. However, if the deposition target exceeds the actual 
emissions, X, will decrease in a following step. Obviously, if the deposition target 
is met, the shadow price will be in accordance with cost effective emission 
abatement and will not have to be adjusted. Ermoliev et al. (1996) have shown 
that (2.26) converges for any sequence of pg, p,... so that pk > 0, £4=0°° 9k ~ °°-
These conditions guarantee a convergence independent of the initial vector of 
shadow prices X". 
Although it has been mathematically proved that it is possible to implement 
emission charges that will result in cost effective emission abatement, in practice, 
without having information on the abatement costs, this system will be very time 
consuming. Countries will resist this method as changing charge rates cause large 
uncertainty. Moreover, since the choice of the step multipliers p^ pp... is based on 
excess concentrations (positive or negative) and not on the calculation of the total 
costs, the adjustment mechanism described does not lead to a monotonic decrease 
of total costs. Another argument against this charge is that the charges will differ 
among countries which can be regarded as injustice. 
A system of tradeable emission permits must also be adapted to make it suitable 
for non-uniformly mixing pollutants. Several alternatives have been developed for 
taking emission location into consideration. One is the use of tradeable deposition 
permits instead of emission permits. A second option is trading emission permits 
in zones, within each of which all emissions can be treated as a single source. A 
third option is the so-called pollution offset systems (Tietenberg, 1985). In this 
thesis I explore the use of tradeable emission permits for non-uniformly mixing 
pollutants further. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed theoretical principles for acid rain policy, and 
have taken several issues have been taken into account. First, economic theory has 
been reviewed, next the need for cooperation has been outlined and finally, the 
choice of instruments has been discussed. 
Neo-classical economic theory focuses on optimal pollution control. The optimal 
control level occurs at the intersection of marginal control costs and marginal 
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benefits of pollution control. At this control level, total welfare for a society is 
maximized. Because of difficulties in establishing the marginal benefits of 
pollution control, it is hard to define an optimal control level in practice. In this 
thesis I follow the environmental criteria approach. This approach abandons the 
aim of an optimal allocation in the sense of achieving maximum welfare. Instead, 
it aims at cost-effective abatement. Once the environmental criteria set by the 
authority have been given, conditions for cost minimization can be derived. As 
this approach is well suited for empirical environmental problems, I have used it 
in this study. 
To achieve cost-effective international emission abatement, cooperation is 
needed. However, Maler (1990) indicated that if dynamics are taken into account, 
i.e., if the damage is assumed to depend upon the accumulated deposition cor-
rected for the assimilative capacity of the environment, then both cooperative and 
non-cooperative emission abatement will result in critical load deposition levels. 
But, cooperative emission abatement converges to critical loads sooner and the 
total damage is smaller. Generally, individual countries do not have incentives to 
cooperate. According to the prisoners' dilemma, individual rationalism hampers 
the reaching of agreements on cooperative pollution control. However, the real 
situation is not as bad as this theory suggest, as there are actually several ways of 
applying sanctions. Moreover, side payments can be introduced to stimulate 
countries to participate in cooperative emission abatement. 
The final question concerns the most suitable policy instrument for international 
emission abatement. For reason of cost effectiveness, economic instruments are to 
be preferred to regulation. Generally, these instruments will bring about an 
abatement allocation that minimizes total abatement costs. They allow more 
flexibility and provide a continuous incentive to search for and adapt new 
abatement technologies. For non-uniformly mixing pollutants systems of emission 
charges and of tradeable emission permits both have to be adapted to take 
emission location into account. This thesis elaborates the use of tradeable emission 
permits. 
3 THEORY OF TRADEABLE EMISSION PERMITS 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I argued that tradeable pollution permits have some attractive 
properties which make them suitable for application in cost-effective emission-
abatement strategies. Having discussed tradeable permit systems in general in the 
previous chapter, in this chapter I examine them more thoroughly. Permit trading 
for non-uniformly mixing pollutants is analysed in particular. The difficulties that 
occur in permit trading for this type of pollutant are shown and the alternatives 
put forward in the literature to solve these are discussed. The theory of tradeable 
emission permits has been well documented by Tietenberg (1985). This theory is 
elaborated on, illustrated and extended by reviewing some empirical studies. 
Several issues on permit trading are dealt with. First a distinction is made 
between emission permits (section 3.2) and deposition permits (section 3.3). An 
emission permit gives the right to emit a unit of pollutant whereas a deposition 
permit gives the right to deposit a unit of pollutant at a certain receptor. 
Montgomery (1972) showed that for both kinds of permits, competitive markets 
result in cost effective abatement. In section 3.3, I argue that a system of 
tradeable deposition permits is, in theory, well suited to non-uniformly mixing 
pollutants. However, as there are important disadvantages to the implementation 
of a system of tradeable deposition permits, several alternative systems of 
tradeable permits for non-uniformly mixing pollutants can be found in the 
literature. These alternatives are discussed in section 3.4. 
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) pointed out the difference between the actual 
trading process and the implicitly assumed trading process as modelled in existing 
empirical studies. It was generally assumed that permit trading is a simultaneous 
process. Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991), however, suggested that permit trading 
in practice is a bilateral and sequential process. I examine this issue of bilateral 
and sequential permit trading in section 3.5. 
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As well as the problem of which permit system to apply, another question that 
arises is the initial allocation of permits. Permits can be sold by auction or they 
can be distributed freely. In the latter case, the question arises of according to 
which principle permits should be distributed. As this thesis is concerned with an 
international environmental pollutant, the distribution of permits is a topic of 
international negotiation. Section 3.6 reviews the topic of the initial allocation of 
permits. 
In the United States, a system of tradeable emission permits for S0 2 emissions 
has already been implemented (see e.g. Peeters, 1992; Chicago Board of Trade, 
1995). Although the structure of environmental authority in the United States 
differs largely from that in Europe, it is of interest to discuss the US permit 
trading system. This is done in section 3.7. Finally, in section 3.8 I draw con-
clusions on permit trading for non-uniformly mixing pollutants. 
3.2 Tradeable emission permits 
An emission permit gives the right to its holder to emit a unit of a pollutant. By 
issuing a certain number of emission permits and subsequently requiring a polluter 
to posses the appropriate number of emission permits according to its emission 
level, authorities are able to control the total amount of emission. If permit 
markets are fully competitive, free trade in emission permits result in a cost-
effective permit allocation among emission sources, provided the aim is to reduce 
the total quantity of emissions. The resulting allocation is characterized by 
emission abatement that meets the pollution target (defined by the total number of 
permits) at minimum abatement cost. 
It is easy to illustrate how this allocation occurs. Initially, a source j is endowed 
with emission permits q°j. Assuming sources aim at minimizing costs, it is 
profitable for a source to sell emission permits so long as the price of emission 
permits exceeds the costs of additional emission abatement. However, if the cost 
of additional emission abatement exceeds the permit price, it is rational to buy 
permits. This can be illustrated mathematically for a source j (Tietenberg, 1985): 
Mm (C/rj) + P(q,rq°j)} 
s.t. rj = Ej - q'j 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
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rj>0 (3.3) 
where: 
C/rj): abatement cost of source j 
ry abatement level of source j 
Ey. initial emission of source j 
q°y. initial allocated emission permits of source j 
q'y. amount of permits of source j after permit trading 
P: permit price 
According to equation (3.1), costs include abatement costs and the costs of buying 
permits or, in the case of selling permits, the benefits of selling. If emissions 
exceed the initial number of issued permits ((Err}) > q°j), a source has to buy 
emission permits or increase emission abatement. As long as the initial number of 
available emission permits exceeds the actual emissions ((Efr}) < q°j), a source is 
able to sell permits or, if possible, decrease emission abatement. The choice 
between additional emission abatement and trading permits depends upon the price 
of the permit and the marginal abatement costs of the source. However, a source 
will only be able to buy permits from another source if the latter's abatement cost 
is less than the price at which permits are sold. Therefore, the source that does the 
cleaning is the one with lower abatement costs. Obviously, the total number of 
permits over all sources j remains constant during trading, that is: Y,j <fj = X/ a'j-
The conditions for a cost-effective allocation for the set of all sources is 
(Tietenberg, 1985): 
If the market for emission permits is fully competitive, then an equilibrium 
price P" will emerge. The equations show that marginal abatement costs will be 
equal to P", and consequently will result in equalized marginal abatement costs 
dC(rj)/drj -P>0 
rj[ dC(rj)/drj - P ] = 0 
r,>0 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
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between polluters, which yields the cost-effective allocation.20 Abatement costs 
increase exponentially if r} approximates Ep therefore q'j is always positive. The 
equilibrium permit price is a function of the total number of permits issued, the 
total initial emissions before any reductions, and the marginal abatement costs of 
emission reduction (Bohm and Larsen, 1994). 
Theoretically, for uniformly mixing emissions like greenhouse gases, tradeable 
emission permits are a suitable instrument for generating a cost-effective emission 
reduction, provided that control costs and transaction costs are not excessive. 
However, this does not hold for emissions that are non-uniformly mixing. For 
these, the damage caused depends on the amount of emission, on the location of 
the emission sources, and on factors of air chemistry and meteorology. For this 
type of emission, a system of tradeable emission permits will not generally auto-
matically result in cost-effective emission abatement. To what extent a tradeable 
emission permit system deviates from the cost-effective allocation for non-
uniformly mixing pollutants depends on the source-receptor matrix, the source's 
abatement costs and the deposition targets. Empirical research can provide insight 
in this matter (Tietenberg, 1995). 
3.3 Tradeable deposition permits 
An obvious alternative to emission permits are deposition permits which take 
into account the location of emissions. A deposition permit gives the holder the 
right to deposit a unit of pollutant at a certain receptor. Authorities are able to 
realize deposition targets by issuing the number of deposition permits for each 
receptor according to its deposition target, and by subsequently requiring sources 
to possess the appropriate number of deposition permits for each receptor affected. 
In this way, both the emission location and emission dispersion are taken into 
account. 
In order to emit a pollutant, a source has to own the appropriate number of 
deposition permits for the receptors it affects. The appropriate number of deposi-
tion permits necessary for source j follows from the transport coefficient aip 
2 0For a buyer it may be that dCj^ydrj > P if ij = 0. In that case, the marginal abatement costs will 
not be equal to P". 
Theory of tradeable emission permits 51 
representing the relative contribution of the emission of source j at the deposition 
at receptor i (see section 1.3). If deposition permits for each receptor are issued, a 
system of tradeable deposition permits results in separate markets for each 
receptor. Consequently, a source affecting several receptors has to operate in a 
number of markets. An individual source that minimizes costs can be represented 
by equations (3.7) - (3.9) (Montgomery, 1972): 
where: 
P,: permit price for receptor i 
q°jf initially allocated deposition permits of source j for receptor i 
q'jf. deposition permits of source j for receptor i after permit trading 
According to equation (3.7), total costs include abatement costs and costs of 
buying permits or, in the case of selling, the benefits of selling permits. A source 
requires permits for all receptors i it affects, which means the costs of permits are 
summed over i. If emissions exceed the initial number of issued permits for a 
receptor, a source either has to buy deposition permits for that receptor or has to 
increase emission abatement. So long as the initial number of available deposition 
permits exceeds the actual emissions, a source is able to sell permits or, if 
possible, decrease emission abatement. Unrestricted trade in deposition permits 
will result in a cost effective deposition permit allocation. This allocation is 
characterized by emissions which meet the deposition targets at minimum 
abatement costs. The allocation which minimizes abatement costs is characterized 
by equations (3.10) - (3.12) (Tietenberg, 1985): 
MmC/r^ + ^Pfq'.-q0^ 
s.t. £ ctj/Ej-rj) < q'p for each i 
rj>0 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
dC/rJ/drj - T,'^, P, atJ > 0 
r/dC/rJ/drj - E' , w P, a,jj = 0 
rj > 0 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
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Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) noted that a deposition permit system has the 
potentially undesirable characteristic that while it controls the deposition target at 
the receptors, it may do so while allowing increases in total emissions. They 
suggested that this increase is politically objectionable.21 
Apart from political considerations, the deposition permit system also has 
practical problems. The difficulty for a source to operate under a deposition 
permit system is sketched in Tietenberg (1985). If a source wants to increase 
emissions, separate permits have to be bought for each affected receptor, in 
different markets. In general, the permit price will differ between receptors, which 
reflects the difficulty of meeting the deposition target at that receptor. In markets 
with few participants, prices may be uncertain. Moreover, the demand for permits 
in a market not only depends on permit prices in that market, but also on prices in 
all other permit markets. This interdependency among markets means that a 
source has to operate simultaneously in all relevant markets, since a source can 
not definitely buy in market A until it knows the price in market B and vice versa 
(Tietenberg, 1985). Although these arguments certainly hold, it is no novelty for 
firms to deal with uncertain prices or with dependency among markets. However, 
in a situation with a large number of receptors, trading becomes quite complicated 
resulting in high transaction costs. Because of these problems related to the 
implementation of a system of tradeable deposition permits, alternative permit 
systems have had to be developed. 
3.4 Alternative permit systems for non-uniformly mixing pollutants 
3.4.1 An overview 
Several alternatives for deposition permit trading that take emission location 
into account are found in the literature. These alternatives range from the relative-
ly simple to the more advanced. Four alternatives are discussed here: (1) emission 
permits, (2) zonal emission permits, (3) a "worst case" approach, and (4) trading 
subject to trading rules. As Tietenberg (1985) indicated the fourth option to be a 
''Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) pointed out in particular that while total emissions are clearly of 
secondary importance in the US Clean Air Act, strategies which allow large aggregate emission 
increases may not be allowed under the current A c t 
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promising one, I examine it in detail in the following section. The first three 
options are discussed in this section. 
Emission permits 
The crudest alternative is simply to ignore spatial complexity and to introduce a 
system of tradeable emission permits (Tietenberg, 1985). As I showed in section 
3.2, such a system will result in equal marginal costs of emission reduction among 
sources. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that deposition targets will not be 
violated. This equal marginal cost component is an advantage of the system since 
equalized marginal costs are a necessary condition for achieving a certain degree 
of required reduction at the lowest cost. However, the degree of required emission 
reduction needed to reach deposition targets cost-effectively is usually not the 
same for all sources, since what is important in determining how much emission 
reduction is needed for non-uniformly mixing pollutants is the location of sources 
and emission permits have no control over this. 
Whether emission permits provide a suitable instrument for pollution control 
depends on the degree of required control component. The degree of emission 
reduction required by emission permits depends on the spatial configuration of 
sources. If a few sources affect a receptor requiring a large deposition reduction, 
these sources will need to control their emissions to a very high degree. This will 
result in high marginal abatement costs. This emission reduction can only be 
realized by issuing a limited number of emission permits. As these cause marginal 
abatement costs to be equalized across all sources, other sources also face high 
marginal costs of control, despite the fact that emissions from these sources may 
have very little impact on the receptors where the greatest environmental improve-
ment is needed (Tietenberg, 1995). In conclusion, if a cluster of sources domi-
nates a receptor, the emission permit system induces additional emission control in 
order to reach deposition targets. In that case, the degree of required control 
dominates the advantage of the equal marginal cost characteristic, causing the 
control costs to be too high with an emission permit system.22 Where there is no 
2 2 It is assumed that policy makers aim at non-violation of deposition targets. Alternatively, issuing 
more emission permits implies lower abatement costs, but will cause a violation of these targets. 
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cluster of sources dominating a vulnerable receptor, the implementation of a 
system of emission permits leads to less overcontrol (Tietenberg, 1995). In this 
latter situation, an emission permit system might be a suitable instrument for non-
uniformly mixing pollutants. 
To judge whether emission permits are, indeed, a suitable instrument there 
needs to be an examination of the practical situation. For Europe, empirical 
research indicates that unrestricted emission trading results in a substantial loss in 
the ecosystem protection (Klaassen, 1995). In the USA, opinions differ on this 
subject. Kete (1992) stated that in the Sulphur Allowance Program in the USA, 
the expected reductions from an unrestricted emission trading system are not 
likely to lead to a worse environmental situation than that of a command and 
control policy. 'Sensitive ecosystems will be protected and improved by reduc-
tions in deposition regardless of which particular sources are controlled, or to 
what specific degree' (Kete, 1992:82). Kete's motivation was as follows. Acid 
rain involves a great number of sources, and emissions are transported long 
distances. Therefore deposits come from many dispersed sources. 'Thus no one 
source, not even the largest and dirtiest of the old power plants in the Ohio River 
Valley, dominates deposition at any northeast or mid-Appalachian region 
receptor.' This view is slightly contradicted and modified by the NAPAP (1991) 
research results. Although emission permit trading is not explicitly modelled, 
preliminary analysis indicates that deposition patterns will change with interstate 
trading. But the importance of geographical differences diminishes as the overall 
reduction goal increases. Three categories can be identified for S0 2 emission 
reductions below the 1980 levels (NAPAP, 1991). 
1. Reduction goals up to 8 million tonnes: different geographical patterns of 
control are potentially important. 
2. Reduction goals between 8 - 1 2 million tonnes: 'transitional'. 
3. Reduction goals above 12 million tonnes: geographical patterns are relatively 
unimportant because virtually all major sources would need to be controlled to 
very low emission levels. 
This classification assumes that very low emission control levels imply an equal 
percentage reduction. Otherwise geographical differences in deposition patterns 
will occur. Kete's view also contradicts with research results of Young and Shaw 
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(1986) who indicated that most sulphur emission reductions should take place 
within a limited number of regions if the aim is to reach deposition targets 
efficiently. On the basis of these research results I conclude that unrestricted 
trading in emission permits will generally not be a suitable instrument for 
controlling non-uniformly mixing emissions. 
Zonal emission permits 
A second alternative for deposition permit trading is zonal emission permit 
trading. In this, the control region is divided into a number of zones. Trading in 
emission permits on a one to one basis is only allowed within one zone, and 
trading permits between zones is prohibited. Creation of zones takes location 
crudely into account. The underlying idea is that sources in one zone are closely 
clustered with more or less the same transfer coefficients. The advantage of zonal 
permit trading is that it is a rather uncomplicated system that prevents the most 
serious damage at vulnerable receptors. However, the implementation of a zonal 
system places a larger burden on the control authority than the implementation of 
a pure emission permits system. The initial zonal allocation of permits is difficult. 
Allocating too much control responsibility to one zone and too little to another 
hampers the achievement of a cost-effective allocation (Tietenberg, 1985). 
Trading permits that are restricted to zones obviously reduce the potential for 
cost savings. As the creation of zones reduces the number of sources that are 
allowed to trade with each other, trade opportunities are restricted. There is 
generally a trade off between the size of the zone (the number of sources) and 
non- violation of deposition targets. Non-violation of deposition targets requires 
small zones, but this consequently decreases cost savings. How sensitive the cost 
penalty is to the size of the market is an empirical question. Some empirical work 
has indicated that substantial savings can be achieved in emissions trading even 
when the trading areas are quite small. The suggestion is that even when small 
zones are necessary, emissions trading may still represent an improvement over 
traditional regulatory policies which do not allow any trading at all (Tietenberg, 
1995). 
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Worst case approach 
The third alternative, the "worst case" approach, involves a simple version of 
tradeable deposition permits. Instead of issuing permits for all receptors, only a 
single receptor deposition-permit market is created. In this all trades are com-
pleted on the basis of their effect on a single "worst case" receptor. Other 
receptors are presumed to benefit indirectly from the emission reduction needed to 
meet the deposition target at this single receptor. The main benefit of this single 
receptor permit market is that transaction complexity is avoided, and as permit 
trading is not restricted, the cost penalty associated with restricted trade opportun-
ities is avoided. Single receptor dominance is a prerequisite in this approach to the 
guaranteeing of non-violation of deposition targets at all receptors. For a single 
receptor dominance to exist, the deposition constraint has to be binding on only 
one receptor in the cost-minimum abatement allocation. If more than one binding 
receptor exists, a single deposition-permit market no longer guarantees compliance 
by these other receptors. Additional emission reduction is needed to achieve non-
violation of deposition targets at these receptors. The amount of excess emission 
reduction needed to assure compliance depends on the proximity of the binding 
receptors to each other (Tietenberg, 1985). 
A second consideration regarding a single receptor permit market put forward 
by Tietenberg (1985) is that locational incentives are established over time. 
Sources tend to be situated at a distance, thus avoiding affecting the "worst case" 
receptor, because at a distance, sources affect this receptor to a smaller degree. 
This means that fewer permits are required to legitimize emissions. Consequently, 
new "worst case" receptors might emerge. However, locational incentives to move 
pollution activities might also have positive aspect if polluting activities are 
relocated so that fewer vulnerable receptors are affected. This consideration raises 
the question of to what extent firms take environmental aspects into account in 
their choice on location. As the cost of environmental policy is only a small 
fraction of total costs related to this choice, locational incentives will not be very 
strong (Komen en Folmer, 1995). A profound discussion on this topic is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
If there is more than one binding receptor, an obvious alternative is to create 
separate permit markets for each of these receptors, thus combining zonal permit 
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trading and a "worst case" type of permit trading. The idea is as follows. Trading 
emission permits is replaced by trading in deposition permits. In each established 
zone, deposition permits for one single "worst case" receptor are traded, it being 
assumed that the other receptors will benefit indirectly from the emission reduc-
tion needed for compliance by the "worst case" receptor. The establishment of 
zones has to be based on the effect sources have on binding receptors. By 
grouping all the sources that affect a "worst case" receptor in one zone, the non-
violation of deposition targets is guaranteed. A difficulty occurs if sources affect 
more than one binding receptor. It is not easily to classify these sources in one 
receptor market while guaranteeing non-violation of deposition targets. Alterna-
tively, these sources could operate in more than one market, but this would 
diminish the attractiveness of the system. As the number of binding receptors 
increase, so the complexity of this system approaches that of the deposition permit 
system where separate permits for each receptor are required. 
Emission trading subject to rules 
The fourth alternative for emission trading in non-uniformly mixing pollutants 
is to subject emission trading to rules regulating deposition. According to Tieten-
berg (1985), the introduction of trading rules is probably the most practical way 
for incorporating source location into permit based pollution control policies. If 
spatial complexity is to be taken into account, trading cannot be allowed to be 
unlimited, but has to meet certain constraints on the exchange of emission 
permits. Trading subject to rules sometimes implies the use of trade ratios in 
permit trading. Several studies applying these kinds of trade restrictions have been 
described in the literature. I discuss trading rules and trading ratios in more detail 
in the next section. 
3.4.2 Trading rules and trading ratios 
Emission trading subject to rules is a hybrid approach that combines certain 
characteristics of both deposition permit trading and emission permit trading. The 
basic idea is to define permits in terms of emissions and allow their sale among 
polluters, though generally not on a one-to-one basis. More specifically, transfers 
of emission permits are subject to the restriction that the transfer does not result 
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in a violation of the deposition targets. This explains the hybrid character of 
emission trading subject to rules. It involves the purchase and sale of emission 
permits, and at the same time, it captures the spirit of a deposition-based system 
because the rate at which permits exchange with one another depends on the 
relative effects of the associated emissions on deposition level at receptors 
(Krupnick et al., 1983). Three trading rules have been suggested to account for 
deposition targets. 
1. The pollution offset (Krupnick et al., 1983). 
2. The non-degradation offset (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1982). 
3. The modified pollution offset (McGartland and Oates, 1985). 
The pollution offset approach allows emission trading so long as deposition 
targets are not violated. The non-degradation offset rule ensures that trading does 
not violate deposition targets and, at the same time, prevents an increase in the 
total amount of emissions. According to the modified pollution offset concept, 
trading in emission permits is allowed so long as both deposition targets and pre-
trade deposition levels are not violated. This approach does not directly control 
the total amount of emissions. The differences between the three pollution offset 
systems can be illustrated mathematically by equations (3.13)-(3.24). All pollution 
offset systems aim at minimizing costs, but the constraints differ. 
Pollution offset system (Krupnick et al., 1983): 
Since the pollution offset system does not put any restriction on permit trading 
except that of the non-violation of deposition targets, the formal statement of this 
system coincides with the definition of cost-effective emission abatement (see 
section 2.2). 
Non-degradation offset system (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1982): 
Mm Cj (rj) 
s.t. iyj=J ay (Efrj) <<f, V / 
Tj>0 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
Min VJ=, Cj 
s.t. £ av e'j < dtit V i 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
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(3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) r>0 
where: 
e°f. pre trade emissions of source j 
e'f. post trade emissions of source j 
Modified pollution offset system (McGartland and Oates, 1985): 
Min E^, q (rj) 
s.t. E av (e'J < Min. {£•„ d°J V i 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
ej>0 
fj > 0 
where: 
ef,: pre-trade deposition at receptor i 
d",: deposition target at receptor i 
The pre-trade deposition at a receptor i equals the summation over j of the 
transfer coefficients and the pre-trade emissions concerned. 
To explain the trade opportunities defined by the three different approaches 
consider Figure 3.1 which is a graph illustrating the different trade rules (Tieten-
berg, 1985). This graph is restricted to two receptors and two emission sources. 
Line Rl shows the emission combinations of source 1 and source 2 which do not 
violate the deposition target at receptor 1. Line R2 shows the emission combinat-
ions of source 1 and source 2 which do not violate the deposition target at 
receptor 2. Point E is the starting point representing the initial distribution of 
emission permits. In the initial permit allocation only the second receptor is 
binding. Given the initial permit allocation, line Rc represents combinations of 
emissions that keep the depositions at receptor 1 at pre-trade level. The 45 degree 
line represents combinations of emissions that hold the total emissions constant by 
construction. Since, after trade allowance, costs are lowered as one moves away 
from the origin in either the horizontal or vertical direction (because less control 
is required), emissions would be represented by a point on the outer edge of the 
appropriate frontier. 
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Emission Source 1 
0 B2 Emission Source 2 
Figure 3.1 Trading Rules (Source: Tietenberg, 1985) 
If source 2 is the first source to sell permits (which implies that source 2 
decreases its emissions) starting from E2, the trade area using the pollution offset 
is represented by area E^EGBO, because neither the deposition target at receptor 1 
nor at receptor 2 may be violated. The pollution offset is the only rule that makes 
trading opportunities contingent to the pre-trade emission situation as Rl and R2 
are only a function of deposition targets and transfer coefficients. If the non-
degradation offset is applied, then the trade area is restricted to E^KBO, because, 
in addition to non-violation of deposition targets, total emissions are not allowed 
to increase, i.e. should remain to the left of and below the 45 degree line. The 
modified pollution offset restricts trade to the area E^AO. This rule allows trade 
only so long as neither deposition targets nor pre-trade deposition levels are 
violated. Therefore emissions should remain to the left of Rc. Both Rc and the 45 
degree line depend on the initial allocation of emission permits of source 1 and 2 
as both lines must pass through point E. This means that the degree to which the 
non-degradation and the modified pollution offset can be expected to diverge from 
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the lowest cost allocation is sensitive to the initial allocation (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1987). 
Obviously, the pollution offset offers the most opportunities for trade, since it 
does not make trade dependent on the pre-trade emission level of the sources. 
Consequently, the pollution offset also offers the most opportunities for cost-
savings, while guaranteeing the achievement of deposition targets. An underlying 
condition for this system to function well is the provision of additional emission 
permits by the environmental agency, provided deposition targets are not violated. 
This latter could cause a free rider problem where polluters may benefit from the 
transactions of others (McGartland, 1988). Consider the hypothetical situation as 
presented in Figure 3.2 where three sources, A, B and C, affect two receptors, 1 
and 2. 
Figure 3.2 Illustration of opportunities to free ride in case of a pollution 
offset system. 
Emissions of source A only affect receptor 1 and emissions of source C only 
affect receptor 2 whereas the emissions of source B affect both receptors 1 and 2. 
If source B sells emission permits to source C, then deposition at receptor 1 will 
always be reduced below the target. This provides source A with the opportunity 
to free ride, since it allows source A to increase emissions at no cost until the 
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deposition at receptor 1 equals the target. Obviously, a free riding option may also 
exists for source A if receptor 1 is initially not binding.23 
The modified pollution offset system excludes free riding initially since pre-
trade deposition levels may not be violated in this system. However, after some 
trading has been carried out, the deposition at some receptors may be below the 
redefined targets. This would create an opportunity for free riding. Only the non-
degradation offset will rule out free riding. It must be remembered that under this 
offset system, deposition targets may not be violated and total emissions may not 
increase. This latter requirement excludes free-riding opportunities since sources 
cannot increase emissions without another source decreasing emissions. 
A study by McGartland and Oates (1985) for the Baltimore air quality control 
region indicates that permit trading subject to rules generates substantial cost 
savings compared to a command and control approach implying a equiproport-
ional cut-back in emissions from a defined baseline, sufficient to attain the air 
quality standards. The study confirms that a pollution offset approach results in 
lower abatement costs than a modified pollution offset system. However, under 
the pollution offset, emissions increase dramatically compared to the command 
and control system, whereas under the modified offset system, total emissions are 
not much higher than emissions associated with the command and control 
approach. McGartland and Oates (1985) concluded that the modified pollution 
system is attractive on both economic and political grounds since it captures large 
cost savings while at the same time preventing any deterioration in environmental 
quality. 
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1987) applied the non-degradation and the modified 
pollution offset to the St. Louis air quality region and the Cleveland area. Two air 
quality standards were considered for both areas. The permit trading systems were 
compared to the State Implementation Plan (SIP). In this plan, the control require-
ments for each source are in proportion to its weighted percentage degradation of 
regional air quality measured at all receptors. This study shows that the non-
degradation offset trading rule yields a lower cost than the modified pollution 
offset. However, neither of these two rules can dominate universally (with respect 
'This holds analogously for source B and C if receptor 2 is initially not binding. 
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to the lowest cost). If the starting allocation for trades controls emissions is suffi-
ciently high, it is possible that the modified pollution offset trade system will 
result in lower control costs. In this case the amount of required emission 
reduction would be high, increasing the value of the flexibility inherent in trades 
which allow emissions to increase. Though modified pollution offset trades have 
this flexibility, non-degradation offset trades do not. The overall conclusion of 
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1987) was that the use of either trading rule represents a 
substantial improvement over the exclusive reliance on the SIP allocation. 
3.5 Bilateral permit trading 
Several authors have discussed possible impediments to the non-coinciding of 
emission trading with the solution of the mathematical optimization models, 
referring to cost-effective allocation of emission abatement. Hahn (1984) con-
sidered market power, Tschirhart (1984) the regulation of firms trading in permits 
and Zylicz (1993) the case of interacting pollutants. In this section 1 want to 
discuss losses in efficiency caused by bilateral sequential trading (BST) (Atkinson 
and Tietenberg, 1991).24 
In the previous sections I have implicitly assumed trading in emission permits 
to be a simultaneous and multilateral process. This assumption on the trade 
process for non-uniformly mixing pollutants is a necessary condition for the 
coinciding of the market result with the cost-effective emission abatement. 
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) suggested that trading in emission permits is 
actually more likely to take place bilaterally and sequentially than simultaneously. 
This results in fewer cost savings than is suggested by the results of the 
optimization models. This is an important issue since it forces us to think about 
how to deal with trade restrictions on BST transactions as defined by trade rales. 
The cost effectiveness may also depend on the sequence in which trade takes 
place. 
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) simulated bilateral sequential permit trading for 
air pollution in the St. Louis Air Quality region. Trading was restricted by the 
non-degradation offset, permit trading only being allowed if every bilateral trade 
'For an overview of impediments see Munro et al. (1995). 
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agreed individually not to violate the environmental quality constraints and not to 
allow permit trading to increase total emissions. The simulation results confirm 
that bilateral sequential trades cannot reach the cost-effective emission allocation. 
Atkinson and Tietenberg suggested three reasons for this. First, some trades which 
could be completed in a multilateral, simultaneous trading environment could not 
be completed in a BST environment because they would violate the environmental 
standards. Second, for non-increasing emissions to reach the cost-effective 
allocation from the starting point, some trades need to be allowed to increase their 
emissions. This occurs when the purchasing source affects receptors whose deposi-
tion is below the targets. Third, the simulation model assumes that traders secure 
all the permits they can from their trading partner at once. Greater cost savings 
could result if some of these were reserved for subsequent trades (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1991). 
After Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991), other authors also used the concept of 
bilateral and sequential permit trading to analyse permit trading for non-uniformly 
mixing pollutants. Klaassen and Amann (1992) and Klaassen (1994a) studied a 
pollution offset for S0 2 emissions trading among European countries. The 
pollution offset can be implemented by means of an exchange rate which defines 
the volume of emissions that one source has to decrease (through selling permits) 
if another source increases its emissions by one unit (through buying permits). 
Two conditions have to be fulfilled to reach the cost minimum solution by this 
kind of permit system. First, the exchange rate between two traders has to equal 
the ratio of the marginal abatement costs in the cost minimum solution. Second, 
the initial permit allocation has to be on a line with a slope equal to the ratio of 
marginal cost in the optimum and this line has to go through the optimum. As this 
is a very restricting condition, Klaassen (1994a) concluded that the application of 
an exchange rate will not guarantee the attaining of the cost minimum solution, 
and will not ensure that deposition targets will be met. To analyse the extent to 
which exchange trading deviates from the cost-effective emission abatement, 
bilateral permit trading using an exchange rate must be simulated. The starting 
point for this simulation is the cost minimum allocation for attaining deposition 
targets based on a gap closure of 60%, assuming that countries at least carry out 
their current reduction plans. The simulation results indicate that exchange rate 
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trading generates a cost saving of 5%. However, trading increases emissions by 
3.5% causing a violation of deposition targets. To a certain degree these violations 
are small, but for a number of locations the deposition after trading is up to 40% 
higher than the deposition targets (Klaassen, 1994a). 
Burtraw (1994) studied bilateral sequential permit trading in Europe by applying 
a pollution offset programme in which trade is allowed as long as any deposition 
constraint is not violated. As well as considering permit trading among nations, 
Burtraw (1994) also simulated trading between disaggregated stylized represen-
tations of economic enterprises by dividing national cost functions into two or 
three parts. Simulation results show that the performance of the trading pro-
gramme improves significantly if trading takes place between enterprises rather 
than between nations. However, the cost minimum solution cannot be fully 
reached. Burtraw (1994) offered no explanation for this improvement. Klaassen 
(1995a), however, suggested that this improvement may simply follow from the 
increase in trading partners constructed by the dividing of the cost functions, since 
an increase in the number of trading partners increases the change that a trading 
partner can be found for a cost-saving trade that does not violate deposition 
constraints. 
3.6 Initial permit allocation 
Independent of what kind of permit trading system is used, emission permits 
have to be distributed initially before permit trading can actually start. The choice 
of an initial permit allocation is politically sensitive as this choice involves equity 
implications and may have strong economic consequences. Two questions 
regarding the initial distribution of emission permits at country level are addressed 
in this section: first, how the permits should be distributed among the countries; 
second, which principles are available to decide how many permits each country 
initially receives. 
The first question considers whether permits should be initially distributed gratis 
or whether they should be auctioned. Auctioning of permits causes countries 
facing low marginal abatement costs to reduce emissions, whereas countries facing 
high marginal abatement costs will buy permits. If countries behave rationally, the 
auctioning of permits will lead to the cost-effective emission abatement allocation. 
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One drawback to the auctioning of permits is that it places a high financial burden 
on countries as they have to pay both control costs and permit costs (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1984). Therefore countries will generally favour free initial distribu-
tion of permits. Another drawback is that country-specific circumstances, such as 
those resulting in extraordinarily large emission reductions cannot be compensated 
if permits are initially distributed by auction. Introducing an emission permit 
system in which permits are gratis provides a way to compensate countries. 
This leads us to the second question addressed in this section: that of under 
which distribution rule permits should be initially distributed. Different rules for 
the distribution of permits result in differences in the distribution of gains from 
trade. Several distribution rules based on equity criteria are presented here. Rose 
and Stevens (1993) gave an overview of alternative equity criteria for global 
warming. These criteria are easily applicable to acidification as this involves the 
distribution of permits over a large number of countries. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
equity criteria, the general operational rule and the operational rule for allocating 
C 0 2 (or S0 2) permits. The table illustrates that equity implies a normative 
evaluation that allows for more than one interpretation. 
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Table 3.1 Overview of equity criteria and the resulting distribution rale for 
C 0 2 permits (Source: Rose and Stevens, 1993). 
Criterion General operational rule Operational rule for CO, permits 
horizontal equalize net welfare change 
across nations 
allocate permits to equalize net wel-
fare gains (as proportion of GDP 
equal for each nation) 
vertical progressively share net welfare 
change 
progressively distribute permits (net 
cost proportions inversely correlated 
with per capita GDP) 
ability to pay equalize abatement costs across 
nations 
allocate permits to equalize abatement 
costs (as proportion of GDP) 
sovereignty cut back emissions proportionally 
across all nations 
allocate permits in proportion to 
emissions 
egalitarian cut back emissions in proportion 
to population 
allocate permits in proportion to 
population 
market justice make greater use of markets auction permits to highest bidder 
consensus seek a political solution promot-
ing stability 
distribute permits so majority of 
nations are satisfied 
compensation compensate net losing nations distribute permits so no nation suffers 
a net loss of welfare 
Rawls' maximin maximize the net benefit to the 
poorest nations 
distribute large proportion of permits 
to poorest nations 
environmental cut back emissions to maximize 
environmental values 
limit permits associated with vulner-
able ecosystems 
The 'ability to pay' criterion is based on abatement cost whereas the horizontal, 
vertical and compensation criterion are based on both the costs and the benefits of 
emission abatement. Although rough estimates are available for abatement costs, 
benefits of abatement however can hardly be measured. For this reason, the 
allocation of permits would, in practice, have to be based on relatively straightfor-
ward rules. In the first sulphur protocol on emissions reduction, the sovereignty 
criterion is applied as a rule for distribution of emissions reductions.25 This 
criterion offers an operational advantage because it focuses on easily observable 
burden sharing. It is for this reason that international environmental agreements 
often take the form of a uniform percentage reduction. However, this rale 
minimizes the disruption of current production and works in favour of (heavy) 
polluters. Using population or GDP as a base favours other countries. An accept-
'This protocol, however, does not involve the use of tradeable permits. 
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able allocation rule might take account of historical emissions, GDP and popula-
tion together (Zhang and Folmer, 1995). 
The absence of an international institution that is able to enforce the initial 
allocation means that countries have to negotiate and it may be difficult to reach 
consensus amongst countries of widely differing levels of economic development 
(Collins, 1995). However, it was possible to negotiate a second sulphur dioxide 
protocol in which the agreed emission reductions differ substantially between 
countries.26 The outcome of this protocol could be used as a starting point for 
trading permits. 
3.7 Permit Trading in the U.S. 
In the United States, air pollution control is laid down by the Clean Air Act 
(CAA). Among other things this act deals with S0 2 permit trading, but it also 
includes environmental quality objectives. In this section I turn to the permit 
trading system for S0 2 in the US, beginning with the environmental targets of the 
CAA. 
Responsibility for the enforcement of the CAA is assigned to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which has to establish national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS). Under the CAA, states are required to formulate a State 
Implementation Plan (SIP). This plan has to include enforceable emission 
limitations and other control measures for sources and timetables for compliance 
to reach the NAAQS. In addition to NAAQS and SIP provisions, the CAA 
imposes several types of technologically based standards on new and modified 
sources of emission. Standards for preventing significant deterioration are applied 
in areas which already have a better air quality than the NAAQS, (Peeters, 1992; 
Kete, 1994). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 introduced the opportunity 
for large scale SO z permit trading among sources. This S0 2 trading involves a 
reduction of 10 million tons of S0 2 emissions in the 1980 levels27. Trading is 
restricted to the electric utility industry. The trading programme has two phases. 
Phase I which began in 1995, affects the 110 highest emitting utility plants and 
2 6 The Second Sulphur Protocol uses the environmental criterion. 
2 7 An American ton equals 907,19 kg. 
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involves a reduction of 5 million tons S0 2 . Phase II, beginning in the year 2000, 
will tighten the annual emission limits and affect a total of 800 utility plants. The 
annual total allocated allowances in phase II amount to 8.9 million tons of sulphur 
dioxide (Peeters, 1992). 
Beginning in 1995, allowances are allocated annually according to the grand-
fathering principle. Utilities that begin operating in 1996 or later will not be 
allocated permits. Instead they will have to buy allowances from the market or 
from EPA auctions. For this purpose, EPA will create a small allowances reserve. 
Each allowance is an authorization to emit 1 ton of S0 2 during or after a specified 
year. Obviously, a utility is only allowed to emit an amount of S0 2 if it holds the 
appropriate number of permits. If compliance is not achieved, a penalty of $ 2000 
has to be paid per excess ton of emissions (Kete, 1994). An allowance may be 
bought, sold or banked. This latter implies that a source may keep the allowance 
for future use. However, regardless of the number of allowances a source holds, it 
may not emit at levels that violate federal or state limits (NAAQS and SIP). This 
requirement takes care of the emission location. Cronshaw (1994) indicated that 
firms are willing to bank permits if prices increase minimally with the rate of 
interest. However, if a firm is subject to profit regulation, it might be willing to 
bank permits, even though prices rise more slowly than the interest rate. Banking 
of permits is probably a good thing from the environmental perspective because it 
means that emission reductions occur sooner, rather than later (Kete, 1992). 
Allowances can be bought from EPA's auctions and direct sales. In addition to 
the EPA allowances, private allowance holders may offer their allowances at the 
EPA auction. The auctions consist of a spot market, where allowances that can be 
used in the same year (or banked for future use) can be bought, and of an advance 
market where allowances usable in seven years can be bought. Apart from the 
auctions, EPA reserves allowances for direct sales at a fixed price of $1500. The 
main objective of these sales is to ensure that there is always an opportunity for 
new utilities to buy permits. Both the auctions and direct sales are administered 
by the Chicago Board of Trade, and are held annually. The first were held in 
1993. Table 3.2 illustrates the auction results from 1993 to 1995. 
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Table 3.2 Overview of spot and advance auction results 1993-1995 (source: 
Chicago Board of Trade, 1995) 
Spot auction results Advance auction results 
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 
offered allowances 95.010 58.001 8.306 30.500 47.000 7.000 
offered allowances sold 10 0 600 0 800 400 
total bid quantities 321.354 294.354 255.371 283.406 489.399 236.928 
clearing price $131 $150 $130 $122 $140 $126 
average winning bid $156 $159 $132 $136 $149 $128 
The results from Table 3.2 indicate that S0 2 allowance trading is slowly increas-
ing. As in phase I only 110 plants are involved in the trading programme, trading 
may be expected to expand in phase II, restricting the total emissions further and 
involving 800 plants. 
A final comment on the US S0 2 trading concerns its emission-oriented charac-
ter. The system itself is spatially indifferent and based on emissions only. Trading 
is not restricted by rules and no other modifications which take into account 
environmental targets apply. However, all the other CAA air pollution regulations 
continue to apply. Therefore, regardless of how many permits a unit holds, it 
cannot emit S0 2 above the SIP limits and other requirements of the CAA. This 
guarantees that environmental criteria are not violated. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined permit trading for non-uniformly mixing pollu-
tants. Environmental degradation by these pollutants not only depends on the 
amount of emission but also on the emission location. Therefore the aim is to use 
permit trading for reaching deposition targets rather than emission targets. The 
difficulties occurring in permit trading for this type of pollutant have been 
illustrated and the alternatives found in the literature for solving these difficulties, 
have been discussed. 
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Using tradeable emission permits for non-uniformly mixing pollutants results in 
cost-effective emission abatement. However, it does not take the deposition targets 
being aimed at into account. The extent to which the resulting cost-effective 
emission allocation deviates from the cost-effective deposition allocation depends 
on the source receptor matrix and the marginal control costs of sources. Generally 
speaking, it cannot be concluded that emission permits are a suitable instrument 
for non-uniformly mixing pollutants, though in the US tradeable emission permits 
are actually used for S0 2 . However, this emission trading does not aim at 
reaching a deposition target but is only emission-oriented. Environmental targets 
are taken care of by State Implementation Plans. Instead of using emission 
permits it may be more suitable to implement a system of deposition permits. 
Theoretically, the use of tradeable deposition permits results in a cost-effective 
allocation that meets deposition targets. However, a disadvantage of this system is 
that it may result in an increase in emissions, something which is politically 
delicate. Another argument put forward in the literature against this system is the 
trading complexity that occurs when sources have to operate simultaneously in 
many different markets. 
Since the use of both emission and deposition permits is not considered a very 
suitable instrument, several alternatives permit systems for non-uniformly mixing 
pollutants have emerged in the literature. Relatively simple alternatives are permit 
trading within zones and the worst case approach. Unfortunately, however, these 
systems are no guarantee against the violation of deposition targets. A permit 
trading system that does not violate deposition targets, is perhaps a more advanced 
system where trading is subject to rules. There are three variants: the pollution 
offset, the non-degradation offset and the modified pollution offset. All systems 
guarantee non-violation of deposition targets. The pollution offset offers results in 
a cost-effective deposition allocation and offers the largest trade opportunities. 
However, it allows for an increase in emissions. The non-degradation offset 
system excludes an increase in emissions and the modified pollution offset sets no 
restriction on emissions but protects pre-trade deposition levels. Whether the non-
degradation offset system or the modified pollution offset system results in the 
lowest cost is theoretically impossible to say. 
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In judging permit trading systems, special attention has to be paid to the nature 
of the trading process. Following Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991), I have assumed 
that permit trading is a bilateral and sequential process. Combining permit trading 
subject to rules with the bilateral and sequential trading concept sheds new light 
on the cost effectiveness of these permit trading systems. Empirical studies 
indicate that bilateral permit trading applying offset rules will not result in cost-
effective abatement. 
Assuming a bilateral and sequential trading process, the question whether an 
emission permit trading system can result in both minimum abatement costs and 
non-violation of deposition permits cannot yet be answered affirmatively. How-
ever, bilateral and sequential trading has only recently been applied in studies on 
permit trading and needs to be further examined. It has become obvious that 
permit trading has to be restricted in some way to take deposition targets into 
account. Restrictions are needed that will result in non-violation of deposition 
targets, while at the same time, will not hamper the achievement of the cost-
effective allocation. 
4 ACID RAIN MODELS 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I examined theoretical principles for emission abatement strat-
egies. There are various models available for quantifying these strategies, both in 
terms of costs and in terms of environmental benefits. This chapter discusses 
integrated assessment models for acid rain. First, however, I want to briefly 
introduce these models. 
Integrated assessment models assemble and integrate information for analysing 
the problem of (in this case) acidification. Integrated acid rain models provide a 
scientific basis for developing and evaluating alternative acid rain abatement 
strategies and are therefore a useful tool in decision-making. The major aim of 
these models is to assist in international policy-making. In this chapter three 
European models are discussed which can be characterized as integrated asses-
sment models since they cover a wide range of aspects of acidification by 
combining information from different disciplines. These models are (i) the Regi-
onal Acidification INformation and Simulation (RAINS) model, developed at the 
International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria (Alca-
mo et al., 1990), (ii) the Abatement Strategies Assessment Model (ASAM) 
developed at Imperial College London (ApSimon and Wilson, 1991), and (iii) the 
Coordinated Abatement Strategy Model (CASM) developed at the Stockholm 
Environmental Institute in York, United Kingdom (Rosemarin, 1991). 
Integrated assessment models have a similar format. The starting point is 
economic activity, causing emissions that are linked to energy use. The spatial 
scale on which emissions are considered may differ. Emissions may be reduced by 
several abatement techniques or by changes in the fuel mix or through energy 
conservation. To calculate the costs of emission reduction strategies, abatement 
cost functions are specified. This enables comparison of the cost effectiveness of 
the alternative abatement options. Since acid rain is an international (continental) 
transboundary problem, the models described in this chapter include all European 
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countries. As a result the level of detail that can be analysed by these models as 
far as emission control options are concerned is limited to the national level. No 
sub-national information is provided. To calculate the deposition resulting from an 
emission allocation a source-receptor matrix is used which describes the atmosp-
heric transport of acidifying emissions. The deposition resulting from a certain 
emission pattern may be compared with deposition targets. This comparison gives 
an indication of the environmental damage caused by acidifying emissions. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. As the RAINS model is the most 
complete and the most extensively documented integrated assessment model I 
discuss it first. After giving a general description of the model (4.2.1) I go on to 
discuss specific topics and critically review them in the following subsections. In 
discussing energy use, attention is given to the Energy Flow Optimization Model -
Environment (EFOM-ENV), which was used in combination with RAINS. This 
model focuses on alternative options for the future development of entire energy 
systems, taking into account technical, economic and environmental aspects of 
energy supply and emission generation (Rentz et a l , 1994). The ASAM model is 
discussed in section 4.3 and the CASM model in section 4.4. Both models are 
examined in relation to the RAINS model. In section 4.5 I look at non-European 
acid rain models, and in section 4.6 I put forward conclusions. 
4.2 The RAINS model 2 8 2 9 
4.2.1 Introduction to the RAINS model 
The Regional Acidification Information and Simulation (RAINS) model was 
developed at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
(Alcamo et a l , 1990) and focuses on acidification in Europe. As the aim is to 
provide a temporal spatial overview of acidification in Europe, the regional and 
temporal scales of RAINS are accordingly large (Alcamo et al., 1990). The 
RAINS model has been used in European emission reduction negotiations since 
1988 (Hordijk, 1995). 
^This section refers to the RAINS model version 6.0. 
2 9This section draws heavily on Alcamo et al., 1990. 
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The model combines information on future energy use and agricultural activity, 
(using emission coefficients for S0 2 , NO x and NH3 to determine regional emission 
levels) with information on costs and effects of pollution control strategies, long 
range atmospheric transport and sensitivity of ecosystems. The model simulates 
the flow of these acidifying pollutants from source regions in Europe to environ-
mental receptors. The current model version (6.0) covers 38 source regions: 26 
countries, 7 regions in the former USSR and 5 sea regions (for ship emissions). 
Analysis of depositions is carried out for 547 land-based receptor sites with a 
regular grid size of 150 x 150 km. The model has three parts: (1) the energy, 
emissions and costs of pollution control submodel, (2) the submodel describing 
the atmospheric transport of emissions, and (3) the submodel describing the 
impact of acid deposition on the environment. Figure 4.1 is a schematic diagram 
of the RAINS model. 
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Figure 4.1 Schematic diagram of the RAINS model (based on: Alcamo et 
al, 1990) 
There are two basic ways of using the model: scenario analysis and optimization 
analysis. Scenario analysis examines the implications of an energy pathway and a 
control strategy. As indicated in Figure 4.1, the model is used from left to right 
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for scenario analysis. Optimization analysis uses RAINS from right to left through 
the model, starting with goals for environmental protection. The model determines 
the lowest cost emission reduction strategy needed to accomplish the specified 
goals.3 0 In the following subsections I describe the main parts of the model in 
more detail. 
4.2.2 Energy and emissions 
The RAINS model computes country scale acidifying emissions. Emissions of 
sulphur dioxide (S0 2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) are based on data on national 
energy use (Amann, 1990). Emissions of ammonia (NHJ are based on the number 
of livestock animals, fertilizer use and industrial emissions (Klaassen, 1994). 
Energy 
National energy use is subdivided into 6 economic sectors and each sector is 
broken down into different fuel types according to their characteristics of produc-
ing sulphur and nitrogen emissions. In total 12 fuel types are distinguished. In 
addition, energy production processes are introduced so as to have all necessary 
information available for creating alternative energy scenarios, while maintaining 
a country's energy balance. Historical data on energy consumption are taken from 
the UN-ECE (United Nations European Commission for Europe - Geneva) energy 
database, which is the only consistent database available for all European coun-
tries. 
For future energy use, an Official Energy Pathway (OEP) was created. This 
pathway is based on national projections of energy trends and descriptions of 
energy policies up to the year 2000, as submitted to international organizations by 
individual governments. However, these data are not guaranteed to be either 
consistent or plausible, in some cases simply reflecting the desired goal of govern-
ments. Nevertheless, the data do represent the most official views on future 
energy use for Europe (Amann, 1990). According to this OEP, total energy 
consumption in Western Europe is stabilizing. It is assumed that the use of natural 
3 0 In RAINS version 6.0 only cost minimization is implemented. In earlier versions of the model 
emission minimization and sulphur removal maximization, given a limit on expenditures were 
implemented as well. 
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gas will increase sharply. Eastern European countries show a continued increase in 
energy consumption. Table 4.1 illustrates the energy use for the Netherlands in the 
year 2000 according to the OEP. 
Table 4.1 Energy use per sector and fuel type (PJ) for the Netherlands, OEP, 
year: 2000 (source: RAINS 6.0). 3 1 3 2 
CON PP DOM TRA IND OTH SUM 
BC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HC 25 325 0 0 47 0 397 
DC 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 
MD 0 0 81 224 13 0 318 
HF 50 4 11 0 35 0 100 
LF 38 0 0 237 11 293 579 
GAS 63 214 528 0 285 105 1195 
OS 0 19 0 0 0 0 19 
NUC 0 29 0 0 0 0 29 
HYD 0 25 0 0 0 0 25 
ELE 13 -260 142 8 130 0 33 
DH 0 -54 54 0 0 0 0 
SUM 189 302 816 469 621 398 2795 
Sulphur Dioxide Emissions 
Sulphur dioxide (S0 2) emissions are caused by combustion of fossil fuels 
(mainly coal and oil) and by industrial processes. Since there is a direct relation 
between the sulphur emissions and the sulphur content of fuel, sulphur emissions 
originating from fuel combustion are computed by using data on the energy 
consumed in several sectors in each country, together with information on the 
''Sectors are: conversion (Con), power plants (PP), domestic (Dom), transport (Tra), industry 
(Ind), other sector (Oth). 
"Fuel types are: brown coal (BC), hard coal (HC), derived coal (DC), medium destillate (MD), 
heavy fuel oil (HF), light fuel oil (LF), Gas (Gas), other solids (OS), nuclear (NUC), hydro (HYD), 
electricity (ELE), district heating (DH). 
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sulphur content of fuel in each country. The sulphur content of fuels is compared 
to the energy content of the fuel by using information on the heat values of the 
fuels. The fraction of sulphur contained in ash is also taken into account. Since 
coal is a rather heterogeneous fuel its sulphur content is the most sensitive 
parameter for estimating national S0 2 estimates. Estimates of sulphur content are 
more accurate for liquid fuels as they are more homogeneous. Future emissions 
are estimated by using the 1980 fuel parameters values. The user of RAINS might 
alter these values when developing abatement scenarios. 
Because consistent quantitative information is not available, computation of 
sulphur emissions by industrial processes is less accurate than that of sulphur 
content of fossil fuels. Process emissions are only included for those countries that 
explicitly report these emissions, assuming that in countries not reporting them, 
process emissions are of minor importance. In general, process emissions will be 
about 10% of the national total (Alcamo et a l , 1990). 
Nitrogen Oxides Emissions 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) are formed during combustion mainly in two ways: (i) 
by oxidation of the nitrogen contained in the fuel (fuel NOx) and (ii) by the high 
temperature combination of nitrogen and oxygen in the combustion air (thermal 
NOJ." Formation of fuel NO x depends on the nitrogen contained naturally in 
the fuel as well as on the burner type and the firing mode used in the combustion 
process. Thermal NO x formation depends on the combustion temperature, increas-
ing exponentially at higher temperatures (Ltibkert, 1987). Because of the variabil-
ity in NO x formation, computing NO x emissions is complex if all factors are 
separately taken into account. 
However, there is an OECD emission inventory for 11 countries.34 This inven-
tory provides information on NO x emissions per sector for 1980. Average 
emission coefficients for sector/fuel combinations are derived by combining these 
3 3 A third way is the so called 'prompt' NO„ produced in the flame reaction zone. However, this 
N O x is an order of magnitude lower than the thermal and the fuel NO„ and is therefore considered 
negligible (Ltibkert, 1987). 
"These countries are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, (former) West Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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emission data with data on total energy consumption per sector in 1980. Only 
fuels of major importance in a sector are taken into account. The resulting 
emission coefficients are extrapolated to countries for which no detailed informa-
tion is available, i.e the eastern European countries. By multiplication of NO x 
emission coefficients with data on energy consumption, total NO x emissions per 
sector and per country are calculated for all of Europe. Although the method of 
calculating NO„ emission at a country level is rather inaccurate, comparison of the 
estimated emission numbers with other emission inventories indicates that the 
estimates are within an acceptable range (Ltibkert, 1987). 
Ammonia Emissions 
Ammonia (NHJ emissions originate from livestock farming, fertilizers, indus-
tries and other anthropogenic sources. Of these, livestock farming is the most 
important one. Generally NHX emissions are calculated as a product of emission 
coefficients and level of activity (Klaassen, 1994). 
Emission coefficients for livestock farming are animal and country specific. 
However, lack of information for most European countries means the starting 
point is the information on emission coefficients in the Netherlands.35 This 
information is combined with country specific circumstances like nitrogen 
fertilizer application and meadow and stall periods. For example, to calculate the 
emission factor for sheep, the stable and meadow period are country specific, but 
the data on N-excretion and volatilization factors are based on Dutch data. 
Emission coefficients for fertilizer use are based on the type of fertilizer used in 
each country. This information allows average N-losses to be determined. For 
countries where no information is available, an average N-loss of 5% is assumed. 
Ammonia emissions from industries mainly originate from ammonia production 
and fertilizer plants. Using the literature, an emission coefficient of 5.8 kg NH 3 
per tonne fertilizer produced has been used for every country. The emission 
coefficient for human population (respiration) equals 0.3 kg NH 3 per person. 
"National data are used in only a few cases. For the United Kingdom national data are used for 
the emission coefficients of pigs, laying hens, broilers, horses and sheep. For Finland national data 
are used for pigs, laying hens, broilers, horses and 'other cattle'. 
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Estimating future ammonia emissions requires projections for livestock popula-
tion and fertilizer use. These forecasts are based on national forecasts from 
various institutes. Where no country specific data are available, trends are extrapo-
lated. For a projection of fertilizer production a trend extrapolation is also used. 
The emission projections are based on the assumption that the emission coeffi-
cients remain constant. According to this projection, total ammonia emissions in 
Europe will increase. This trend differs for European regions: in Northern EC 
countries and in Scandinavia, emissions are expected to decline or to stabilize, 
while in Southern EC countries and in Eastern Europe an increase is generally 
expected. 
Discussion on Emissions 
Having described the way emissions are treated in the RAINS model, some 
points of discussion have to be dealt with. Relating S0 2 and NO x emissions to 
energy use seems to be a flexible approach, since this offers the user of the 
RAINS model the opportunity of defining an alternative energy pathway, which is 
translated by the model into S0 2 and NO x emissions. However, in the RAINS 
model, energy use is an exogenous input and the related emission coefficients are 
based on 1980-data. As a result, the way in which sulphur and nitrogen emissions 
are computed seems to be rather rigid. To meet this rigidity to a certain extent, 
the RAINS model has the option of modifying energy scenarios. By means of this 
option, alternative energy scenarios can be implemented. However, energy remains 
an exogenous input. Several alternative energy scenarios which affect the 
emissions of S0 2 , NO x and C 0 2 are provided in a study by the Institute for 
Industrial Production (IIP) and IIASA (Rentz et al., 1992). The Energy Flow 
Optimization Model - Environment (EFOM-ENV) was used to construct these 
scenarios. This model focuses on alternative options for the future development of 
entire national energy systems. It takes technical, economic and environmental 
aspects of energy supply and emission generation into account. EFOM-ENV 
describes the energy flows from the primary energy supply over several conver-
sion stages to the final energy consumption. 
Another consequence of using exogenous energy data in the RAINS model is 
that the option of energy conservation is not explicitly modelled. Energy conser-
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vation not only reduces S0 2 and NO x emissions, but it also plays an important 
role in reducing C 0 2 emissions, the most important greenhouse gas. Since global 
warming is a major environmental problem, this link is very interesting, but it 
remains outside the scope of the RAINS model. The EFOM-ENV model, how-
ever, does include the option of energy saving. It follows that a reduction of C 0 2 
by means of energy conservation coincides with a reduction of S0 2 and NO x. In 
contrast to this influence of C 0 2 reductions on S0 2 emissions, there is no signifi-
cant influence on C 0 2 reductions by abatement of S0 2 (Rente et al., 1994). In 
fact, because installation of emission reduction equipment causes an increase in 
energy use, S0 2 reduction requires a moderate energy increase. Other things being 
equal, this increase will result in increasing C 0 2 emissions. The same holds for 
the use of a catalyst for reducing NO x. Since energy use in the RAINS model is 
mostly an exogenous input, there is no direct link with economic activity. Because 
energy use is generally correlated with economic activity, this relation is only 
indirectly included in the model. Therefore the RAINS model can be classified as 
a partial model. Moreover, it can also be characterized as partial because it only 
covers acidification and does not take into account other related environmental 
problems like climate change and pollution by heavy metals.3 6'3 7 
In the RAINS model the computation of ammonia emissions is treated different-
ly from nitrogen and sulphur emissions since the first is not related to energy use. 
Because information on other European countries is lacking, the estimation of 
emission coefficients is largely based upon Dutch data. The estimation of emission 
factors for ammonia was the subject of discussion. First, Buijsman et al. (1985) 
estimated emission factors. Next, research by Asman (1990) indicated that these 
factors underestimate actual emissions. Emission estimates by the Cooperative 
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of 
Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) are based on Buijsman et al. (1985) multiplied 
by a correction factor 1.2. In view of the large differences in agricultural practices 
3f'It should, however, be noted that in 1993 IIASA started to include photo-oxidants in RAINS. 
The emission database now includes emissions on Volatile Organic Compounds. Work on a long-range 
transport model for 0 3 formation is underway. 
"An application of the atmospheric submodel of RAINS to heavy metals can be found in Bolo et 
al. (1991). 
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in Europe, the estimation of ammonia emissions which is mainly based on Dutch 
data is not very accurate. However, given the available information it seems to be 
the best possible. 
4.2.3 Control technology and costs 
Emissions not only depend upon energy use, but also on the availability and 
implementation of control technologies. In this section I discuss control strategies 
and their costs. In accordance with the scale of analysis, control costs are country 
specific. The requirement to assess the abatement costs for all European countries 
(regions) limits the level of detail that can be maintained in the RAINS model. 
Emphasis is put on the international consistency and comparability of abatement 
cost functions. Given the available control options, RAINS can establish national 
control functions which are used in the optimization procedure. However, it is 
also possible to specify certain abatement measures (scenarios) and to calculate 
the resulting emissions and the related costs. Since the RAINS model is used for 
assessing the efficiency of different pollution control strategies, control costs form 
an essential part of the model. 
Sulphur Removal 
Sulphur reduction can take place in various ways. There are generally five 
abatement options: (i) energy conservation; (ii) fuel substitution; (iii) use of low 
sulphur fuels or desulphurized fuels; (iv) desulphurization during the combustion 
process and (v) desulphurization of flue gasses after combustion.38 Energy 
conservation as such is not included in the RAINS model as a sulphur removal 
option. Nevertheless, it is possible to define an energy scenario based on energy 
conservation and to calculate the resulting emission. However, RAINS does not 
calculate the costs of that energy conservation, nor does it check the consistency 
of the user's input to the model. 
Option (ii) relates to substitution of sulphur containing fuels for a different type 
of energy source with low or no sulphur content. Although this is often an 
3 8 The distinction between option (ii) and (iii) is that the former is the substirMon between different 
fuel types, for example using gas instead of coal, while the latter is the use of a low sulphur fuel 
within one fuel type, for example the use of low sulphur coal. 
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effective way of reducing emissions, it may be limited for historical, political, 
institutional or technical reasons. This limitation makes it difficult to derive cost 
estimates. Moreover, the costs of fuel switching may have a large effect on the 
economy, a factor which is not included in RAINS. For these reasons the option 
of fuel substitution is excluded (Amann, 1990). It should be noted, however, that 
it is possible to define scenarios implying fuel substitution, for example by 
replacing brown coal in power plants by hard coal, but RAINS does not calculate 
the costs of this option. 
The main control options for sulphur dioxide are the use of low sulphur fuels 
and the desulphurization of flue gases. If aiming at international consistency and 
comparability, a basic assumption in calculating control costs is the existence of 
free trade and exchange of emission abatement technology. This means that, in 
principle, technologies for the same installations are available for all countries at 
equal investment costs. In addition, the costs of each abatement technology are 
influenced by national circumstances through which abatement costs differ for 
every country. The computation of the costs of using low sulphur fuels is rather 
simple since the use of low sulphur fuels requires no investments. The costs of 
using low sulphur hard coal are derived from an analysis of the long term price 
differences on the world coal market. Substitution of brown coal by imports with 
low sulphur fuel content is excluded because of high transportation costs which 
make substitution unlikely. 
There are several techniques that allow for desulphurization during and after 
combustion. These techniques require investment at the plant site and therefore 
abatement costs are more difficult to estimate. Costs of desulphurization are 
mainly based on data from the former West Germany which had extensive 
experience on desulphurization. The investment costs depend on the type of 
technology applied, the fuel type and the average boiler size. To convert the 
investment costs to costs per removed ton of S0 2 , the country specific real interest 
rate and the average lifetime of plants are used. The capacity utilization (annual 
operating hours) and the sulphur removal efficiency relate those annualized costs 
to the actual amount of removed sulphur (Amann and Kornai, 1987). Because of a 
lack of accurate data, costs for removing process emissions have been estimated 
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very roughly. It is assumed that every country can remove its process emissions 
up to 80% of the uncontrolled emission rates at stepwise increasing costs. 
Given the available pollution control options and their costs, the options are 
ranked according to their cost effectiveness. For a selected energy pathway a 
compilation of the lowest cost solutions results in a national cost curve that 
describes the cost optimal combination of measures needed to achieve specified 
levels of national emission reductions. Figure 4.2 shows the national S0 2 abate-
ment cost function for the Netherlands, based on the official energy pathway for 
the year 2000. 
Total Costs Marginal Costs 
2000 1 8000 
- 6400 
4800 
- 3200 
1600 
S 
CO 
Figure 4.2 S02 abatement cost function for the Netherlands, 2000, OEP 
(Source: RAINS 6.0) 
Nitrogen Removal 
The RAINS model includes only direct NO x control measures, applicable to 
existing energy infrastructures. Emission reductions as a result of structural 
changes of the energy system were excluded since such changes have macro 
economic impacts, which are not covered in RAINS. Actually, two options for 
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nitrogen removal are included: (i) combustion modification and (ii) flue gas 
cleaning. The routine for calculating the abatement costs of these options is first 
to calculate the total costs related to an emission reduction option and next to 
derive the annual costs from these total costs (Amann, 1989). 
A distinction is made in stationary sources between investment related costs and 
operating costs, as well as investment costs. For a control technology, all costs are 
related to one unit of fuel input, with fuel type and the economic sector being 
taken into account. Next, unit costs are derived, taking into account the capacity 
utilization factor. Finally, the cost efficiency of different control options is 
evaluated by relating the abatement costs to the amount of NO x removed. The 
technology specific data, describing economic and technical properties of control 
technologies are assumed to be equal for all European countries. In addition, use 
is made of country-specific data like average capacity utilization of plants, 
average boiler size and interest rates, that describe national conditions under 
which abatement technologies are applied. Technology specific data are mainly 
European data. Country-specific data are based on international statistics, where 
possible (Amann, 1989). The cost evaluation for mobile sources basically follows 
the same approach as for stationary sources. The amount of abated NO x emissions 
is calculated on the basis of the emission factor for unabated emissions, the 
removal efficiency of the control option, and the average annual fuel consumption 
of a vehicle and its lifetime. The calculations assume that the emission factors are 
equal for all countries. In reality however, it is more likely that they will differ 
between countries, but no data for this are available. 
In summary, two sources of variations in costs for applying the same control 
technology over Europe can be distinguished. One is the national circumstances, 
like the interest rate. The second source of variations is related to the structural 
differences of national energy systems which determine the potential for applica-
tion of individual control options. Given all available control options and the 
related costs, national cost curves can be derived that define the lowest cost for 
achieving varying reduction levels. Because the overall potential of reducing 
emissions from a specific source has to be consistent, special provisions are taken 
for control options excluding each other and having different costs and removal 
rates. Examples are the uncontrolled catalyst and the controlled three-way system 
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for mobile sources. In ranking these options, the marginal costs for the more 
expensive but also more efficient control option is related to the incremental 
emission reductions compared to the cheaper option (Amann, 1989). 
Ammonia Removal 
Estimates of abatement costs for ammonia are based on specific data for 
country, animal, and technology. Lack of experience means that the cost estimates 
for ammonia reduction are more uncertain compared to those for controlling 
sulphur and nitrogen emissions. There are three options for controlling ammonia 
originating from livestock farming: (i) changes in the nitrogen content of the 
fodder, (ii) adaptations during stable and storage of manure, and (iii) low ammo-
nia application of manure. Several techniques are available within these three 
options. Manure processing is assumed to take place only in the Netherlands. 
Since the costs of manure processing are much higher than other techniques, it 
cannot be limited to controlling ammonia emissions only, but is used for control-
ling manure (mineral) surpluses. Ammonia emissions from industrial processes 
can be reduced through the application of stripping and absorption techniques. 
The costs of controlling these emissions are a fixed amount per ton NH3 removed, 
which implies that there are constant marginal abatement costs. 
Estimation of control costs for ammonia originating from livestock farming is 
more complex. For all available techniques, unit costs are calculated per animal 
per year. In order to obtain the cost per unit of NH 3 removed, the costs are related 
to the amount of emissions reduced. In doing so it has to be remembered that 
abatement options may simultaneously reduce emissions during stable and storage, 
application and in the meadow. Another aspect that is taken into account is that 
the options for reducing ammonia emissions for each animal category can be 
applied in combination. But removal efficiencies of combinations are less than or 
equal to the sum of removal efficiencies of separate options. For example, low 
nitrogen feed for dairy cows reduces emissions by 20% while manure injection 
reduces emission by 90%. However, in combination both options reduce emissions 
only by 92%. Removal efficiencies of combinations are calculated using nitrogen 
balances for each animal type. 
Acid rain models 87 
The routine for computing national cost curves for ammonia abatement differs 
slightly from the routine for computing national cost curves of sulphur and 
nitrogen abatement. First, control options within each animal category are ranked 
according to their marginal costs and their individual potential for removal. The 
option with the lowest cost is selected first. The marginal costs for the remaining 
options are calculated in relation to this first option, and the option with the 
lowest marginal costs is then considered the second best alternative. If further 
alternatives remain, the marginal costs are then computed in relation to the second 
best alternative. This procedure is repeated for each animal category as well as for 
industrial control. Finally, all options that are shown to be efficient are ranked 
according to marginal costs. This is expressed in the national cost function. 
Moreover, because of structural differences between agricultural systems, especial-
ly the structure of the livestock population and the intensity and type of fertilizer 
use, the potential of control opportunities is not always fully applicable in each 
country. Therefore the potential application of techniques is reduced to less than 
100% for some countries. 
According to the national cost functions, the maximum feasible overall 
reduction in ammonia emissions for Europe that can be achieved by technical 
means is 30 to 40% over the 1980 level (Klaassen, 1994). 
Discussion on control technology and costs 
The aim of international consistency and comparability of national control costs 
limits the level of detail that can be maintained. For example, national average 
boiler size and average capacity utilization are used for the calculation of national 
S0 2 and NO x abatement costs. Using these averages affects the national abatement 
costs since the distribution of capacity utilization and the distribution of boiler 
sizes has a significant influence on the abatement costs in a country. Another 
issue of discussion relates to the fact that the abatement costs for S0 2 and NO x 
date from the late eighties and are now out of date. This is especially true for 
eastern European countries where the transition of centrally planned economies to 
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market economies, which started in 1989, causes changes in the energy sector, and 
therefore also in control costs.39 
A difficult problem arises when control technologies simultaneously reduce 
emissions of other air pollutants (e.g. reduction of NO x by a three way catalytic 
converter also reduces CO and VOC). If the control of NO x is selected as a single 
target, such control options may turn out to be less cost efficient than other tech-
niques (Amann, 1989). Because the RAINS model refers solely to acidification, 
other linked environmental problems are ignored, and from a broader point of 
view this results in inefficient solutions. If efficiency is not only related to 
acidification but to other linked environmental problems as well, abatement 
options which are inefficient in reducing acidification only may turn out to be 
efficient. However, since work is in progress to include other pollutants in the 
RAINS model, this disadvantage will vanish in the near future. A point indicated 
in previous sections is that the macro economic effects of emission reductions are 
not taken into account. A study concerning the macro economic impact of the 
implementation of the EC directive to control air pollution indicates, however, 
that this impact is small (Klaassen and Nentjes, 1991). 
The EFOM-ENV model, which has already been mentioned, can be used to 
identify cost optimal combinations of technologies that satisfy the exogenously 
determined final energy demand and other user-determined constraints. Examples 
are a restriction of total emissions, a selection of techniques or a restriction of fuel 
types. Cost estimates available by using this model include energy conservation, 
an option that is excluded in the RAINS model. The EFOM-ENV model analyses 
the temporal development of the energy system over a long term planning horizon 
taking into account the age structure of the existing plants, the dynamics of 
market penetration of innovative technologies and the time structure of emission 
control regulations. Therefore the cost functions provided by this model are based 
on a dynamic approach. Compare this to the RAINS model which uses a static 
approach to the estimation of cost functions since dynamic effects such as uneven 
age structures are not taken into account (Amann et al , 1992a). The EFOM-ENV 
model is currently in use in all member states of the European Community. Work 
"An energy-efficiency scenario for Eastern Europe is described in Amann et al., 1992. 
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is in progress to apply EFOM-ENV to Central and Eastern European countries as 
well (Rente et al., 1993). 
The model results from EFOM-ENV show that the relevance of energy conver-
sion measures greatly depends on the energy scenario definition. A policy aiming 
at S0 2 emission reduction does not usually lead to a significant increase in energy 
savings, because the costs of additional energy conservation measures are gen-
erally higher than the costs of conventional S0 2 emission reduction technologies. 
If the policy aim is to reduce emissions of C0 2 , S0 2 and NO x emissions simulta-
neously, energy saving becomes a cost-efficient abatement option (Rente et al., 
1994). 
4.2.4 Atmospheric transport 
The atmospheric transport of acid pollutants in the RAINS model is based on 
the atmospheric model developed within the Co-operative Program for Monitoring 
and Evaluation of the Long Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (E-
MEP) (Eliassen and Saltbones, 1983; Iversen et al., 1991). The main inputs of this 
model are emissions on a grid scale of 150 x 150 km and meteorological data. 
The model simulates the transport of emissions within 96 hours. Based on this 
model, EMEP provides transport matrices for S0 2 , NO x and NH3, which relate 
national emissions to deposition at each grid-point. Background sources are also 
taken into account. These include natural sources, very long transport of emissions 
from North-America and anthropogenic emissions in Europe that have spent more 
than 96 hours in the atmosphere. Since part of the background deposition is 
caused by anthropogenic emissions in Europe, it is assumed that two-thirds of the 
background deposition will decrease if emissions decrease. The relationship 
between a country's emissions and its contribution to deposition at any grid-point 
is assumed to be linear. It is generally accepted that over long time and space 
scales the assumption of linearity between S0 2 emissions and deposition is 
appropriate (Alcamo et al., 1990). For NO x and NH 3 this assumption has to be 
modified: the assumption of linearity only holds in part. 
A main assumption in the atmospheric model is that pollutants are homogene-
ously mixed in the mixing layer. This layer is the layer above the earth's surface 
in which acidifying pollutants diffuse; it varies geographically and with time of 
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day and season. During the day this layer extends up to an elevation of about one 
or two kilometres, whereas at night it drops to within a few hundred metres. 
Pollutants from high chimney stacks may then be mixed into the unstable air 
above the mixing layer and transported over long distances. The variability of 
deposition at any location depends on the number of emission sources taken into 
account and on the average period of deposition. If both factors are large enough, 
the EMEP model predicts the deposition satisfactorily. Starting from an estimate 
of annual European emissions, the EMEP model calculates the annual deposition 
with low variability. Decreasing the spatial and time scales increases the uncer-
tainty of the model calculations significantly. The EMEP model uses input of 
emission data on a grid scale of 150 x 150 km. 
Estimating future atmospheric transport requires assumptions about future 
meteorological conditions. The choice is between using the meteorology of a 
recent year or using average meteorological data. Climate patterns of individual 
years vary significantly from one another and from the long term average (Iversen 
et al., 1991). Since 1994 an eight-year average (1985-1992) is used in RAINS. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the atmospheric transport of emissions. In these 
figures the export, import and the domestic contribution of sulphur emissions is 
illustrated for two arbitrarily chosen countries. Both figures are based on the 
emissions according to the Official Energy Pathway (OEP) for the year 2000 and 
the average transport matrix used in the RAINS model. 
Another source of uncertainty about atmospheric transport is that of climatic 
change caused by global warming. Global warming may affect the precipitation 
and wind patterns in Europe and consequently alter the spatial patterns of deposi-
tion. Uncertainty of transfer coefficients does not seem to be a function of the 
distance between sources and receptors. There is no relationship between relative 
uncertainty and distance (Alcamo et al., 1990). 
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4.2.5 Environmental Impacts 
Having examined emissions, control options and control costs as well as the 
atmospheric transport of acidifying emissions, the final issue for discussion is 
environmental impacts of acid deposition. To analyse the environmental impacts 
of acid deposition, the RAINS model currently uses the critical loads concept. 
This means that deposition patterns resulting from various emission allocations 
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can be compared with these critical loads.40 The exceedance of critical loads 
indicates the environmental damage of an emission allocation. 
Critical loads for an ecosystem are defined as 'the quantitative estimate of 
exposure to one or more pollutants below which harmful effects which are judged 
to be significant on specified elements of the environment do not occur according 
to present knowledge' (Nilsson and Grennfelt, 1988). A map showing critical 
loads of acidity, for sulphur and for nitrogen was developed by the Coordination 
Center for Effects (CCE). The map shows the cumulative distribution of critical 
loads for a mixture of forest soil combinations and surface waters for each cell of 
the EMEP-grid system (150x150 km) (Hettelingh et al., 1991; Downing et al., 
1993). Critical loads are given in percentiles. The 1- and 5-percentile maps of 
acidity, sulphur and nitrogen were produced by the CCE. The 1- (or 5-) percentile 
map of critical loads reflects the upper limit of the range of critical loads in each 
EMEP grid which covers 1% (or 5%) of the area in an EMEP grid cell. Conse-
quently, this critical load protects 99% (or 95%) of the entire EMEP grid cell 
area. 
Critical loads are computed by means of the steady state mass balance method. 
This method assumes a time independent equilibrium between the production and 
consumption of acidic compounds in soils. Dynamic processes are assumed to be 
unimportant for the assessment of long-term critical loads. The steady-state mass-
balance method computes the critical load as the difference between the dissol-
ution of base cations and the critical alkalinity leaching during weathering. The 
relative importance of sulphur and nitrogen depositions is expressed in the critical 
load of sulphur and of nitrogen respectively. The critical load for sulphur is 
derived from the computed critical load of actual acidity by using a sulphur 
fraction. The sulphur fraction is the ratio of sulphur deposition to the net deposi-
tion of sulphur and nitrogen. In calculating the sulphur fraction, uptake and 
immobilization of nitrogen is taken into account. The critical load of nitrogen 
reflects the sensitivity of ecosystems to both eutrophication and acidity. Nitrogen 
uptake for managed forests is taken as the maximum allowable eutrophication 
an earlier version of the model soil acidity, lake acidity and forest impacts of acidification 
were treated in separate submodels. 
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limit. Therefore the critical load of nitrogen is the share of the critical load of 
acidity attributed to nitrogen. For forests this critical load is corrected for the 
nitrogen uptake (Hettelingh et al., 1991). 
Discussion on environmental impacts 
In the RAINS model deposition patterns emerging from scenarios can be com-
pared with critical loads. Damage resulting from acidifying deposition is therefore 
expressed in physical terms, i.e. the exceedance of critical loads. The RAINS 
model makes no attempt to assign a monetary value to the damage of critical load 
exceedance. As a result, it is not possible to apply a cost-benefit analysis to 
acidification within the model. The model can only compute a cost- effective 
emission allocation if given a certain deposition target. In Chapter 2, I called this 
approach the 'ecological approach'. A disadvantage of the approach is that, in a 
neo-classical optimal pollution-control context, it is implicitly assumed that the 
damage above the deposition target is infinitely large. Exceedance of critical loads 
are assumed to have an equal weight, which is an unrealistic assumption. 
A drawback to the critical loads as used in the RAINS model is that these loads 
are based only on the sensitivity of soils and surface waters. This means that other 
damage related to acidification, like direct damage to vegetation and buildings, 
and health damage is not taken into account. Another problem is that the critical 
loads are annual average loads. Peak concentrations, which may cause substantial 
health damage for example, are not taken into account (Chadwick and Kuylen-
stierna, 1992). Finally, the methodology used for subdividing the critical load for 
acidification into a critical load for sulphur and a critical load for nitrogen has to 
be criticized since this methodology is strongly debatable. A main disadvantage of 
the current formulation of these critical loads for sulphur and nitrogen is that the 
loads do not depend only on ecosystem properties, but also on the current 
deposition ratio of sulphur and nitrogen. However, the ratio between sulphur and 
nitrogen deposition is not a fixed number but may change over time. This 
suggests that the critical loads should be recalculated whenever the deposition 
composition of sulphur and nitrogen changes (Downing et al., 1993). 
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4.3 The ASAM model 
The Abatement Strategies Assessment Model (ASAM) was developed against 
the background of the international negotiations concerning the abatement of S0 2 
and NO x . To date the model only contains the emissions of S0 2 . The aim of the 
model is to serve as a computer tool to assist in the development of progressive 
reductions of acid deposition for achieving environmental goals (ApSimon et al., 
1994). 
As I indicated in the introduction, the structure of the ASAM is rather similar to 
the structure of the RAINS model. The EMEP transfer matrix is used to describe 
the atmospheric transport of S0 2 , critical loads being used to assess the environ-
mental damage of a certain emission allocation. The model differs with respect to 
the spatial scale on which emissions are considered and, as a result, abatement 
costs are no longer national cost curves. A second major difference is the 
approach used to derive effective emission reductions. The following subsections 
explain these two differences in more detail. 
4.3.1 Emissions and costs 
In the ASAM, the S0 2 emissions are not taken at national level but at the grid 
level of 150 x 150 km. One advantage of this approach is that major emission 
sources can be treated explicitly. This approach compensates for the drawback of 
the assumption of a constant spatial distribution within a country, as made in the 
RAINS model. Unfortunately, the EMEP emission inventory does not distinguish 
different emission sources, like power plants and industrial and domestic energy 
uses. The ASAM, however, is able to use official national emission data that do 
distinguish these source categories. In this model the spatial distribution of future 
emissions is kept constant over time and is based on the current emission pattern 
(ApSimon et al., 1994). Available literature does not make it clear which official 
emission data are ultimately used in the ASAM. 
As emissions are considered on a 150 x 150 km grid scale, ASAM has provisi-
on for individual specification of the costs of emission reduction for each indivi-
dual grid cell. However, since in practice national emission data are used, costs of 
abatement are estimated accordingly. The abatement costs for sulphur dioxide are 
based on the national cost functions of the RAINS model. These cost functions 
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are scaled for each source grid square in a country according to the proportion of 
the country's emissions in that square. Because cost curves can involve some large 
reductions at constant costs, the ASAM defines a maximum reduction step 
equivalent to emissions from a single power plant, or limited by a ceiling on 
expenditure per step (ApSimon et al., 1994). Because the RAINS abatement cost 
functions are used, the criticism that the option of energy conservation is not 
included in these functions holds for the ASAM as well. Although the ASAM 
claims to take into account the emissions from individual sources and their related 
costs, the emission and cost data are not available for this purpose. Therefore the 
intended accurate spatial distribution of emissions and costs is actually only a 
rough estimate. 
The grid square to grid square approach might only cause changes for the 
largest countries in Europe with significant internal differences in emission 
densities. Model results show that there appears to be no significant influence 
from the use of grid square to grid square atmospheric transport (IIASA, 1991). 
4.3.2 Effective emission reductions 
The ASAM can be used to derive economically and environmentally effective 
emission reductions. This is known as the Best Economic Environmental Pathway 
(BEEP). It is based on the assumption that environmental improvement will be 
achieved through a series of successive steps during a specified time period. At 
each step the ratio between the benefit, in terms of reduction of deposition 
towards specified target loads, and the associated costs should be maximized. 
Accordingly, ASAM produces a sequence of emission reductions at selected 
emitters, with deposition converging towards target levels as a function of the 
cumulative costs (ApSimon et al., 1994). Deposition targets can be critical loads 
or other specified target loads. At each step the model selects for each emitter the 
cheapest available emission reduction option not yet implemented and the 
associated benefit of the corresponding reduction. The benefit of a reduction for a 
source j consists of the change in deposition at any receptor caused by that 
emission reduction and of the contribution of this emission reduction towards the 
reduction of the difference between current deposition and the target deposition at 
any receptor. If the target is met at a receptor, this latter contribution is reduced 
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to zero. Weighting functions built into the model can be used to put more 
emphasis on sensitive areas, or to weigh susceptible areas where the exceedance is 
particularly large. Successive steps are implemented until the target loads are 
attained or the maximum expenditure allowed is exhausted (ApSimon et al., 
1994). 
The BEEP approach has the advantage that it clearly shows how the benefit to 
cost ratio changes with increasing expenditure, and how well environmental goals 
are being reached given an overall amount of money to spend on emission 
reduction. However, this is only a quasi-advantage. Similar information can be 
provided by the RAINS model, for example by comparing cost effective emission 
allocations with different deposition targets. Another benefit of the sequential 
procedure applied in the ASAM is that it is not subject to discontinuities in the 
pattern of emitters at which reductions are selected. For example, in the case of 
tightening targets, flue gas desulphurization once fitted to a power plant will not 
be switched to another. A third advantage is that ASAM still produces useful 
results even if the target loads specified cannot be completely attained. More 
sophisticated linear optimization techniques concentrate on obtaining just a single 
"best solution" strategy to meet the specified target deposition (ApSimon and 
Wilson, 1991). This is only a small advantage since LP techniques also provide 
information about which target loads may not be achieved. LP solutions also 
provide so called shadow prices which indicate the relative difficulty of attaining 
targets at the receptors. 
In conclusion, the advantages of using the BEEP approach instead of linear 
programming to derive the cost effective emission allocation are not very great. 
Moreover, in the available literature on the ASAM, it is not clear exactly which 
optimization procedure is followed to determine the Best Economic Environ-
mental Pathway. Conceptually, the ASAM allows for more accurate calculations 
by using emissions at grid cell level. However, lack of data means that an 
approximation of the associated control costs for each grid cell is required and 
that no change in the future spatial distribution of emissions can be assumed. Thus 
accuracy is cancelled out. 
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4.4 The CASM model 
The structure of the Co-ordinated Abatement Strategy Model (CASM) is similar 
to the structure of the RAINS model. CASM is built around a linear programming 
package and was developed to help develop acid rain control strategies. The 
model includes SOz and NO x emissions. All data required for use in CASM is 
prepared by the Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI), with the exception of 
EMEP transfer matrices (Gough et al., 1993). 
The CASM offers a choice of optimization criteria. Like the RAINS model, 
CASM can perform cost minimization, subject to constraints. Other additional 
optimization criteria that are available are exceedance, damage and area minimiza-
tions, given a budget constraint of total allowable abatement expenditure (Rose-
marin, 1991). Exceedance minimization minimizes the number of tonnes of 
sulphur exceeding critical loads. Damage minimization minimizes a weighted 
exceedance of critical loads counted up over all receptors. In this alternative, 
receptors have different influence depending on the extent of exceedance. In area 
minimization, the exceedance of critical loads is restricted to the smallest possible 
area. The extent of exceedance is of no importance in this optimization alterna-
tive. In the following subsections I discuss emissions, cost curves and critical 
loads of the CASM. 
4.4.1 Emissions 
As in the RAINS model, national emissions in the CASM are based on energy 
use data. The energy demand in OECD countries is derived from official energy 
projections. The energy demand in non-OECD countries is based on energy 
projections prepared for the Stockholm Environmental Institute. Demand for 
energy is divided into five sectors, and seven fuel types are distinguished. In order 
to calculate national emissions, the energy demand for every sector is combined 
with fuel sulphur content estimates and fuel conversion retention factors. Where 
appropriate, emissions from industrial processes are also included. The way 
emissions are calculated in the ASAM is very similar to the approach used in the 
RAINS model, the difference being that other energy data are used. 
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4.4.2 Costs 
In the CASM, control costs functions are on national basis. As in the RAINS 
model, these national cost functions are based on the application of several control 
technologies. Also as in the RAINS model, energy conservation is not taken into 
account. The methodology for establishing these cost functions is as follows. Total 
annual costs and the sulphur removed are listed for every technology. The 
technologies are sorted by the total annual costs, and uneconomic technologies are 
rejected. Criteria for rejection are not explicit in the available publications on 
CASM. Next, the marginal costs and the marginal amount of sulphur removed are 
calculated. This gives the marginal costs per ton of sulphur removed. Finally the 
cost curve is smoothed (Rosemarin, 1991). 
The sources for which the costs of abatement technologies are specified are 
power stations, industrial boilers and refineries. To obtain the cost functions, the 
energy demand of a sector and the sulphur content of fuel are taken into account. 
The technical abatement options for sulphur removal differ per sector and fuel 
type used. These include coal washing, flue gas desulphurization and fluidized bed 
combustion. A complete list of abatement options is given in Rosemarin (1991). 
Technology cost functions are a combination of a capital cost function and an 
operating and maintenance cost function. Cost factors are construction costs, 
labour costs, electricity costs and by-product disposal costs. 
Similarities between cost functions in the CASM and the RAINS model differ 
from country to country. For instance, the marginal costs for Poland for the year 
2000 in the CASM are very similar to the costs in the RAINS model. However, 
for France, the CASM estimates show substantial higher marginal abatement costs 
compared to the abatement costs in the RAINS model (Rosemarin, 1991). 
Accurate information that explains this difference is not available. To obtain the 
abatement cost functions of NO x, a distinction is made between stationary and 
mobile sources. Abatement options for stationary sources are combustion modifi-
cations and selective catalytic reductions. The abatement options for mobile 
sources depend upon the type of engine. A main abatement option for petrol 
engines is the use of catalytic converters. Measures for diesel engines that meet 
certain emission standards are specified. As in the RAINS model, the technical 
information on abatement measures in the CASM is combined with cost estimates 
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for each source category. Finally, these cost estimates are combined in a national 
cost curve (Gough et al., 1993). 
Model results show that for most emission reduction scenarios the cost estimates 
of the CASM are in broad agreement with the RAINS model. The differences in 
costs have a range of 20% (IIASA, 1991). 
4.4.3 Critical Loads 
For analysing the environmental effects of acid deposition, the Stockholm Envi-
ronmental Institute (SEI) developed a method of estimating the differential 
relative sensitivity of surface areas of Europe to acidic deposition. In this section 
this method is explained and differences from the critical loads as developed by 
the Coordination Center for Effects (CCE) are indicated. 
The SEI aims at the determination of the relative sensitivity of ecosystems for 
showing the relative size of the effect that a unit of acid deposition will have on 
living organisms of different aquatic or terrestrial ecosystems (Chadwick and 
Kuylenstierna, 1992). The effect of acid deposition depends on the direct and 
indirect effects. Indirect effects occur because of acid deposition on the soil. The 
most important site factors influencing the sensitivity of ecosystems to the indirect 
effects are rock type, soil type, land use and annual rainfall. A small number of 
categories of these factors which have different effects on sensitivity are distin-
guished. The effects of these categories are expressed in weights. Next, weights 
are applied to the four site factors in proportion to the known or assumed degree 
to which they affect sensitivity. When combined, a range of sensitivity classes 
results. From this range, five relative sensitivity classes are defined. These five 
classes are mapped for areas in Europe. Since it does not seem justifiable to give 
absolute values to a relative scale, targets are assigned to the classes of relative 
sensitivity which are based on critical load values (Chadwick and Kuylenstierna, 
1992). The target of Class 4 is twice as large as the target of Class 5, which is the 
most sensitive and the target of Class 3 is twice as large as that of Class 4 and so 
on. 
A main advantage of the method to assign critical loads to sensitive areas as 
developed by the SEI is the use of several factors to specify acidic sensitivity of 
the environment. In contrast to the critical loads developed by the CCE, the 
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sensitivity classes developed by the SEI are not only based on soil type, but other 
relevant factors are also taken into account. However, like the critical loads 
developed by the CCE, the sensitivity classes developed by the SEI ignore acidic 
sensitivity of cultural properties or health implications caused by acidic pollution. 
A drawback of the method used by the SEI is that finally only five sensitivity 
classes are distinguished. The map developed by the SEI was compared with the 
critical loads map of the CCE. In general the SEI map has lower critical loads; in 
other words the amount of deposition not causing damage is lower. The largest 
similarities are in Northern Europe and in the USSR. Differences occur in 
Southern, Western and South-Eastern Europe. Maps showing the differences are 
given in Hettelingh et al. (1991). 
The effect of using the different critical load maps was analysed by a CASM 
run. For this purpose an exceedance minimization subject to a cost constraint was 
calculated. This cost constraint consisted of the cost of a uniform 50% emission 
reduction on 1980 figures in all countries. Calculation results show that compared 
to SEI critical loads, the total amount of sulphur abated is similar, but if CCE 
critical loads are used, a slightly greater degree of abatement takes place in 
Northern and Central Europe and the USSR and consequently less in Southern, 
Western and South-Eastern Europe. In keeping with the pattern of abatement, the 
greater number of emission reduction in Northern and Central Europe, using CCE 
critical load maps results in lower critical load exceedance in this region. Like-
wise, a greater exceedance of critical loads occurs in Southeastern, Southern and 
Western Europe if the CCE map rather than the SEI map is used (Hettelingh, et 
al., 1991). However, the use of this single example does not allow a general 
conclusion to be drawn on the effect of the use of different critical load maps. 
Hetteling et al. (1991) concluded that as the overall differences in SEI and CCE 
European critical load maps are small and as they result in broadly similar 
abatement strategies, the confidence in the use of critical load maps is promoted. 
4.5 Non European acid rain models 
In previous sections of this chapter I limited discussion to European acid rain 
models. However, acid rain is not a typically European environmental problem 
only. To give a more complete overview of acid rain models, in this section non-
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European acid rain models are reviewed: first an Asian model and then United 
States models. 
In July 1992, a research project was begun on acid rain and emission reduction 
in Asia, the model being based on the framework of the RAINS model (Foell et 
al., 1995). RAINS-Asia is an integrated assessment model for 23 countries in Asia 
and focuses on S0 2 emissions. It consists of three sub modules: (i) the energy and 
emissions module, (ii) the acid deposition module, (iii) the ecosystems impact 
module. The energy and emission module calculates the emission for a range of 
energy scenarios and the abatement costs. The core of the module is a sectoral 
and fuel specific end-use energy model. Sulphur emissions are calculated from the 
energy scenarios taking fuel characteristics, combustion technology and emission 
control assumptions into account. The module provides a gridded inventory of 
S0 2 emissions. The deposition module calculates the ambient levels and the 
deposition loading throughout Asia that result from a certain emission allocation. 
Next, in the ecosystem impact module, deposition levels can be compared with 
critical loads. By assessing the consequences of emission strategies, RAINS-Asia 
will be a useful tool for policy makers on acid rain at both national and regional 
levels. 
In the US several types of acid rain models have been developed. As well as an 
integrated assessment model, there is also a model which takes uncertainty into 
account and another which takes probability into account. In 1984, a framework 
for an integrated assessment model was designed within the US National Acid 
Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP). However, the model has never been 
operational. It was designed to link models or data bases in such a manner that 
policy decisions could be made on a cost-benefit analysis (Streets, 1989). The 
model has 6 modules: (i) emissions, (ii) atmospheric processes, (iii) receptor 
systems, (iv) economic valuation, (v) control and mitigation and (vi) policy 
evaluation. Modules (i) to (iii) are more or less similar to the modules in the 
RAINS and RAINS-Asia models. The economic valuation module calculates the 
direct and indirect economic damage (or benefit) of changes in deposition. 
Module (v) calculates the costs of emission control. In the RAINS model this 
module is integrated with the emissions module. The policy analysis module (vi) 
integrates all of the information generated in the rest of the model in a form 
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useful to the policy-maker. All that the policy analysis module can expect to 
achieve is to provide the best available tools to weigh the merits of alternative 
courses of action. In fact, the policy evaluation aims at providing a cost benefit 
analysis. 
The models discussed so far have not dealt with uncertainty. I now want to 
describe two models that include treatment of uncertainty. The first is the ADEPT 
(Acid DEPosition decision Tree program) which takes uncertainty into account in 
the analysis of acid rain (North et al., 1985). This model focuses on the balancing 
of costs of S0 2 emission abatement with the ecological effects. In the absence of 
perfect foresight, the model aims at providing the best decision based on the 
information available today. It is based on decision analysis, which provides a 
formal theory for choosing among alternatives whose consequences are uncertain. 
There are three stages in the ADEPT model. First, there is the effect of control 
strategies on emissions. Secondly, the emissions are related to changes in deposi-
tion and finally changes in deposition must be related to changes in impacts. 
To describe a set of scenarios at different points in time, use is made of a 
decision tree. A decision tree can include a large number of scenarios defined by 
different combinations of decisions and outcomes at each stage. Once the scen-
arios have been described in terms of probabilities and values, the decision tree 
can be used to compare the decision alternatives. Each scenario shows the 
consequences of a particular strategy. The uncertainty in a scenario is represented 
by the extent to which emission reduction reduces acid deposition and on the 
relationship between deposition and long term ecological impacts. The judgement 
on uncertainties, however, is a subjective matter. The use of the decision frame-
work relies heavily on the assessment of judgemental probabilities. The ADEPT 
model has been used for illustrative calculations of the costs and benefits to 
individual states for acid deposition control policies (North et al., 1985). 
A probabilistic model was developed by Rubin et al. (1988). This model aims at 
calculating cost-effective emission controls for coal-fired power plants. The model 
is called the Integrated Environmental Control (IEC) Model since it takes both 
NO x and S0 2 emissions into account. A unique feature of the IEC model is its 
ability to analyse uncertainty. A range of output results is achieved which 
describes statistically the combined effects of uncertainties in many different 
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parameters that vary simultaneously. A cumulative frequency distribution then 
characterizes the probability that some result (e.g. cost) will exceed a specific 
value or lie within some specified range. This type of result is believed to be 
more meaningful than the single deterministic answers generally produced by 
studies. However, the IEC Model only focuses on coal-fired power plants, 
whereas in decision-making on cost effective acid rain abatement other emission 
sources should be taken into account. 
There are two types of non-European acid rain models: integrated assessment 
models and models including uncertainty. Taking uncertainty into account in acid 
rain models seems an attractive alternative. However, as the judgement on 
uncertainties is a subjective matter this will influence model results. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have discussed acid rain models paying most attention to 
integrated assessment models. These models are policy oriented and provide 
information on the costs and environmental effects of different emission abate-
ment strategies. Environmental damage is not expressed in monetary terms in the 
integrated assessment models, because accurate monetarization of environmental 
damage is not possible in practise. Instead, the environmental damage is treated in 
physical terms. Physical environmental targets are often used in environmental 
policy. Given these targets, a cost-effective emission abatement policy can be 
stipulated. The use of physical environmental targets is very usefull for policy 
oriented models . 
Among the European integrated assessment models the RAINS model is the 
most complete and extensive model. Although the RAINS model, the ASAM and 
the CASM are very similar, they diverge on various points as well. One differ-
ence is the number of acidifying compounds taken into account. Another differ-
ence concerns the optimization options that are implemented. A third point of 
difference is the emission accuracy. Finally, different data sources are used. The 
main benefit of the ASAM model is its accuracy on emission locations and the 
resulting atmospheric transport. However, because data for this purpose is 
unavailable, the intended accuracy is not entirely reliable. Model results show no 
significant differences caused by the grid to grid approach used. A serious 
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drawback of this model is the lack of clarity of the procedure to derive the so 
called Best Economic Environmental Pathway. 
The CASM is attractive because of its large number of optimization criteria. 
However, since policy aims at reaching certain deposition targets, optimization 
criteria to minimize environmental damage given a budget constraint are actually 
not very useful for policy purposes. Comparison of the CASM and the RAINS 
model shows that the model results are broadly in line with each other. The 
current status of acceptance of the RAINS model might be explained by two rea-
sons. First, the model is the most completely integrated assessment model for 
acidification. The alternative integrated assessment models, the CASM and the 
ASAM, do not substantially improve on the RAINS model. Second, RAINS was 
developed by scientists of various disciplines at an international "East-West" 
institute. This aspect's main role was the acceptance of the RAINS model in 
international policy-making (Hordijk, 1991, 1995). 
Despite the completeness of the integrated assessment models, they can still be 
improved. A main point for improvement is the abatement cost functions. At the 
moment these are not very accurate. One difficulty is that the model should 
predict the optimal emissions for a future year. This requires assumptions about 
future energy use which among others depends upon things like fuel prices and 
economic development; factors that are difficult to estimate. In this context, 
models including uncertainty may be a valuable complement to deterministic 
models. Obviously, the judgement on uncertainty remains a subjective matter. 
Another point for improvement is the valuation of environmental damage. As 
indicated in this chapter, the critical loads developed by CCE and by the SEI do 
not take all damage factors into account. Estimation of environmental damage 
requires factors like the presence of (historical) buildings and agricultural crops to 
be taken into account. Despite the need for improvement, the acid rain models 
have substantially increased knowledge about the acid rain problem and provide 
useful information to assist and improve policy-making. 
In my research I used the RAINS model for calculations. Since I needed to 
calculate cost-effective emission allocations and to analyse deposition levels 
resulting from emission allocations, the use of an integrated assessment model was 
the most appropriate. I chose the RAINS model for two reasons: first, it is the 
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most complete model for acidification; second, it is broadly accepted, since it was 
actually used in the international negotiations on the Second Sulphur Protocol. 

5 PERMIT TRADING FOR NON-UNDJORMLY MIXING 
POLLUTANTS 
5.1 Introduction 
As I showed in Chapter 2, trading emission permits that is subject to rules 
might be a promising instrument for achieving a cost-effective emission abatement 
allocation, while taking deposition targets into account. In Chapter 3 I discussed 
the theory on tradeable permits more thoroughly. This present chapter elaborates 
on permit trading, on the assumption that trading is a bilateral and sequential 
process. I analyse whether cost effective emission abatement can be achieved by 
bilateral permit trading, and how such a bilateral trading system would look. In 
particular, the following topics will be examined: (i) the cost effective allocation 
of emission abatement, (ii) the need for a bilateral trading process versus a 
simultaneous trading process, and (iii) conditions needed for the bilateral trading 
process to achieve the cost effective allocation of emission abatement. 
Permit trading as a bilateral and sequential process was first simulated by 
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991), by applying a non-degradation offset system. 
According to this system, every trade transaction must not exceed deposition 
targets, not may total emissions increase. The simulation results of Atkinson and 
Tietenberg show that under these specific settings bilateral trade may improve 
efficiency, but is not able to approach the cost-effective allocation of emission 
abatement. Applying the deposition constraint to every bilateral trade transaction 
in the way Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) did, is a very restrictive rale that 
prevents the achievement of the cost-effective solution. 
In this chapter I introduce an alternative bilateral trading system which is the 
able to achieve the cost-effective emission abatement. According to this system 
not every bilateral trade transaction has to meet the deposition targets, but deposi-
tion targets should be met in the final stage, after the completion of a sequence of 
trade transactions. Because of this liberalization of restrictions, bilateral trade 
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might coincide with the cost-effective solution.41 To meet the deposition targets 
after a sequence of trade transactions, the amounts traded have to be controlled by 
a trade institution. The maximum number of traded permits between two sources 
allowed by the trade institution can be derived from the cost-effective solution for 
each transaction. Such an alternative bilateral trading scheme is indicated as 
'guided bilateral trade'. 
The aim of this chapter is to develop the methodology and the principles for 
guided bilateral trade by means of theoretical and hypothetical examples. I show 
how and under which conditions guided bilateral trade may lead to the cost-
effective solution. I use a small model to illustrate the system of guided bilateral 
trade. Profitable trade opportunities appear to depend on a combination of the 
source-receptor matrix and the abatement-cost functions. Because guided bilateral 
trade is formulated as an optimization problem with a large number of equations 
and inequalities, it has not been possible to provide an analytical derivation of the 
optimum conditions for profitable trades. This means that it is not possible to 
derive conditions for the source-receptor matrix and for the abatement-cost 
functions that guarantee profitable trade opportunities. 
This introduction concludes with a reminder of the classification of trade 
systems in Table 5.1. Two main criteria are cost effectiveness and violation of 
deposition targets. There are two explanations for cost-effective emission abate-
ment: (I) an emission abatement allocation which abates a certain amount of 
emission at minimum abatement costs or (II)an emission abatement allocation 
which meets certain deposition targets at minimum abatement costs. This distinc-
tion is relevant since in the acid rain problem not only are the number of 
emissions important but the deposition resulting from an emission allocation also. 
In this study lam mainly interested in cost effectiveness of type II, as nowadays 
this approach is very relevant for policy-making. 
•"Assuming a fixed number of emission permits, bilateral trade will only result in cost-effective 
emission abatement if the total number of issued emission permits coincides with the sum of emissions 
in the cost-effective abatement allocation. 
Table 5.1 Overview of different trade systems 
Trade system: Offset rate: Description: Cost effective: 
emission deposition 
Non-violation of Discussed in 
deposition tar- section: 
gets 
IT) an 
yes no no 5.3 
non-degradation 
offset 
no no yes 
5.3 
pollution offset no yes yes 5.3 (5.4.2) 
modified pollu-
tion offset 
no yes yes 5.3 (5.4.2) 
yes no no 5.4.1 
non-degradation 
offset 
no no yes 5.4.1 
pollution offset no ? yes 5.4.2 
modified pollu-
tion offset 
no ? yes 5.4.2 
guided bilateral 
trade 
no yes yes* 5.5 
simultaneous 
bilateral 
unconstrained 
constrained 
unconstrained 
offset rate = 1 
offset rate 
. offset rate = 1 
constrained <^ 
\ ^ offset rate 
offset rate = 1 
* only if all trade transactions defined by the trade vector are profitable (see section 5.5) 
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A main distinction in trade systems is that between simultaneous permit trading 
and bilateral permit trading. This distinction is important because, subject to the 
deposition targets, simultaneous permit trading can capitalize instantaneously on 
all increases and decreases among sources whereas bilateral trade cannot (Atkin-
son and Tietenberg, 1991). The second distinction is that between unconstrained 
and constrained permit trading. To reach cost-effective emission abatement of the 
latter, permit trading has to be restricted in some way so as to take account of 
deposition targets. I shall argue that constrained permit trading is only possible if 
permit trading is regarded as a bilateral process. However, in the literature, 
constrained permit trading is also regarded as a simultaneous process. Therefore 
Table 5.1 includes constrained simultaneous permit trading is included. A final 
distinction concerning trade systems that should be mentioned concerns the offset 
rate. Offset rate is defined as the amount of emissions that a source has to reduce 
if another source increases its emission by one unit. The most natural way to 
think of permit trading is on a one-to-one basis, which implies an offset rate of 1. 
However, if deposition targets are taken into account, it might not be necessary 
for the amount of emission reduction to equal the amount of emission increase. In 
such cases the offset rate might be unequal to one. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. First, in section 5.2, an example 
is introduced and the cost-effective abatement allocation is derived. This example 
is used throughout the chapter to illustrate the effect of different trade systems. 
Next, in section 5.3, simultaneous permit trading is reviewed. Section 5.4 dis-
cusses bilateral permit trading. The requirement that every trade has to meet given 
deposition targets is explored and the offset rates for different trade-rules are 
derived. In section 5.5 the idea of 'guided bilateral' trade is elaborated and 
illustrated. Section 5.6 is conclusions. 
5.2 Cost-effective emission abatement 
Cost-effective emission allocation that does not violate deposition targets 
follows from the optimization problem in which deposition targets (ct•) at every 
receptor i are met at minimum aggregate abatement costs (C) of the n sources. 
The level of abatement (r) depends on the difference between initial emissions 
(Ej) and actual emissions (ej. The deposition at a receptor depends upon the 
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emission of the sources affecting that receptor, multiplied by the transfer coeffi-
c i e n t s - I n the remainder of this chapter, cost-effective emission abatement 
refers to achieving deposition targets at minimum abatement costs. Mathematically 
the problem is defined as follows: 
MinJTCfr) (5J) 
n 
s.t^a^j < d*, for every i ft-^) 
rj= Ej-ej (5-3) 
r^O, rf<Ej (5-4) 
To illustrate the cost effective solution, a numerical example is developed for 5 
emission sources (n=5) and 5 receptor sites (i=5). In the base situation it is 
assumed that the initial emission (EJ of source j = 1,...,5 amounts, of 275, 200, 
175, 400, 350 respectively. The transfer of emissions is given by the transfer 
matrix A. An element av represents the share of source j ' s emission deposits at 
receptor i. 
0.5 0.1 0 0 0 
0.25 0.4 0.05 0.05 0 
0 0.05 0.45 0.1 0.20 
0 0.15 0.05 0.5 0.15 
0 0 0.05 0.35 0.45 
The deposition at receptor i = 1,...,5 resulting from the initial emission levels 
amounts of 158, 178, 199, 291 and 306 respectively. It is assumed that the deposi-
tion target (<£) are 100 for each receptor. This requires substantial emission 
abatement. 
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For reason of simplicity in this initial example, abatement-cost functions for 
source j = 1,...,5 are assumed to be affine 0} is the amount of emission abatement 
by source j ) : 4 2 C, = 10 + 100r, 
C2 = 50 + 200r2 
Q = 75 + 300r3 
C4 = 700 + 50r4 
C5 = 25 + 175r5 
It is assumed that no emission abatement takes place in the base situation. The 
solution to the optimization problem as formulated by equation (5.1)- (5.4) shows 
that the minimum costs needed to meet the deposition targets are 87,010.43 Total 
emissions are 575. The average emission reduction for the base situation is 59%. 
Table 5.2 gives an overview of abatement, costs, emissions and deposition in the 
cost-effective emission abatement allocation. 
Table 5.2 EXAMPLE I (59%): Overview of emissions, abatement, costs and 
deposition in the cost effective allocation. 
Source/ 
receptor 
3 4 
1 275 59 216 21610 60 
2 200 200 0 0 100 
3 175 106 69 20775 100 
4 400 0 400 20100 67 
5 350 210 140 24525 100 
sum 1400 575 825 87010 
In the cost-effective abatement allocation, source 4 abates all emission. This can 
be explained by the low marginal abatement costs of source 4. Moreover, the 
4 2This assumption is released in section 5.5.3. 
4 3This solution follows from solving the optimization problem with the linear programming packa-
ge 'pcprog'. 
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column sum in the transfer matrix of source 4 equals 1, indicating that all 
emissions from source 4 are deposited in the region under consideration. All other 
sources have a column sum smaller than 1, which means that part of the 
emissions are deposited outside the region. Source 3 reduces 40% of its initial 
emissions, in spite of high marginal abatement costs. This might be explained by 
the relatively large transfer coefficient of source 3 for receptor 3, which is one of 
the binding receptors. Receptors 1 and 4 are non-binding in the cost-effective 
abatement allocation. Consequently, relaxing the deposition target for receptor 1 
and/or receptor 4 will not influence total abatement costs. Receptor 2, 3 and 5 are 
binding. A graphical illustration of the cost-effective abatement allocation is given 
in Figure 5.1. 4 4 The cost-effective allocation of emissions is at point CE. The 
initial emissions are represented by point E. 
e2 
- C 3 
• C2 
- c i 
Aesd* I 
E 
Figure 5.1 
B el 
Cost-effective allocation of emission 
Figure 5.1 considers the emissions of two sources. Emissions of source 1 (el) 
are measured along the x-axis and emissions of source 2 (e2) along the y-axis. 
The deposition target can be met by different combinations of el and e2. The 
•"In contrast to the numerical illustration, in the graphical illustration, in agreement with common 
practice, abatement-cost functions are assumed to be non-linear. 
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polygon AB defines the feasible area; i.e. AB represents combinations of 
emissions of both sources which do not violate the deposition targets. 
Different emission allocations imply different abatement costs. Total abatement 
costs are represented by iso-cost curves Cl, C2, and C3. A low emission level 
implies high abatement costs. Consequently, moving to the origin, iso-cost curves 
represent a higher level of abatement costs. Therefore C3 represents the lowest 
level of abatement costs. However, the emission combinations corresponding to 
C3 violate the deposition targets. The deposition target meets the lowest cost at 
CE. Given the initial emission allocation E, both sources have to reduce emissions 
though not to the same extent, to reach point CE. 
5.3 Simultaneous permit trading 
Having presented a benchmark in the previous section, in this section I want to 
introduce permit trading. Simultaneous permit trading assumes that all sources 
trade multilaterally. Assuming profit-maximizing behaviour, competitive markets, 
the availability of full information and lack of restrictions, simultaneous permit 
trading will equalize marginal abatement costs.45 As a result, the emission 
abatement is cost effective but will not meet deposition targets.46 Figure 5.2 
illustrates simultaneous trade. 
As in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 shows the emissions of two sources, el and e2. Point 
CE represents the cost-effective emission allocation which meets the deposition 
targets at minimum costs. If the number of initially issued permits equals the 
number of emissions in the cost-effective allocation (CE), then the initial permit 
allocation has to be somewhere on the dotted line SEPj.47 Simultaneous permit 
trading will result in point S, since at that point the allocation of permits is 
tangent to the highest iso-cost curve, which implies that, given the total amount of 
emission permits, abatement costs are at a minimum. There is no rationale for 
sources to stop trading permits at point CE because moving to point S means 
4 5This has been explained in Chapter 2. 
mln section 4.1 this is indicated as cost effectiveness of type I. 
4 7 The choice of an initial permit allocation is extensively discussed in section 4.5. 
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Figure 5.2 Simultaneous Trading in Permits 
additional cost savings. However, the simultaneous trade result violates the 
deposition targets. This illustrates that permit trading has to be constrained in 
some way to take deposition targets into account. 
Constrained simultaneous trade by means of trading subject to rules has already 
been discussed by several authors (see Chapter 3, section 3.4). However, the 
concept of simultaneous permit trading being constrained is vague. No answer is 
given in the literature to the question of how to implement a system of con-
strained simultaneous trade (see e.g. Krupnick et al., 1983). It is difficult to think 
of a simple mechanism that mimics simultaneous trade subject to rules. In the 
literature (e.g. Krupnick et al., 1983) it is mistakenly said that simultaneous trade 
will automatically result in the cost-effective solution. This is unrealistic because 
there is no indication of how constraints should be implemented in practice. 
Therefore, the idea that a cost-effective abatement allocation satisfying the 
deposition targets (point CE in Figure 5.2) can be reached by constrained simulta-
neous trade is purely theoretical. A more realistic assumption is to see permit 
trading as a bilateral sequential process (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991). 
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5.4 Bilateral Permit Trading 
5.4.1 One-to-one emission trading 
A natural way to think of permit trading in practice is of trading being a 
bilateral process. This section looks at bilateral trade between a seller (S) and a 
buyer (B). Assuming that permit trading takes place bilaterally, a sequence of 
trade transactions takes place in which different sources can act as seller and 
buyer. 
When S and B are allowed to exchange emission permits that do not exceed 
deposition targets, they do so under cost minimization. The trade result can be 
derived from the following optimization problem:48 
(5.5) 
efa,j + exsals + eBaIB< d", for every i (5.6) 
j*S, B 
1 0 
es= es- cr 
(5.7) 
e/= ej,j±S,j*B (5.9) 
r = Ej~ ej , j=S,B 
es+ eB<, es+ eB 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
o,P,e5,eB > 0 
(5.12) 
where: 
C/ry): abatement-cost function of source j 
e°j. pre-trade emission of source j 
e'f. post-trade emission of source j 
Ef. initial emission of source j 
"""In this analysis it is assumed that banking of permits does not take place. The effect of banking 
was analysed by Cronshaw and Kruse (1994). 
Permit trading for non uniformly mixing pollutants 117 
a: number of emission permits sold 
8: number of emission permits bought 
r/. emission abatement of source j 
a,f. transfer coefficient of source j to receptor i 
<£;. deposition target at receptor i; 
In this optimization problem, source S is selling emission permits to source B. 
Consequently, source S has to increase emission reduction whereas source B will 
reduce less than originally required. The change in emission reduction results 
from the difference between initial emissions and pre-trade emissions and initial 
emissions and post-trade emissions (Arj = e'} -e°). The emission allocation after 
the trade transaction has to meet the deposition target at every receptor. First, the 
pre-trade emissions follow from the number of permits a source is initially 
equipped with. The systems of issuing emission permits were discussed in Chapter 
3, section 3.6. As a result of trading, pre-trade emissions change for a subsequent 
trade. 
This section analyses bilateral trade according to Atkinson and Tietenberg 
(1991), assuming permit trading takes place on a one-to-one basis (i.e. CT=|3). It 
illustrates that the cost-effective solution cannot be achieved by means of this 
trading system. 
Trade opportunities depend largely on the transfer coefficients. If am < ajS, 
trading emission permits are always allowed with respect to receptor i, because in 
this case the decrease in deposition caused by source S is equal to, or exceeds the 
increase in deposition caused by source B. If am > ais, trade is only possible 
where receptor i is non-binding. The maximum traded number of emission 
permits for non-binding receptors (i.e. d°, < dt;, d°, represents the pre-trade 
deposition level) equals (dC, - (f)/(am - aiS).49 Where a receptor is binding, 
trading is only allowed if am < als. Although one-to-one trading is attractive 
because of its simplicity, trade opportunities are limited if trading permits take 
place on a one-to-one basis. This is first illustrated graphically and then numeri-
cally, using the model introduced in section 5.2. 
This only holds for > ajS. 
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Before bilateral permit trading can be simulated, an initial emission permit 
allocation has to be specified. The rule that every trade transaction has to meet 
deposition targets also requires the pre-trade allocation to meet the deposition 
targets. In this example it is assumed that every source is provided with a number 
of emission permits based upon a uniform emission-reduction percentage.50 The 
number of issued permits is established so that the deposition caused by the initial 
permit allocation meets the targets (i.e. d3, < </,). In Figures 5.3 and 5.4 the initial 
emission-permit allocation and the constrained and unconstrained bilateral trading 
result are represented, assuming an offset rate of one. 
e2 
As in Figure 5.1, emission combinations which do not harm the deposition 
target are represented by the shaded polygon in both figures. The initial emissions 
are at point E. Basing initial emission permits on a uniform emission reduction, 
the initial permits are represented by point EP. Because permit trading is assumed 
^This is also known as the sovereignity criterion (Rose and Stevens, 1993). Other criteria for the 
issuing of permits have been discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.6. 
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to take place with an offset rate of 1, the total number of emission permits 
remains constant. In the figures this is represented by the dotted 45-degree line 
ZEPj through EP. Trading permits imply a movement along line XEPj. 
Compared to the initial permit allocation (EP), Figure 5.3 shows that, if the sum 
of emissions el and e2 remains constant, deposition targets could be met at lower 
costs in the so called Quasi Cost Effective allocation (QCE). This is because point 
QCE is on a higher iso-cost curve, and represents lower total abatement costs than 
at point EP. 
e2 
\ s 
? 
EP2 
BIB 
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E 
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Figure 5.4 Unconstrained bilateral trading in permits 
Figure 5.4 shows the need for constrained permit trading. If trading permits are 
unconstrained, permit trading will result in point S, equal to the simultaneous 
trade result. Given the sum of emission permits, the allocation is at lowest cost in 
point S. However, point S is outside the feasible area. Only if trading permits are 
allowed on condition that deposition targets are not violated, will permit trading 
result in point QCE. The quasi cost-effective emission allocation is the emission 
allocation which minimizes abatement costs so that deposition targets are met, 
given the total number of available emission permits. The quasi cost-effective 
allocation can only be reached if permit trading is limited. As shown in section 
5.4, trade constraints can only be defined if the trading process is bilateral. 
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Figure 5.1 indicated that the cost-effective emission allocation is at point CE. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates that, given the initial emission permit allocation based upon 
uniform emission reduction and assuming that deposition targets must be met 
while permit trading takes place at a one-to-one basis, then the cost effective 
emission allocation will never be reached. If the aim is to reach the cost-effective 
emission allocation by permit trading on a one-to-one basis, the initial permit 
allocation has to be chosen differently. 
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Figure 5.5 Cost-effective trading in permits on a one-to-one basis 
In order to reach the cost-effective emission allocation (CE) by one-to-one 
constrained permit trading, the total number of issued emission permits has to 
equal the total emissions in point CE. Therefore the initial permit allocation has to 
be on line EEPj*, which intersects point CE. If the initial permit allocation is 
based on a uniform emission reduction, for example, the initial allocation is at 
EP*. Note that to reach the cost-effective solution, the initial permit allocation 
does not necessarily has to meet the deposition targets. Permit trading, restricted 
Permit trading for non uniformly mixing pollutants 121 
by a deposition constraint will now result in allocation CE.5 1 In CE the highest 
possible iso-cost curve representing the least abatement costs is reached and 
deposition targets are met. Permit trading still has to be constrained in some way 
to take care of deposition targets. 
The bilateral trading process, assuming an offset rate of 1, can be illustrated 
numerically using the model introduced in section 5.2. Following Atkinson and 
Tietenberg (1991) it is assumed that every trade transaction has to meet the 
deposition targets. Consequently, the initial emission permit allocation based upon 
an equal reduction percentage is such that deposition targets are met. Figure 5.3 
illustrated that this system of permit trading will only result in a quasi cost-
effective abatement allocation and not in the cost-effective abatement allocation. 
For the initial permit allocation EP not to violate deposition targets a total 
reduction percentage of 67.5% is required.52 In the cost-effective allocation, the 
average reduction percentage only amounts to 59%. If the initial permit allocation 
is based on a 59% reduction, point EP* from Figure 5.5 will be the initial alloca-
tion that violates deposition targets. 
Table 5.3 gives an overview of initial emissions (Ej), initial permit allocation 
(EPj), the pre-trade costs (Cj°) and depositions (d,0) as well as the quasi cost-
effective solution. The difference between the initial emission permit allocation 
and the emission allocation which meets deposition targets at the lowest cost, is 
indicated as a trade vector.53 In Figure 5.3 the trade vector is represented by EP-
QCE. In Figure 5.5, the trade vector is represented by EP*-CE. In Table 5.3, 
column five represents the trade vector. 
"In practice, the rule that permit trading is only allowed as long as deposition targets are not 
violated is no longer usable since the initial permit allocation EP* is outside the feasible area 
5 2 In PCPROG this is calculated by solving the equations that describe the relation between 
emission reduction and deposition, taking into account a uniform emission reduction percentage. 
"Whether this allocation is the quasi cost-effective allocation or the cost effective allocation 
depends upon the total amount of issued emission permits. 
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Table 5.3 EXAMPLE II (67.5%): Overview of pre-trade data and the quasi 
cost-effective solution. 
Source j / E, EPj C° d,0 Buy (+) ej' q 1 d,' 
receptor i Sell (-) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 275 90 18510 57 - 6 5 25 25010 50 
2 200 65 27050 58 + 135 200 50 95 
3 175 57 35475 65 + 118 175 75 100 
4 400 130 13600 95 - 130 0 20100 47 
5 350 114 41325 100 - 58 56 51475 34 
Sum 1400 456 135960 0 456 96710 
The cost-saving of permit trading, given the initial number of emission permits, 
amounts to 39250. This is the difference between abatement costs resulting from 
the initial permit allocation and the abatement costs in the quasi cost-effective 
emission allocation. In this example, bilateral and sequential trade in emission 
permits, requiring every trade not to exceed deposition targets captures all cost 
savings. That is buyers and sellers can trade all their permits at a profit. However, 
bilateral permit trading does not necessarily capture all cost savings. Whether all 
savings are captured depends on the source-receptor matrix and the abatement 
costs. Nevertheless, deposition targets can be met by lower abatement costs. A 
potential cost saving of 9700 (i.e. the difference between the costs in the quasi 
cost-effective allocation and the costs in the cost effective allocation) cannot be 
captured by means of the specified trade system. Table 5.4 shows the bilateral 
trade result stepwise. The sources that trade in emission permits are in bold and 
are underlined. 
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Table 5.4 EXAMPLE II (67,5%): Emissions, deposition and abatement cost 
after every bilateral trade transaction.54 
BILATERAL TRANSACTIONS: 
Source pre-
trade 
I n III IV V VI VII VIII rx 
EMISSIONS: 
1 90 90 90 54 54 36 28 iZ 27 25 
2 65 65 95 131 196 196 196 197 200 200 
3 57 157 157 157 157 175 175 175 175 175 
4 130 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 114 114 114 114 49 49 52 57 54 56 
DEPOSITION: 
1 57 67 70 56 62 55 51 51 51 50 
2 58 58 68 74 100 96 94 94 96 95 
3 65 100 98 100 90 98 100 100 100 100 
4 95 50 39 45 45 46 47 47 47 47 
5 100 70 59 59 30 31 34 34 33 34 
ABATEMENT COSTS (x 1000): 
1 18.5 18.5 18.5 22.1 22.1 23.9 24.7 24.8 24.8 25 
2 27 27 21 13.8 <ui 0.8 0.8 M 0 0 
3 35.5 5^ 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 0 0 0 0 0 
4 13.6 18.6 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1 
5 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 52.7 52.7 513 51.3 51.8 51.5 
Sum 136 111 106 102.8 101.2 97.5 96.9 96.8 96.7 96.6 
Saving 25 5 3.2 1.6 3.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 
In this example 9 bilateral trade transactions take place. After these transactions 
have taken place, permit trading is no longer possible without violating deposition 
'Small differences in costs compared to those in table 5.3 are caused by rounding off the figures. 
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targets. It is assumed that permits are traded in whole units. The trade sequence is 
defined as follows. Given the pre-trade emission allocation, the trade transaction 
generating the largest cost saving is assumed to take place first. Emission alloca-
tion alters after every trade transaction, consequently the opportunities for 
subsequent trade and the potential for cost savings in a subsequent trade alter. 
This explains why the cost savings differ in every trade transaction and do not 
follow a specific pattern. The quasi cost-effective allocation is achieved after the 
completion of all trade transactions. Notice that source 5 has to sell and buy 
permits successively in transaction VIII and IX. This is rather unrealistic for 
dynamics. Selling permits implies implementing additional reduction measures 
while buying permits allows these measures to be cancelled.55 
5.4.2 Offset Rates 
An alternative to permit trading on a one-to-one basis is permit trading with 
offset rates. An offset rate is defined as the emission amount a source S has to 
decrease if another source B increases emissions by one unit in order to meet the 
deposition constraint. The idea behind using offset rates is that so long as deposi-
tion targets are not violated, the amount of emission reduction does not have to 
equal the amount of emission increase. For instance, so long as deposition targets 
are met, two sources S and B are allowed to trade emission permits with an offset 
rate of 0.5 which means that the increase of emissions from source B is twice as 
much as the decrease of emission from source S. Consequently, total emissions 
will increase. This is only possible if source B is able to obtain the remaining 
number of emission permits from the authorities.56 
The concept of offset rates unequal to one is illustrated graphically in Figure 
5.6. This figure considers emissions from two sources, el and e2. The shaded area 
represents emission combinations which do not harm the deposition targets. The 
initial emission permit allocation, that meets the deposition target is assumed to be 
at EP. Since permit trading does not take place on a one-to-one base, Figure 5.6 
shows that it is possible to move from the initial permit allocation (EP) to the 
sSee also section 5.5.4. 
'In that case a trading agency functions as a "third' party in the bilateral trade transaction. 
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Figure 5.6 Permit trading with an offset rate 
cost-effective allocation (CE). Applying an offset rate unequal to one allows 
permit trading to move along line SEP/, which is not a 45° line. Because of 
trading along this line, in this illustration the total amount of permits increases. 
The need to define constraints for permit trading still holds. If trading permits 
were not constrained, trading would result in allocation T violating deposition 
targets. 
When deriving the offset rate for a trade between two sources S and B, 
distinction has to be made between binding and non-binding receptors. If a 
receptor is binding no increase in deposition at that receptor is allowed. Conse-
quently, the deposition at receptor i originating from source B has to be smaller 
than, or equal to the deposition originating from source S: 
From equation (5.13) the offset rate follows: V = Ae/AeB > aiB/aiS. This offset rate 
only holds for one binding receptor. In general the offset rate has to be set so as 
not to violate the deposition target at any binding receptor. Therefore the offset 
rate equals (for i corresponding to a binding receptor): 
(5.13) 
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V > Max {a.Jals}, for /=!,..,/ (5.14) 
Consequently, opportunities for permit trading applying an offset rate based 
upon transfer coefficients are larger compared to one-to-one permit trading. If am 
equals zero, trade is always allowed as far as receptor i is concerned. In this 
situation source B is allowed to increase emission without any compensation from 
another source. If aIB is not equal to zero and aiS equals zero, trading in emission 
permits is never possible without exceeding the deposition target at receptor i. In 
this situation source S is not able to compensate for the additional deposition 
caused by receptor B. 
Trade opportunities that apply a pollution offset depend largely on the initial 
permit allocation. If it implies a deposition lower than the deposition targets, trade 
options are increased. After trade transactions have taken place, some receptors 
will become binding, thus restricting opportunities for trade. Trading in permits 
according to the modified pollution offset offers fewer trade opportunities. 
According to this rule, trading in permits is only allowed so long as neither 
deposition targets nor pre-trade deposition levels are violated. Consequently, all 
receptors are binding, thus restricting trade opportunities. 
5.4.3 Optimum condition for bilateral trade 
Finally, in this section the optimum condition for bilateral permit trading is 
derived, applying an offset rate. Assuming both trading sources minimize costs, 
the optimal traded amount of emission permits applying an offset rate (V) can be 
derived from the following optimization problem (Klaassen and Amann, 1992): 
Mm. Cs(rs)+ CB(rB) (5.15) 
s.t. e s = a (5.16) 
(5.17) 
P = Fo- ri. 18) 
J i = S,B (5.19) 
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After reformulation, the condition for a cost minimum solution can be derived by 
using the Lagrange function (Klaassen and Amann, 1992): 
The optimal amount of traded emission permits is the amount for which the 
marginal abatement costs of the source that is selling emission permits equals the 
marginal abatement costs of the source buying emission permits, weighted by the 
offset ratio. Marginal costs are equalized in one-to-one permit trading because in 
this case the offset rate equals one. From condition (5.21) it follows that the 
buying of emission permits is only profitable for source B if in the pre-trade 
situation C'/r^ < V x Cgfrg), as buying emission permits decreases the marginal 
abatement costs of source B while selling emission permits increases the marginal 
abatement costs of source S. Although the use of offset rates unequal to unity 
enlarges trade opportunities, it has also drawbacks. Offset rates are not simple, 
fixed rates but depend on the pre-trade emissions and deposition targets (Klaassen 
and Amann, 1992). As a result, the trade systems become rather complex. The 
following section develops a system of guided permit trading to meet the draw-
backs of trading with an offset rate. 
5.5 Guided Bilateral Trade 
5.5.1 Introduction 
In the previous section I assumed that every bilateral trade has to meet the 
deposition targets. I also showed that this is a rather restrictive condition. If 
sources affect different receptors, a source selling permits is not able to compen-
sate all receptors for an increasing deposition caused by the increase in emission 
from the source that is buying permits. Moreover, the initial permit allocation has 
to meet the deposition target. It is therefore necessary to find other rules for 
trading. One way to do this is to introduce the concept of 'guided bilateral trade'. 
(els x V) + el = (el x V) + eg 
C&s) = Vx C&g) 
(5.20) 
(5.21) 
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The central principle in the concept of guided bilateral trade is that not every 
bilateral trade transaction has to meet the deposition targets. This is because a 
subsequent bilateral trade transaction might compensate'for the excess deposition 
at a receptor brought about by a previous trade transaction. A sufficient condition 
in guided bilateral trade is that deposition at all receptor points has to meet the 
targets only after all bilateral trade transactions have been completed. To ensure 
that deposition targets are eventually met, the number of permits traded in a 
bilateral transaction has to be controlled by a trade institution. The allowed 
number of traded emission permits is derived from the cost-effective solution. The 
question raised in this section is how the cost-effective allocation of emission 
abatement can be reached by guided bilateral trade. The concept of guided 
bilateral trade is explained by using the simple model with 5 emission sources and 
5 receptor sites, which was introduced in section 5.3. For reasons of simplicity the 
abatement-cost functions are (for the time being) linear. 
A bilateral trade transaction will only take place if the two trading parties 
benefit from the trade. In guided bilateral trade, the decision by the trade institu-
tion whether trade is allowed or not is based on the cost-effective allocation of 
emission abatement. Only after all allowed bilateral trade transactions have been 
completed, will the deposition targets be met at all receptors. Cost-effective abate-
ment implicitly assumes full cooperation. However, as I discussed in Chapter 2, it 
is not in every country's interest to participate in a full cooperation agreement 
since some countries may be disadvantaged by full cooperation. Correspondingly, 
there might be a discrepancy between what is rational for a certain country and 
what is rational for Europe as a whole. Given the initial emission permit alloca-
tion, three situations can be distinguished. 
(I) A situation in which every bilateral trade transaction is rational for each 
trading partner and contributes to the cost-effective solution, i.e every seller 
might trade with every buyer at a profit. 
(II) A situation in which a bilateral trade transaction is necessary to reach the 
cost-effective abatement allocation, but which is not profitable for some 
individual countries. 
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(III) A situation in which a bilateral trade transaction is necessary if the cost-
effective abatement is to be reached, but which is only profitable if trade 
takes place involuntary, i.e. with a certain trading partner. 
These three situations are successively be illustrated in the next section. 
5.5.2 Deriving guided bilateral trade 
Emission trading on a one-to-one basis might only reach the cost-effective 
solution as derived in section 5.5.1, if the number of issued permits equals the 
total emissions in the cost-effective emission abatement allocation. In this section 
the emission permits (EP) initially issued are based on the average emission 
reduction percentage in the cost-effective abatement allocation.57 The average 
reduction percentage amounts to 59% (derived in section 5.3). Consequently, it is 
assumed that the initially assigned emission permits equal 41% of the initial 
emission (Ey) of every source. Since deposition not only depends on the total 
amount of emissions but also on the allocation of emissions among the sources, 
this permit allocation does not meet the deposition targets in all receptor areas. 
Trading in emission permits is necessary if deposition targets are ultimately to be 
met. An overview of the cost-effective emission abatement allocation to be 
reached by bilateral trade, was given in Table 5.2. 
Now all information is available that is needed to analyse guided bilateral 
permit trading. Table 5.5 gives an overview of the pre-trade data and the cost-
effective emission allocation. The first column shows the unrestricted emissions, 
the second column gives the emission allocation according to the initially allo-
cated emission permits, the third column shows the abatement costs resulting from 
this initial permit allocation and the fourth column presents the deposition in the 
pre-trade situation. The cost-effective emission allocation is presented in the sixth 
column and the associated costs are presented in the seventh column. The last 
column shows the deposition in the cost-effective allocation. The fifth column 
shows the difference between the initial permit allocation and the cost-effective 
allocation. This difference is indicated as a trade vector. When countries trade the 
5 7 This is in agreement with uniform emission reduction as applied in the S 0 2 Protocol. Uniform 
emission reduction was criticized in Chapter 2. 
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number of permits as indicated by the trade vector, the result is the cost-effective 
allocation. The total potential savings from emission trading amount to 31936 (the 
difference between ZCj1 and £Cj°). 
Table 5.5 EXAMPLE I: Overview of pre-trade data and cost-effective alloca-
tion 
Source j / 
receptor i 
3 E P j C/> d,° Buy (+) 
Sell (-) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 275 113 16210 72 -54 59 21640 60 
2 200 82 23650 73 +118 200 50 100 
3 175 72 30975 108 +34 106 20627 100 
4 400 164 11900 131 -164 0 20100 67 
5 350 144 36075 126 +66 210 24457 100 
Sum 1400 575 118810 0 575 86874 
The trade vector can be used for a scheme of bilateral trade to indicate which 
sources might be potentially trading partners and to show the maximum number 
of emission permits that sources are allowed to trade (see Table 5.6). Table 5.6 
has to be read as follows. Sources selling emission permits are represented 
vertically. The trade vector shows that these are source numbers 1 and 4. Sources 
buying emission permits are represented horizontally, i.e. numbers 2, 3 and 5. The 
marginal abatement costs (MC) of every source are given in italics. The number 
of permits sold (CT) and bought (P) according to the trade vector are also given. 
To derive the trade scheme an assumption has to be made about the sequence of 
bilateral trades. An obvious assumption is that a trade transaction generating the 
largest cost saving will take place first.58 Table 5.6 has been filled by applying 
this rule. Consequently, the sequence of trades is as follows. First, source 4 sells 
'Transaction costs have not been taken into account. 
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MC: 200 300 175 
source: 2 3 5 
P: 118 34 66 
MC: source: a: 
100 1 54 54 
50 4 164 118 34 12 
The model used for simulation is specified by equation (5.22) - (5.31): 
S I B I 
sj- es.t = es / - i - Y,Gs B t > for every S a n d 1 
B 
EB t = eB ,_, + X) Gs B i ' for every B and t 
s 
Y, Gs, B.t = Ss > f°r every S 
i 
Y, Gs.B.t = B B ' for every B i 
r s > , = Es - es t , for every S and t 
RB,t ~ EB - eB t , for every B and t 
Gs. B. t 5 M i n iss > B B ) X H S . B. t > f°r every S, B, t 
Y,H Hs B i - 1 ' f°r every t 
S B 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
(5.24) 
(5.25) 
(5.26) 
(5.27) 
(5.29) 
(5.30) 
118 permits to source 2. Next, source 4 sells 34 permits to source 3. Source 1 
then sells 54 permits to source 5. Finally, source 4 sells 12 permits to source 5. 
Alternatively, the sequence of trades might be based upon the ratio in marginal 
costs of two trading sources. If so, the sequence of trades changes. First source 4 
sells permits to source 3, then to source 2 and finally to source 5. Next, source 1 
sells permits to source 5. 
Table 5.6 EXAMPLE I: Trade scheme for bilateral trade. 
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where: e e r r G > 0 (5.31) asj > EB.t ' \ S , I ' RB.l ' us. B. i - u 1 7 
Cs,t(rs,t> = abatement-cost function of a seller S 
CBl(rB) = abatement-cost function of a buyer B 
Variables: 
rSl = emission reduction by seller S at stage t 
rBl = emission reduction by buyer B at stage t 
eSt = emissions of seller S at stage t 
eBt = emissions of buyer B at stage t 
Gs,B,t = traded permits between seller S and buyer B at stage t 
HS,B,I = binary variable for every buyer-seller combination at stage t 
Data: 
Es = initial emissions of country S 
EB = initial emissions of country B 
Ss = maximum permits seller S is allowed to sell 
BB = maximum permits buyer B is allowed to buy 
The objective is to minimize total abatement costs. By minimizing total abatement 
costs over all stages t, the trade between sources S and B that generates the largest 
cost saving will take place first. A trade transaction causes the emission of a 
source selling permits to decrease, and the emission of a source that is buying to 
increase. The emissions of sources not involved in trade remain constant. The 
number of permits sold equals the number of permits bought in every trade 
transaction between two sources. The total number of permits that sources are 
allowed to buy or sell is limited by the trade vector (elements S s and BB). To 
clarify the sequence of bilateral trade transactions equation (5.29) defines that 
only one transaction takes place in any stage. Variable HSJSL is a binary variable 
defining the trade between a seller and a buyer at stage t. 
Simulating bilateral trade results finally in the same emission allocation as the 
cost-effective emission abatement allocation. In this example, every bilateral trade 
generates a profit because the marginal abatement costs of the sources that are 
buying permits always exceed the marginal abatement costs of the sources selling 
emission permits. Consequently, trading in permits is always profitable. This 
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illustrates situation (I), as described in section 5.6.1. Table 5.7 gives an overview 
of abatement costs and savings caused by bilateral permit trading. 
Table 5.7 EXAMPLE I: Overview of abatement costs after every bilateral 
trade transaction. 
to tl t2 0 t4 
Cl 16210 16210 16210 21648 21648 
C2 23650 50 50 50 50 
C3 30975 30975 20506 20506 20506 
C4 11900 17800 19545 19545 20100 
C5 36075 36075 36075 26559 24615 
Sum 118810 101110 92386 88307 86919 
Profit 17700 8724 4082 1388 
The pre-trade situation is represented by tO. The abatement costs of trading 
sources are given in bold and are underlined. According to the specified sequence 
of trades the first trade transaction between source 2 and source 4 is the most 
profitable and the last trade transaction between source 3 and source 4 generates 
the least profit. The profit in every transaction depends upon the difference in 
marginal abatement costs between the two trading sources. In this example the 
marginal abatement costs differ widely from 50 to 300. Consequently, profits in 
every transaction differ widely. The total profit generated by emission trading 
amounts to 31894. All potential cost savings are fully reached. Every bilateral 
trade transaction is rational for each trading partner. In this situation individual 
rationality coincides with full cooperation. Assuming that the emission sources 
aim at cost minimizing, all trade transactions will take place and the final trade 
result will coincide with the cost effective allocation of emission abatement. 
However, as I indicated in section 5.5.1, rationality does not necessarily have to 
coincide with full cooperation. To illustrate situation (II) I have changed some of 
the transfer coefficients in the source-receptor matrix. Consider a new matrix A 
(the altered transfer coefficients are underlined): 
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0.5 0.1 0.1 0 0 
0.25 0.4 0.05 0.05 0 
0 0.15 0 6 0.1 0 2 5 
0 0.25 0 1 0.5 0.15 
0 0 0.05 0.35 0.45 
Altered transfer coefficients affect the cost-effective solution. The solution to 
the optimization problem as formulated by equation (5.1) - (5.4) is solved by 
applying the new transport matrix. Table 5.8 gives an overview of the emissions, 
abatement and costs in the cost-effective solution. 
Table 5.8 EXAMPLE II: Overview of emissions, abatement, costs and depo-
sition in the cost effective abatement allocation. 
Source j / 
receptor i 
1 275 163 112 11172 100 
2 200 143 57 11478 100 
3 175 40 135 40508 100 
4 400 0 400 20100 73 
5 350 218 132 23168 100 
Sum 1400 564 836 106426 
The distribution of emission among the sources caused by the new source-
receptor matrix has changed considerably in the cost-effective solution. The 
average abatement percentage in the cost-effective solution equals 60%. The 
initially issued emission permits are again based on the average abatement 
percentage in the cost-effective solution. Table 5.9 gives an overview of the pre-
trade data and the cost-effective emission allocation. 
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Table 5.9 EXAMPLE II: Overview of pre trade data and the cost effective 
allocation 
Source j / 
receptor i 
3 Buy (+) 
Sale (-) 
1 275 111 16410 71 +51 163 11214 100 
2 200 81 23850 72 +62 143 11423 100 
3 175 70 31575 106 -29 40 40530 100 
4 400 161 12050 129 -161 0 20100 73 
5 350 141 36600 123 +77 218 23167 100 
Sum 1400 564 120485 0 564 106434 
The potential savings from emission trading amount to 14051 (the difference 
between SCj1 and £Cj°). If the trade vector (i.e. the number of permits sources 
have to buy or to sell) is known, then a scheme for bilateral trade can be filled in. 
It is still assumed that sources generating the largest cost saving will trade first. 
The trade scheme for bilateral trade is represented in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 EXAMPLE II: Trade scheme for bilateral trade. 
MC: 100 200 175 
source: 1 2 5 
ß: 52 62 77 
MC: source: cr: 
300 3 30 30 
50 4 161 22 62 77 
The sequence of trades is as follows. First source 4 sells permits to source 5. 
Next, source 4 sells permits to source 2. Then source 4 sells permits to source 1. 
Finally, source 3 sells permits to source 1. Simulating bilateral trade according to 
scheme 1 results finally in the same emission allocation as the cost effective 
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allocation of emission abatement. Table 5.11 gives an overview of abatement 
costs after every bilateral trade transaction. 
Table 5.11 EXAMPLE II: Overview of abatement costs after every bilateral 
trade transactions 
to tl t2 t3 t4 
CI 16410 16410 16410 14210 11210 
C2 23850 23850 11450 11450 11450 
C3 31575 31575 31575 31575 40575 
C4 12050 15900 19000 20100 20100 
C5 36600 23125 23125 23125 23125 
Sum 120485 110860 101560 100460 106460 
Profit 9625 9300 1100 -6000 
According to the selected trading sequence, the most profitable trade takes place 
first (tl). The last trade taking place (t4) has a negative profit. This is caused by 
the fact that the marginal abatement costs of source 3 exceed the marginal 
abatement costs of source 1. As a result of permit trading, the increase in abate-
ment cost of source 3 exceeds the decrease in abatement cost of source 1. 
However, this trade transaction is necessary for meeting the deposition targets. 
From an individual rational point of view, source 3 will never sell emission 
permits to source 1 voluntarily unless both sources are compensated for this trade 
by a side payment. From a common point of view, however, this trade is necessa-
ry for reaching the cost-effective solution, given the deposition targets. The total 
profit resulting from the permit trading is sufficient to pay a side payment to 
sources that are disadvantaged by permit trading. To be able to pay a side 
payment to sources 3 and 1, funds have to be created through, for example, the 
trade institution taxing the profit from trading. 
Because of the high marginal abatement costs of source 3, the selling of permits 
by that source will always result in increasing total abatement costs, regardless of 
the trading partner. The disadvantage of permit trading is reduced if source 3 sells 
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emission permits to source 2, as the difference in marginal between these sources 
is the smallest. The loss would now only amount to 3000. However, the assump-
tion of a trade sequence based on the profitability of trades excludes a transaction 
between sources 2 and 3. The selling of permits by source 3 to source 5 also 
results in negative profit. It should be noted that the sequence of trade does not 
affect the total profit of emission trading, but does affect the distribution of the 
profit. 
Simulated permit trading is affected by the specified transfer matrix. The row-
sum of receptor 3 equals 1.1 and, in addition, the contribution of source 3 to 
receptor 3 is substantial. This explains why source 3 has to sell emission permits 
in spite of its high marginal abatement costs. By means of this example I have 
illustrated that trade might not be rational for both trading partners, even though 
the final trade is necessary for reaching a cost-effective solution. 
Finally a situation might be distinguished in which, for all trade transactions to 
be profitable, the choice of trading partners is of overriding importance. This is an 
illustration of situation (III) as described in section 5.5.1. To create such a 
situation, the contribution of source 2 to receptor 2 is raised. To 'compensate' this 
increase, two other coefficients are changed. The changes in this matrix are based 
on trial and error. The altered coefficients (compared to the previous transfer 
matrix) are underlined. Consider the following transfer matrix A: 
0.5 0.1 0.1 0 0 
0.25 0.65 PJ. 0.05 0 
0 0.05 0.45 0.1 0.20 
0 2J. 0.05 0.5 0.15 
0 0 0.05 0.35 0.45 
Analogous to the previous simulations, a cost-effective abatement allocation can 
be calculated using this new transfer matrix A. The initial emission permit 
allocation is defined according to the average abatement percentage. Table 5.12 
gives an overview of pre-trade data and the cost-effective emission abatement 
allocation. 
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Table 5.12 EXAMPLE ITJ: Overview of pre trade data and the cost effective 
allocation. 
Source j / 
receptor i 
di0 Buy (+) 
Sale (-) 
d,1 
1 275 111 16410 71 +49 161 11410 100 
2 200 81 23850 96 -7 74 25250 100 
3 175 71 31275 80 +51 122 15975 100 
4 400 161 12050 113 -161 0 20100 45 
5 350 141 36600 123 +68 208 24875 100 
Sum 1400 565 120185 0 565 97610 
Knowing the number of permits that sources buy and sell, a trade scheme for 
bilateral trade can be filled in by applying the specified trade sequence that trade 
with the highest potential cost savings is assumed to take place first. Regarding 
the marginal abatement costs of sources buying and selling emission permits, it is 
noticeable that to generate a profitable trade, source 2 can only trade with source 
3 since for a profitable transaction the marginal abatement costs of the buyer 
should exceed those of the seller. In this example, source 3 is the only buyer 
whose marginal abatement costs exceed the marginal abatement costs of source 2. 
This is clarified in Table 5.13. If source 2 were to trade emission permits with 
source 1 or with source 5, the trade would generate a loss. Consequently, from an 
individual point of view source 2 would never trade with source 1 or with source 
5. 
As source 2 has to trade with source 3, the sequence of trades is as follows. 
First, source 4 sells emission permits to source 3. Source 4 then sells emission 
permits to source 5. Then, source 4 sells emission permits to source 1. Finally, 
source 2 sells emission permits to source 3. In this example the sequence as such 
is not affected by the fact that source 2 has to trade with source 3. However, 
because source 2 has to trade 7 permits with source 3, the maximum number of 
traded emission permits between source 4 and source 3 is only 44. 
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MC: 100 300 175 
source: 1 3 5 
ß: 49 51 68 
MC: source: cr: 
200 2 7 7 
50 4 161 49 44 68 
Simulating bilateral emission permit trading according to Table 5.13 means that 
the trade result coincides with the cost-effective emission abatement allocation. 
Table 5.14 gives an overview of abatement costs after every bilateral trade. 
Table 5.14 EXAMPLE III: Overview of abatement costs after every bilateral 
trade transactions 
to tl a t3 t4 
CI 16410 16410 16410 11510 11510 
C2 23850 23850 23850 23850 25250 
C3 31275 18075 18075 18075 15975 
C4 12050 14250 17650 20100 20100 
C5 36600 36600 24700 24700 24700 
Sum 120185 109185 100685 98235 97535 
Profit 11000 8500 2450 700 
Because the number of emission permits equals the total emission in the cost-
effective solution, bilateral permit trading results in cost-effective emission 
abatement. Since the number of permits source 4 and source 3 are allowed to 
trade is restricted, and since source 2 necessarily has to trade with source 3, all 
bilateral trades generate a profit. 
Table 5.13 EXAMPLE III: Trade scheme for bilateral trade. 
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The three distinguished situations in the introduction have been illustrated by 
changing the transfer matrix. However, the three situations could also be illus-
trated by changing the cost functions of the sources, because trade opportunities 
depend upon a combination of the source-receptor matrix and the abatement cost 
functions. 
Obviously, in a situation in which the marginal abatement costs of all sources 
selling emission permits exceeds the marginal abatement costs of sources buying 
emission permits, guided bilateral permit trading will result in a cost-effective 
emission-abatement allocation. Whether sources have to sell permits or are 
allowed to buy permits depends upon the pre-trade emissions, the deposition 
target, the transfer matrix and the marginal abatement costs. In general, a source 
has to sell emission permits if it has low marginal abatement costs and a high 
transfer coefficient for a receptor i, which deposition has to be reduced. Neverthe-
less, sources with high marginal abatement costs and a high transfer coefficient 
for a receptor i, which deposition is allowed to increase will buy emission 
permits. 
5.5.3 Extension: non-linear abatement cost functions 
In practice, abatement cost functions for S0 2 emissions do not have a linear 
shape. A more likely assumption is that abatement costs increase exponentially the 
more emission is abated. The introduction of non-linear abatement cost functions 
does not alter the method of guided bilateral trade. This is looked at in this 
section. Assume the following abatement cost functions: 
C, = 20r/ 
C2 = 30r2ls 
C3 = 35r3L65 
C, = 25r4U5 
C5 = J r / » 
Cost-effective emission abatement allocation can be derived by using the data 
on initial emissions, the transfer matrix and the deposition targets from section 
5.3. Table 5.15 gives an overview of the cost-effective emission-abatement 
allocation. 
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Table 5.15 EXAMPLE NONLIN: Overview of emissions, abatement, costs and 
deposition in the cost-effective emission-abatement allocation. 
Source j / 
receptor i 
1 275 181 94 175321 100 3760 
2 200 93 107 134590 88 2269 
3 175 0 175 135809 58 1658 
4 400 115 285 494732 100 3035 
5 375 129 221 108967 98 910 
Sum 1400 518 882 1049419 
Applying the new cost functions, the minimum costs in needed to meet the 
deposition targets amount to 1,049,419. Total emissions in the cost-effective 
solution amount to 518. This is a reduction of 63% compared to the base situ-
ation. Next, the overall emission-reduction percentage is used for the initial 
distribution of emission permits. The initial emission permits amount to 37% of 
the base emission (Ey) for every source. 
Given the initial permit allocation, the cost-effective emission-abatement alloca-
tion can now be derived. The pre-trade data and the cost-effective emission 
allocation are represented in Table 5.16. 
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Table 5.16 EXAMPLE NONLIN: Overview of pre-trade data and the cost-
effective allocation 
Source j / 
receptor i 
ERj Buy (+) 
Sell (-) 
d,1 
1 275 102 598580 65 +79 181 175321 100 
2 200 74 181046 66 +19 93 134591 88 
3 175 65 64609 97 -65 0 135809 58 
4 400 148 398466 118 -33 115 494718 100 
5 350 129 108667 113 0 129 108980 98 
Sum 1400 518 1351368 0 518 1049419 
In this example, the potential savings from permit trading amount to 301,949. 
The fifth column in Table 5.16 contains the trade vector, indicating how many 
permits sources have to buy or to sell in order to reach the cost-effective alloca-
tion. This trade vector is used for a scheme of bilateral trade. The scheme of 
bilateral trade is given in Table 5.17. According to the trade vector, source 5 does 
not trade any permits. Consequently, source 5 is not included in the trade scheme. 
Source 3 and source 4 sell emission permits and source 1 and source 2 buy 
emission permits. Because of the introduction of exponential abatement-cost 
functions, marginal abatement costs are no longer constant but depend on the level 
of abatement. Therefore it is not clear at first sight which sources have to trade 
with one another to generate the greatest profit. 
Table 5.17 EXAMPLE NONLIN: Trade scheme for bilateral trade 
source: 1 2 
P: 79 19 
source: a: 
3 65 65 
4 33 14 19 
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The sequence of trade that allows the first trade transaction to generate the 
greatest profit and the last trade transaction to generate the smallest profit is as 
follows. First, source 3 sells permits to source 1. Source 4 then sells permits to 
source 1 and finally source 4 sells permits to source 2. Table 5.18 gives an 
overview of the abatement costs after every bilateral trade transaction. The 
sources involved in a trade transaction are given in bold an are underlined. In 
addition the marginal abatement costs after the completion of all bilateral trade 
transactions are in the last column of Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18 EXAMPLE NONLIN: Overview of abatement costs after every 
bilateral trade transaction. 
to tl t2 Ü MC 1 
Cl 598580 233280 176720 176720 3760 
C2 181046 181046 181046 134900 2269 
C3 64609 135809 135809 135809 1658 
C4 398466 398466 438009 482143 3035 
C5 108667 108667 108667 108667 910 
Sum 1351368 1057268 1040251 1038239 
Profit 294100 17017 2012 
Table 5.18 shows that the cost-effective emission abatement allocation results 
(deviation in total abatement costs due to round off) after all trade transactions 
have been completed. By introducing exponential abatement-cost functions, the 
sequence of trades might become more complex. Permit trading is not only 
limited by the maximum number of allowed traded permits resulting from the 
trade vector, but if the marginal abatement costs of the sources intersect, then the 
number of traded permits at maximum profit also depend on the level of abate-
ment. 
144 Chapter 5 
5.5.4 Guided bilateral trade and administrative procedures 
As shown in the previous section, guided bilateral trade requires a trade 
institution to guide the process of bilateral trade. This institution has to consider 
whether or not trade transactions are allowed. To be able to control trade transac-
tions, all transactions have to be announced in advance. Next, the institution 
decides whether to allow the transaction. This decision will be based upon the 
trade vector. Consequently, trade transactions which are rational for both trading 
parties but do not contribute to the cost-effective solution are excluded. 
If a trade transaction is necessary to reach the cost-effective solution, that is not 
rational from an individual point of view (situation II), the institution has to play 
an active role in stimulating the transaction by providing a side payment. Funds 
for side payments can be created for example by taxing profitable trade transac-
tions. Using a progressive tax system might equalize the benefits of emission 
trading between the trade parties. In some situations the trade institution can also 
take care of the choice of trading partners. If a source has to trade with a certain 
other source to be able to generate a profit from trade (situation III), the institu-
tion can guide the bilateral trades in such a way that the sources are able to trade 
with one another. 
As stated in section 5.4.1, to reach the-cost effective solution by bilateral permit 
trading on a one-to-one basis, the number of issued permits has to equal the total 
emissions in the cost-effective solution. Where the number of issued permits does 
not equal the total emissions in the cost-effective solution, the trade institution can 
play a part in distributing additional permits so that the cost-effective solution can 
be reached.59 For this reason it might be necessary for the trade institution to 
function as a "third" trade partner by buying permits from one source and selling 
additional permits to another source. A final remark concerns the periods relating 
to a bilateral trade sequence. From a practical point of view it is unrealistic to 
assume that sources will adapt to their new allowed number of emissions 
immediately after every bilateral trade transaction. Sources may trade more than 
once. It is conceivable that after the issue of permits, a certain time-period should 
be allowed for trades to take place. 
'see for example variant 2 in Chapter 6. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have discussed several systems of permit trading in relation to 
cost-effective emission abatement. I have shown that for non-uniformly mixing 
pollutants, permit trading has to be constrained if it is to reach a cost-effective 
emission allocation. This allocation is one that minimizes the total abatement costs 
while at the same time does not violate deposition targets. If permit trading is 
constrained it has been argued that permit trading should be regarded as a bilateral 
process. 
A system of bilateral permit trading which defines that every single transaction 
has to meet deposition targets is restricted by the transfer coefficients and by the 
ratio of marginal abatement costs of both trading sources. If trade takes place on a 
one-to-one basis, trade opportunities are limited and permit trading will not reach 
the cost-effective abatement allocation. Applying an offset rate unequal to 1, 
while enlarging trade opportunities, does make trading very complex. Therefore, 
in this chapter I have developed a new system for bilateral permit trading, 
indicated as guided bilateral trade. In this system the maximum number of permits 
that sources are allowed to sell or buy is based upon the cost-effective abatement 
allocation. It is not necessary for every trade transaction to meet the deposition 
targets, because these targets are taken care of by means of the maximum 
numbers that sources are allowed to buy and sell. The term 'guided bilateral 
trade' indicates that the permit market as such is not able to generate the desired 
outcome. The trade process has to be guided by a trade institution that takes care 
of the number of traded permits. However, any trading system that takes depositi-
on targets into account will need some kind of control. 
To guide trade transactions to a cost-effective emission allocation, the allocation 
has to be known. Therefore the trade institution needs full information to be able 
to establish the trade vector. Unfortunately, this cancels one of the characteristics 
of tradeable permits namely that full information is not needed. In the system of 
guided bilateral trade, the trade coordinating institute has to derive the trade 
vector. However, situations may occur in which reaching a cost-effective alloca-
tion at once is politically not possible.60 In that case a system of guided bilateral 
'As in the Second Sulphur Protocol. 
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trade is able to achieve further cost savings. After all, given a specified emission 
allocation, this system clearly indicates which transactions can take place in which 
both seller and buyer benefit. In other words, a system of guided bilateral trade 
provides a recipe for reaching further costs savings. 
A drawback to guided bilateral permit trading is that trade transactions do not 
necessarily have to be profitable. Non-profitable trade transactions need some sort 
of substitution if deposition targets are to be met. Whether this occurs depends on 
the source-receptor matrix, the abatement-cost functions, the deposition targets and 
the initial permit distribution. The main advantage of the guided bilateral trade 
system is that the cost-effective emission abatement allocation can be achieved if 
all trade transactions are profitable or if non-profitable transactions are subsidized. 
In the past, achieving the cost-effective allocation was thought to be possible by 
means of a simultaneous trade process. However, as I showed in section 5.3, the 
practical implication of such a trade system is a black box. By means of the 
system of guided bilateral trade this black box is opened. 
To analyse the consequences of guided permit trading for S0 2 emissions in 
Europe, guided bilateral permit trading needs to be simulated. The simulation 
results will shed light on the question as to whether the cost-effective emission 
allocation can actually be reached by guided bilateral permit trading. 
6 SIMULATING GUIDED BILATERAL TRADE FOR S 0 2 
REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I apply the concept of guided bilateral trade that has been 
developed in Chapter 5 to sulphur dioxide (S0 2) emission trading between Euro-
pean countries. Having discussed the concept of guided bilateral trade theoretically 
in Chapter 5, in this chapter, I raise the question of to what extent guided bilateral 
trade results empirically in the aimed emission allocation. 
Recapitulating briefly, the guided bilateral trade system aims at reaching a cost-
effective abatement allocation, taking into account deposition targets. In order to 
be able to reach the cost-effective allocation by permit trading, the total number 
of emission permits is based upon the total emissions in the cost-effective 
allocation. In addition the trading of emission permits is subject to deposition 
targets. For this purpose a trade coordinating institute specifies a trade vector that 
indicates how many permits countries are allowed to buy or sell. 
To calculate the cost-effective abatement allocation for S0 2 emissions in Europe 
the RAINS model was used. Assumptions about the deposition targets were based 
upon the 1994 S0 2 Protocol, which implies a gap closure of 60% between the 
actual deposition and the critical loads. Emission data and cost curves were taken 
from the RAINS model too. Having both the cost-effective allocation and a rule 
for initially distributing the emission permits, then the trade vector was derived. 
Having this trade vector and the national abatement-cost functions guided bilateral 
trade between European countries for S0 2 emissions was simulated. The simula-
tion result was analysed for both the environmental consequences and abatement 
costs. 
As well as examining the Base Case in this chapter, I also look at three variants 
of guided bilateral permit trading. First, I will formulate a Base Case based on a 
gap closure of 60%. Next, in variant 1, I formulate a modification on the Base 
Case. This modification examines the consequences of ignoring the current 
emission reduction plans of the countries. Finally, in variant 2, I simulate guided 
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bilateral permit trading, using the Second SOz Protocol as a guideline for the 
initial distribution of emission permits. In this variant, countries not signing the 
protocol are excluded from permit trading. Variant 2 is split into 2 subvariants: 
variant 2A assumes that the Trade Coordinating Institute (TCI) sells permits but 
not at a fixed price, whereas variant 2B assumes that the TCI sells permits at a 
fixed price. The main assumption of the variants are summarized in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Overview of the main assumptions of the variants discussed for guided 
bilateral permit trading. 
VARIANT Deposition Target Initial Permit Alloc-
ation 
Current Reduc-
tion Plans 
Other 
Base Case 60% gap closure historical emissions yes -
Variant 1 60% gap closure historical emissions no -
Variant 2A modified 60% gap 
closure 
second S 0 2 protocol only for non-
signing countries 
TCI permit 
price not fixed 
Variant 2B modified 60% gap 
closure 
second SQ 2 protocol only for non-
signing countries 
TCI permit 
price fixed 
I compare the Base Case with two alternative abatement strategies. Firstly, it is 
compared with non-guided permit trading; this is permit trading without any 
restriction. Secondly, it is compared with a uniform emission reduction strategy 
that meets the deposition targets. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 describes the model 
used for simulation. Section 6.3 formulates the Base Case. Given the assumptions 
of the Base Case guided bilateral permit trading is simulated and compared with 
alternative abatement strategies. Section 6.4 presents the modification on the Base 
Case. Section 6.5 is a discussion of guided bilateral permit trading, starting from 
the S0 2 Protocol. Finally in section 6.6 conclusions are drawn. 
6.2 The model 
6.2.1 General description 
In order to simulate a system of guided bilateral trade among European coun-
tries four steps have to be taken. These four steps are represented schematically 
in Figure 6.1. First, a cost-effective emission-abatement allocation is calculated, 
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given the national abatement cost functions, the emissions, the source-receptor 
matrix and the deposition targets, by using the RAINS model. In this allocation, 
deposition targets are met at minimum abatement costs. The second step is to 
define an initial distribution of emission permits.61 To reach the cost-effective 
abatement allocation by guided bilateral permit trading, the total emissions 
corresponding to the number of initially distributed emission permits must equal 
the total emissions in the cost-effective abatement allocation. Since it is assumed 
that permits are traded on a one-to-one basis, which implies that the total number 
of emissions permits is fixed, this requirement is essential. 
step 1 step 2 step 3 step 4 
abatement 
emission permits 
Q J) calculation I I data 
Figure 6.1 Schematic overview of steps to be taken to simulate guided 
bilateral permit trading. 
The third step is to derive the trade vector. In Chapter 5, I stipulated that the 
trade vector indicates the number of permits countries are allowed to buy or sell. 
The trade vector is calculated as the difference between the cost-effective 
'The issue of the initial distribution of emission permits was discussed in detail in section 3.6. 
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abatement allocation and the initially distributed emission-permit allocation. A 
positive number in the trade vector is the maximum number of emission permits 
a country is allowed to buy, whereas a negative number in the trade vector is the 
maximum number of emission permits a country is allowed to sell. Obviously, 
the initial distribution of emission permits largely influences the trade vector. 
Finally, having obtained the trade vector, the fourth step is to simulate guided 
bilateral trade for S 0 2 emission permits, assuming that a trade-coordinating 
institute restricts the amounts that countries are allowed to buy and sell, in 
accordance with the maximum quantities indicated by the trade vector. To do this 
I developed an optimization model in OMP. 6 2 The aim of simulating guided 
bilateral trade is to clarify the sequence and the volume of trade transactions 
between European countries, under the assumption that countries generating the 
largest cost savings trade first. The model equations of this optimization model 
are given by equations (5.22) - (5.31) in section 5.6.2. In Appendix I the model 
is represented as formulated in the OMP-modelling language. 
To ensure the trade that generates the largest cost saving will take place first, 
the objective function maximizes the profit caused by permit trading in period t. 
The profit of trade is defined as the total reduction in abatement costs that result 
from the modified abatement allocation as a result of trading. To be able ulti-
mately to reach the cost effective allocation, a constraint has been added to the 
optimization model so that for every source, the permits to be sold or bought, 
summed over all periods t are restricted according to the trade vector. For every 
country, the degree of emission abatement in a period t equals the initial 
emissions minus the number of initially issued permits and minus the number of 
permits bought, or plus the number of permits sold before period t. Whether a 
source is a buyer or a seller is defined by the trade vector. 
6.2.2 Abatement cost functions 
Generally, abatement costs increase as more emissions are abated. These costs 
generally increase sharply beyond a certain emission reduction. This is rather 
obvious since the more emission is abated the more expensive are the techniques 
!OMP is a linear programming modelling package. 
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that are needed. A convex shaped abatement cost function can be expressed by 
the functional form: C(r)= a x r b in which r represents the amount of emission 
reduction and a and b are cost coefficients.63 A linear programming model, 
however, requires linear abatement functions.64 Therefore the convex cost 
functions may be approached by piece-wise linear functions. Figure 6.2 is a 
graph showing a piece-wise approximation of a convex function. 
Costs 
1 2 3 4 
Reduction 
C(r): Non-linear redaction function 
C(r) : Piece-wise approximation of C(r) 
Figure 6.2 Approximation of a non-linear abatement-cost function by 
using a piece-wise linear cost function. 
The abatement cost functions used in the optimization model to simulate guided 
bilateral trade are taken from the RAINS model. In this model, the abatement-
cost functions are already piece-wise linear. As I explained in Chapter 4, these 
functions are technologically based and depend upon the energy scenario chosen. 
The abatement cost functions used in the optimization model are based upon the 
Official Energy Pathway for the year 2000. Each step in the RAINS abatement-
cost function implies another abatement technique. The step size differs for every 
6 3Cronshaw and Kruse (1993) indicated that because of the discrete choice of abatement technolo-
gies abatement cost-functions are unlikely in practice to be strictly convex. 
"Because I used binary variables to model the trade sequence, as explained in section 5.2.1, linear 
programming was necessary. When an optimization problem includes binary variables, the problem 
can only be solved if the objective function and the constraints are linear in decision variables. 
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technique, because the ranges of application of techniques differ. Moreover, the 
step sizes and the number of steps vary for every country because the installation 
capacities, the fuels used and other characteristics differ for every country. The 
abatement functions also define the maximum possible emission reduction. 
Broadly, the maximum abatement percentage ranges from 80 to 90% of the 
projected emissions for the year 2000.6 5 
6.3 The Base Case 
6.3.1 Basic assumptions 
Deposition target 
The deposition target for the Base Case was chosen in accordance with the 
negotiations that led to a new S0 2 protocol in June 1994. The deposition target 
currently aimed at is based on a pan European reduction of the difference (the 
'gap') between the actual deposition level and the 5-percentile critical loads for 
sulphur. The 5-percentile critical load protects 95% of the ecosystem area within 
a grid cell of 150 x 150 km against the damaging effect of sulphur deposition. 
A 'gap closure' scenario would bring all European countries closer to fully 
achieving the 5-percentile critical loads with an equal percentage. This scenario 
takes into account regional differences in the environmental sensitivities, the 
dispersion of air pollutants, and differences between the countries' economic and 
energy situations and some notion of economic effort required to achieve these 
targets (Amann et al., 1992a). 
In the negotiations for the 1994 protocol, a gap-closure of 60% has been 
specified as the deposition target (Amann and Schopp, 1993). In this scenario, 
the difference between the 1990 deposition level and the 5-percentile critical load 
is reduced by 60%. For grids where the 1990 deposition already meets the 5-
percentile critical loads, the deposition target equals these critical loads. This 
deposition target is applied to 483 land based receptors of 150 x 150 km each. 
6 5 A main exception is Switzerland where only 40% of the emissions can be abated because of the 
large extent of industrial emissions. 
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The gap-closure concept seems to be a fair target because it aims at bringing all 
countries closer to critical loads with an equal percentage, with the exception for 
those receptors where the deposition already meets the critical loads. However, it 
should be noticed that reaching this target at the binding receptors implies a gap-
closure of more than 60% at non-binding receptors. Moreover, since the deposi-
tion target is expressed as a percentage, countries that were confronted with high 
deposition levels in 1990, will suffer more from environmental damage than 
countries confronted with low deposition levels in 1990. Although the relative 
improvement is equal for all countries, the absolute differences may differ 
substantially. 
Cost-effective emission allocation 
The aim of guided bilateral permit trading is to reach the cost-effective 
emission allocation. This allocation meets the deposition target, in this case the 
60% gap closure target, at the lowest possible abatement costs. Apart from the 
necessary abatement efforts required to reach the specified deposition targets, 
some countries have already committed themselves to achieving a certain emissi-
on reduction. The target years for these plans vary but, for reasons of compari-
son have been assumed to be the year 2000 across Europe. The cost-effective 
emission allocation used in the Base Case takes into account these so-called 
Current Reduction Plans (CRP). The CRP are taken into account by adding a 
constraint in the optimization problem for calculating the cost-effective emission 
allocation. This stipulates that the emission reduction should be greater or equal 
to the CRP reduction. As a result, the cost-effective allocation does not represent 
the lowest possible costs, but the lowest possible costs given the CRP. 
Further, it is assumed that ship emissions will also be reduced. As well as 
distinguishing between emissions from countries, the RAINS model also distin-
guishes betweeen ship emissions.66 However, it is not assumed that these will 
participate in permit trading. The cost-effective emission allocation is calculated 
for the year 2000. Table 6.2 gives an overview of several emission data. 
'Ship emissions are emissions in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. 
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Table 6.2 Overview of S0 2 emission data and projections (kt) 
Country Emissions Unabated Emissions 2000 
1990 
CRP-Emissions 
2000 
Albania 140 137 138 
Austria 98 352 78 
Belgium 414 721 430 
Bulgaria 1266 815 520 
Czechoslovakia 2443 2346 2170 
Denmark 184 369 176 
Finland 260 603 116 
France 1260 1309 1101 
West Germany 940 2271 520 
East Germany 4800 2363 230 
Greece 740 905 595 
Hungary 1010 1075 1094 
Ireland 168 234 240 
Italy 2180 3000 1976 
Luxembourg 16 15 10 
Netherlands 207 424 106 
Norway 54 144 70 
Poland 3210 3738 2600 
Portugal 204 389 304 
Rumania 1800 2592 2592 
Spain 2316 2793 2143 
Sweden 169 412 100 
Switzerland 62 74 60 
Turkey 1459 2887 2889 
United Kingdom 3774 3333 2552 
Yugoslavia 1480 1576 1576 
Baltic Sea 73 73 73 
North Sea 173 173 173 
Atlantic Ocean 316 316 316 
Kola Karelia 701 728 396 
St Petersburg 409 334 307 
Baltic Region 653 629 435 
Belorussia 596 567 456 
Ukraine 2782 5066 1696 
Moldavia 313 378 231 
RSU* 3350 6347 3725 
Europe 40020 49488 32194 
* Remaining Soviet Union 
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The first column shows the emissions in 1990, the second column shows the 
projected unabated emissions in 2000 based on the Official Energy Pathway and 
the third column shows emissions according to the CRP. The emissions are 
presented for all countries (or regions where applicable) that are distinguished in 
the RAINS model. This classification is not up to date. Political changes of the 
past years have not been taken into account. This is revealed by the inclusion of 
Czechoslovakia, both West and East Germany, and Yugoslavia in Table 6.2. 
Emissions in 1990 are used to determine the initial distribution and to calculate 
the deposition in 1990, so as to derive the gap closure deposition target. The 
projected emissions for the year 2000 are the initial (unabated) emissions in 
Figure 6.1 (step 1) that are used to calculate the cost-effective abatement allocati-
on. The CRP-emissions are used as a restriction for calculating the cost-effective 
abatement allocation in the Base Case. 
The cost-effective emission allocation taking into account the CRP for the year 
2000 is represented in Table 6.3. The first column represents the emissions in the 
cost-effective allocation, the second column shows the abatement required to reach 
these emissions and the third column shows the abatement costs. 
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Table 6.3 Overview of the cost effective emission allocation for 60% gap 
closure for the year 2000 taking into account CRP (emissions and 
abatement in kt S0 2 . Abatement costs in million DM.). 
Country Cost-Effective Emission Abatement Costs 
Emissions Abatement 
Albania 132 5 0 
Austria 78 274 537 
Belgium 200 521 712 
Bulgaria 520 295 251 
Czechoslovakia 1792 554 423 
Denmark 51 318 790 
Finland 116 487 916 
France 675 634 461 
West Germany 520 1751 3914 
East Germany 230 2133 2437 
Greece 595 310 212 
Hungary 521 554 290 
Ireland 53 181 234 
Italy 1016 1984 1384 
Luxembourg 10 5 27 
Netherlands 106 318 716 
Norway 34 110 379 
Poland 1717 2021 1782 
Portugal 294 95 69 
Rumania 1036 1556 844 
Spain 1486 1307 496 
Sweden 88 324 979 
Switzerland 60 14 16 
Turkey 2887 0 0 
United Kingdom 949 2384 2533 
Yugoslavia 983 593 819 
Baltic Sea 18 55 101 
North Sea 42 131 238 
Atlantic Ocean 317 0 0 
Kola Karelia 157 571 463 
S t Petersburg 239 95 61 
Baltic Region 266 363 317 
Belorussia 456 111 72 
Ukraine 1696 3370 1988 
Moldavia 231 147 89 
RSU 3725 2622 1320 
Europe 23296 26193 25870 
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Emission abatement (Table 6.3) is the difference between unabated emissions 
(Table 6.2) and the cost-effective emissions (Table 6.2). Comparing the CRP-
emissions (Table 6.2) with the cost-effective emissions shows that for the majority 
of countries cost-effective emissions are lower than CRP-emissions. Since it is 
assumed that countries will at least carry out their current reduction plans in 
calculating cost-effective emission allocation, the cost-effective emissions are 
always lower or equal to CRP-emissions. 
Trade vector 
As a first step in trading, countries have to receive a number of emission 
permits. Since guided bilateral trade aims at reaching the cost-effective emission 
allocation, the sum of all permits over all countries has to correspond to the total 
European emission in the cost-effective allocation. Therefore, in the Base Case, 
the total number of emission permits is equal to 23296 kt S0 2 . 6 7 
The distribution of the total number of permits between the countries in the 
Base Case is based upon historical emissions. The year chosen for reference is 
1990. The initial distribution of permits is equal to the emission that would result 
for each country if all countries reduced emissions by a uniform percentage. In 
the Base Case this percentage is 42%, since it is equivalent to a European 
emission level of 23296 kt SOz. It should be noted that the emission allocation 
resulting from this initial distribution of emission permits does not meet the 
deposition targets. The trade vector follows from the difference between the initial 
distribution of permits and the cost-effective emission allocation. The initial 
distribution of emission permits and the trade vector are represented in Table 6.4. 
For comparison, the cost-effective emission allocation is repeated from Table 6.3. 
The countries in Table 6.4 are ordered according to the trade vector. First the 
buyers are represented and next the sellers are represented. 
'Throughout this chapter it is assumed that 1 permit allows the emission of 1 kt S 0 2 . 
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Table 6.4 Base Case: calculation of the trade vector (kt S0 2). 
Country Cost-Effective Initial Trade Vector 
Emissions Distribution (buyers +; sellers -) 
Albania 132 81 51 
Austria 78 57 21 
Czechoslovakia 1792 1419 373 
Greece 595 430 165 
Luxembourg 10 9 1 
Norway 34 33* 1* 
Portugal 294 118 176 
Spain 1486 1345 141 
Switzerland 60 43* 17' 
Turkey 2887 847 2039 
Yugoslavia 983 860 123 
St. Petersburg 239 238 1 
Belorussia 456 346 110 
Ukraine 1696 1616 80 
Moldavia 231 182 49 
RSU 3725 1946 1779 
Belgium 200 240 -40 
Bulgaria 520 735 -215 
Denmark 51 107 -56 
Finland 116 151 -35 
France 675 732 -57 
West Germany 520 546 -26 
East Germany 230 2779* -2549* 
Hungary 521 587 -66 
Ireland 53 98 -45 
Italy 1016 1266 -250 
Netherlands 106 120 -14 
Poland 1717 1865 -148 
Rumania 1036 1046 -10 
Sweden 88 98 -10 
United Kingdom 949 2192 -1243 
Kola Karelia 157 407 -250 
Baltic Region 266 379 -113 
Baltic Sea 18 18 -
North Sea 42 42 -
Atlantic Ocean 317 317 -
Europe 23296 23296 0 
* adapted data 
Simulating Guided Bilateral Trade for S02 reductions in Europe 159 
Unfortunately the specified initial distribution requires Switzerland and Norway 
to exceed their maximum possible abatement.68 Since this is not possible, the 
initial distribution has been adapted such that both countries can satisfy then-
abatement requirements.69 
6.3.2 Results of guided bilateral trade 
Having described and motivated the basic assumptions for guided bilateral trade, 
all elements for trading are now available. In terms of Figure 6.1, I have com-
pleted steps 1 to 3. Now step 4 has to be taken. From section 5.6.1, we know that 
bilateral transactions are not by definition all profitable. To obtain insight into the 
profitability of trading, guided bilateral permit trading is simulated. 
After the initial distribution of permits, countries can start trading them. The 
maximum number of permits countries are allowed to buy or sell is defined by 
the trade vector. Assuming that the trade transaction with the greatest profit will 
take place first, the sequence of profitable bilateral permit trades is represented in 
Table 6.5. 7 0 The first two columns show the seller and the buyer in a trade trans-
action. The third column shows the number of permits traded in a trade transacti-
on. The fourth column shows the profit generated by the transaction. The profit 
depends on both the quantity of permits traded and the differences in marginal 
abatement costs. The fifth column shows the market price of the traded permits in 
a transaction. This price equals the marginal abatement costs of the seller. 
However, since I assume that permit trading is a bilateral process, it is reasonable 
also to assume that both trade partners will negotiate a permit price so that both 
have the same advantage with permit trading. The last column in Table 6.5 shows 
""This maximum is according to the abatement functions in the RAINS model. If all abatement 
technologies are applied in Switzerland and Norway, their minimum emissions equal 43 and 33 kt S 0 2 
respectively. An overview of maximum abatement for all European countries is given in Appendix II. 
''''Therefore Switzerland and Norway are additionally allocated emission permits for 7 and 2 kt S 0 2 
respectively. Since the total number of emission permits cannot be changed, the permits initially 
distributed to former East Germany have been reduced by 9. East Germany was chosen because this is 
the only country that is able to reduce 9 kt at zero costs because the number of initially distributed 
emission permits to East Germany exceeds the amount of unabated emissions in the year 2000. In 
table 6.3 the adapted initial distribution and trade vector are presented. 
7 0Abbreviations of names of countries are given in Appendix III. 
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this implicit permit price. This price is calculated on the assumption that both 
seller and buyer receive an equal profit share from permit trading. 
Table 6.5 Base Case: sequence of profitable trade transactions 
Seller Buyer Traded Amount Profit Market Permit Implicit Permit 
(kt SOj) (Mio.DM) Price (Mio. 
DM/ kt SOj) 
Price (Mio. 
DM/ktSOj) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDR TUR 1077 2700 0 1.63 
GDR RSU 965 176 0.71 0.80 
HUN AUS 21 155 0.53 4.17 
KOL SWI 17 124 0.70 4.35 
GDR POR 176 122 0.71 1.06 
UK YUG 123 119 0.72 1.22 
UK BYE 110 47 0.73 0.94 
HUN LUX 1 18 0.53 10 
KOL GRE 124 17 0.70 0.90 
HUN NOR 1 10 0.53 6 
UK GRE 41 9 0.73 0.84 
GDR ALB 26 4 0.71 0.81 
UK ALB 19 3 0.73 0.82 
HUN CZE 10 2 0.53 0.80 
ITA CZE 12 1 0.73 0.79 
UK S-PET 1 0.15 0.73 1.08 
The benefit of permit trading by the buyer equals the decrease in abatement 
costs (AC,) minus the permit price (P) that has to be paid, multiplied by the 
number of permits bought (Q). The benefit of permit trading by the seller equals 
the permit price (P) that is received, multiplied by the number of permits (Q) 
minus the increase in abatement costs (ACJ. The implicit permit price can be 
calculated either from a seller's perspective or from a buyer's perspective. The 
following is the calculation from a seller's point of view. If both the seller and 
the buyer receive half the profit of trading, the following equation holds: 
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P * Q - A C = 0 . 5 * Profit (6.1) 
The total profit equals the decrease in the buyer's abatement costs minus the 
increase in the seller's abatement costs: 
Equation (6.3) defines that the implicit permit price (P) equals the decrease in the 
buyer's abatement costs plus the increase in the seller's abatement costs, divided 
by twice the traded quantity of permits (Q). Analogously, (6.3) can be derived 
from the buyer's perspective. 
Consider for example the first trade transaction. The decrease in abatement costs 
(ACJ for Turkey amounts to 3106 million DM and the increase in abatement costs 
(ACJ for former East Germany amounts to 406. The traded quantity of permits in 
the first trade transaction amounts to 1077. If we substitute these numbers in 
equation (6.3) it follows that the permit price equals 1.63. This first trade 
transaction is between East Germany and Turkey, generating a profit of 2.7 billion 
DM. Since East Germany is able to sell a number of permits at zero costs, the 
profit from the first transaction is observably large. Turkey is allowed a great 
increase in emissions in 2000 because they only affect minor environmentally 
sensitive areas. As the initial allocation of emission permits is based on the 
emission level of 1990, the trade vector allows Turkey to purchase a large number 
of permits. The subsequent trade transaction between East Germany and the 
Remaining Soviet Union is about the same size in terms of amount of emission, 
but the profit is considerably smaller. 
The calculations show that countries do not always trade the maximum number 
of permits allowed by the trade vector. This can be explained by the intersection 
of marginal abatement-cost curves. As long as marginal abatement-cost curves do 
not intersect, countries will trade their maximum allowed number of permits. 
Otherwise it is more profitable to trade only until the point of intersection. The 
variation in implicit permit prices is considerable. Since the trade sequence is 
based solely on the profitability of a trade transaction, these prices do not follow a 
pattern. From equation (6.3) it follows that there is no clear relationship between 
Profit = A C A - ACS 
Substitution of (6.2) in (6.1) and rewriting gives: 
P = ( A C > A C S ) / 2 Q 
(6.2) 
(6.3) 
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the profit and the implicit permit price. After all profitable trade transactions have 
been completed the total profit generated by permit trading is 3507.15 million 
DM., but the cost-effective emission allocation has still not been reached. 
To analyse guided bilateral permit trading, Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 illustrate 
the initial trade vector and the corresponding marginal abatement costs in graph 
form. Each bar indicates a country. The y-axis in Figure 6.3 represents the 
number of permits a country is allowed to buy (positive number) or sell (negative 
number). The y-axis in Figure 6.4 represents the marginal abatement-costs in the 
pre- trade allocation. In both figures, buyers are represented first and seller 
second. 
Trade is only profitable if the marginal abatement cost of a buyer exceeds the 
marginal abatement cost of the seller. From Figure 6.4 it is clear that this condi-
tion does not hold for each buyer-seller combination. The most striking example 
is Sweden. The marginal abatement costs of Sweden exceed the marginal abate-
ment cost of any buyer, therefore Sweden will not sell any permits. Other 
countries with relative high marginal costs not selling permits are West Germany, 
Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
From Table 6.5 and from Figures 6.3 and 6.4 it can also be concluded that the 
buyer with the highest marginal abatement cost (Luxembourg) does not buy first. 
Since the trade order is defined by the total generated profit, the number of 
permits a country is allowed to buy is also of importance. Therefore Turkey and 
the Remaining Soviet Union are the first two buyers. Luxembourg, the buyer with 
the highest marginal costs is only the eighth buyer, since it is allowed to buy only 
one emission permit. 
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Figure 6.3 Base Case: initial trade vector (buyers +; sellers -). 
Figure 6.4 Base Case: marginal abatement costs in the pre-trade allo-
cation. 
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Figure 6.5 Base Case: trade vector after all profitable transactions have 
taken place (buyers+; sellers -). 
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Figure 6.6 Base Case: marginal abatement costs after all profitable trade 
transactions have taken place. 
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Finally, Figures 6.5 and 6.6 illustrate the resulting trade vector and the corre-
sponding marginal abatement-costs after all profitable trade transactions have 
taken place. No more profitable permit trading can take place because the mar-
ginal costs of potential sellers exceed the marginal costs of potential buyers. For 
example, Czechoslovakia, a potential buyer, cannot generate a profitable trade 
with any of the potential sellers, because the marginal costs of all potential sellers 
are too high compared to the marginal costs of Czechoslovakia. 
The trade allocation does not meet the deposition targets at all receptors. 
Figure 6.7 shows that the deposition target is exceeded at only 46 of the 483 
receptors and at most of those it is only slightly exceeded. At one receptor the 
relative exceedance is 35%. 
1G 15 2D 25 30 35 <I0 45 50 >50 
%-exceecfarice of d e p o s i t i o n t a r g e t s 
g u i d e d t r a d e 
Figure 6.7 Relative exceedance of deposition targets for the guided trade 
allocation. 
Figure 6.8 shows the location of the 46 receptors where the deposition target is 
exceeded. These receptors are shaded dark. A disproportionately large number of 
these receptors are located in Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Italy. In 
section 6.3.4 deposition levels are compared in more detail. 
Figure 6.8 Location of receptors in Europe exceeding the deposition 
targets in the guided trade allocation (if only profitable 
transactions take place). 
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If the cost-effective emission allocation is to be reached a number of loss-
making transactions has to take place. These transactions will result in an increase 
in abatement costs because such an increase by the sellers can no longer be 
compensated by the decrease in abatement costs of the buyers. This phenomenon 
has already been pointed out in Chapter 5. To stimulate further emission trading, 
a side payment (e.g. a subsidy) has to be introduced. Since the cost difference 
between the pre-trade allocation and the cost-effective allocation amounts to 135 
million DM, there is in principle an opportunity for side payments. The sequence 
of trades after introducing side payments strongly depends upon the amount of the 
side payments and upon the way such payments are introduced. 
For reason of completeness and to give some insight into the volume of loss-
making trade transactions, these transactions are simulated, assuming that a 
subsidy per permit is paid.71 This subsidy is introduced after all profitable trades 
have taken place. First, a subsidy of 5 million DM per permit is paid (i.e. 5000 
DM for 1 tonne S0 2). Next, the subsidy is raised in a stepwise manner by 5 
million DM per permit to generate trade. Table 6.6 gives an overview of the 
sequence of loss-making trade transactions. The first two columns gives the seller 
and the buyer of a trade transaction. The third column gives the number of 
permits traded. The fourth column represents the profit from trade, including the 
subsidy. Correcting the profit for this subsidy results in an increase in abatement 
costs (that is a loss) caused by permit trading, as represented in the fifth column. 
This loss has been calculated as the difference between the profit and the total 
subsidy. For example, in the first transaction the subsidy equals 4715 (943/5), 
whereas the profit equals only 3813. The loss (or increase in abatement costs) 
equals 902. Table 6.6 illustrates that the introduction of a subsidy results in very 
unequally distributed profits. Starting with a subsidy of 5 million DM per permit 
results in extremely high profits for the first countries that trade. 
'It is not suggested that this is a realistic policy alternative. 
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Table 6.6 Base Case: sequence of trade transactions involving losses 
Seller Buyer Traded Amount Profit Increase in total 
(ktSOj) (million DM) Abatement Costs (Mio. DM) 
UK TOR 943 3813' 902 
ITA CZE 238 l l l l 1 79 
BUL RSU 215 1022 1 53 
GDR RSU 274 939 1 431 
POL RSU 147.5 641 1 97 
BAL SPA 113 529' 36 
KOL CZE 107 491 1 44 
FRA UKR 57 245' 40 
IRE RSU 44.5 167' 55 
HUN RSU 33 156' 9 
BEL RSU 40 89' 111 
DEN RSU 38 63' 127 
ROM SPA 9.5 46' 2 
NET SPA 14 13' 57 
FIN UKR 15 8' 67 
KOL SPA 2 6' 4 
ROM SPA 0.5 2.3' 0.2 
POL SPA 0.5 2.2' 0.3 
IRE SPA 0.5 1' 1.5 
FRG UKR 2 0.5' 9.5 
FRG MOL 24 100 2 140 
FIN RSU 20 68 2 132 
GDR MOL 17 2 4 2 146 
DEN MOL 8 l l 2 69 
DEN UKR 6 7 2 53 
DEN ALB 4 4 2 36 
SWE TOR 10 2 2 3 228 
GDR RSU 2 I 4 59 
GDR ALB 2 1" 59 
GDR SPA 1 0.6 4 29.4 
GDR TOR 9 4 3 s 272 
1 Including a subsidy of 5 million DM/permit 
2 Including a subsidy of 10 million DM/permit 
3 Including a subsidy of 25 million DM/permit 
4 Including a subsidy of 30 million DM/permit 
5 Including a subsidy of 35 million DM/permit 
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Assuming still that the most profitable trade takes place first, the profit slowly 
decreases the more transactions take place. This pattern is disrupted after 20 trade 
transactions by the need to raise the subsidy to generate further trade. As a result 
the profit abruptly increases at this point. The total number of subsidies paid is 
extremely high: 2294 permits are traded with a subsidy of 5 million DM per 
permit, 79 permits are traded with a subsidy of 10 million DM per permit, 10 
permits are traded with a subsidy of 25 million DM per permit, 5 permits are 
traded with a subsidy of 30 million DM per permit and finally 9 permits are 
traded with a subsidy of 35 million DM per permit. The total amount paid in 
subsidies equals 12975 million DM. 
The stepwise increase of subsidies seems to be very unfair for countries who 
trade first. If countries behaved rationally they would postpone trading until after 
the highest subsidy is paid. In fact, the introduction of subsidies to stimulate 
permit trading is likely to be politically infeasible. Therefore permit trading will 
only be regarded as far as it is profitable, taking into account that deposition 
targets will not be fully reached. Therefore, in further analyses only the profitable 
trades shown in Table 6.5 are taken. 
6.3.3 Alternative abatement strategies 
Non-guided permit trading 
An interesting analysis is to look at what advantages guided S0 2 permit trade 
has above non-guided S0 2 permit trading in Europe. Therefore non-guided permit 
trading was simulated, based upon the initial permit distribution used for guided 
permit trading. Non-guided permit trading has no restrictions on buying and 
selling permits. It is also not clear beforehand which sources are buyers and which 
are sellers. 
After permits have been distributed, sources can start trading. A source will buy 
permits so long as the marginal abatement costs exceed the permit price. A source 
will sell emission permits so long as the permit price exceeds the marginal abate-
ment costs. Assuming that countries behave rationally non-guided permit trading 
will result in the lowest cost allocation of emissions, given the total emission 
permits available and not taking deposition targets into account. 
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Table 6.7 Overview of the non-guided trade allocation (emissions in kt SO. 
abatement costs in million DM). 
Country Initial Trade Abatement Costs Traded Permits 
Distribution Allocation in the Trade 
Allocation 
(bought +; 
sold -) 
Albania 81 65 60 -16 
Austria 57 292 37 235 
Belgium 240 559 97 319 
Bulgaria 735 554 212 -181 
Czechoslovakia 1419 965 1126 -454 
Denmark 107 279 69 172 
Finland 151 383 163 232 
France 732 736 377 4 
West Germany 546 1904 292 1358 
East Germany 2779 428 1338 -2351 
Greece 430 191 607 -239 
Hungary 587 514 297 -73 
Ireland 98 173 50 75 
Italy 1266 1183 1167 -83 
Luxembourg 9 15 0 6 
Netherlands 120 358 36 238 
Norway 33 106 31 73 
Poland 1865 2578 764 713 
Portugal 118 256 106 138 
Rumania 1046 915 960 -131 
Spain 1345 1193 750 -152 
Sweden 98 327 67 229 
Switzerland 43 67 5 24 
Turkey 847 1583 884 736 
United Kingdom 2192 1827 1109 -365 
Yugoslavia 860 1452 70 592 
Baltic Sea 18 18 - -
North Sea 42 42 - -
Atlantic Ocean 317 317 - -
Kola Karelia 407 266 324 -141 
S t Petersburg 238 125 166 -113 
Baltic Region 379 304 265 -75 
Belorussia 346 433 95 87 
Ukraine 1616 788 2765 -828 
Moldavia 182 62 222 -120 
RSU 1946 2037 2630 91 
Europe 23296 23296 17141 0 
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Table 6.7 gives an overview of the emission allocation after trade. The initial 
distribution of emission permits is equal to the distribution in the guided bilateral 
trade situation. The second column represents the emission allocation after all 
trades have taken place. The abatement costs resulting from this allocation are 
represented in the third column. The last column represents how many permits are 
bought and sold by the countries. Compared to guided permit trading, many 
countries turn out sellers rather than buyers and vice versa. This change occurs 
because deposition targets are not taken into account in non-guided permit trading. 
Since deposition targets are not taken into account in non-guided permit trading 
the total abatement costs after trade strongly decrease, compared to the cost-
effective allocation that meets the deposition targets. However, as I will show in 
detail in section 6.3.4, these cost savings have an environmental drawback because 
deposition targets are not reached. 
Uniform emission reduction 
A second alternative emission reduction strategy that is presented here is the so-
called uniform emission reduction strategy. This strategy aims at reaching the 
deposition target of 60% gap closure at all receptors by requiring an equal 
reduction percentage for all countries. The base year for emission reduction is 
1990. The uniform reduction percentage to meet the 60% gap closure deposition 
target at all receptors equals 66%. Table 6.8 gives an overview of the emission 
allocation and abatement costs of this emission reduction strategy. It should be 
noted that not all countries are able to reduce 66% of their 1990 emissions. For 
these countries (marked with an asterisk) Table 6.8 shows the maximum feasible 
abatement. 
It is common knowledge that a uniform emission reduction strategy generally 
results in excessive abatement costs. Compared to the cost-effective emission 
allocation, the abatement costs increase by 16394 million DM., an increase in 
abatement costs of 63%. 
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Table 6.8 Uniform emission reduction: 66% (emission and abatement in kt 
S0 2 ; abatement costs in million DM.) 
Country Emissions Abatement Abatement 
Costs 
Albania 48 89 85 
Austria 33 319 920 
Belgium 141 580 999 
Bulgaria 430 385 354 
Czechoslovakia 831 1515 1309 
Denmark 63 306 671 
Finland 88 515 1147 
France 428 881 938 
West Germany 320 1951 5659 
East Germany 1632 731 457 
Greece 252 653 543 
Hungary* 395 680 800 
Ireland 57 177 219 
Italy 741 2259 1828 
Luxembourg 5 10 121 
Netherlands 70 354 992 
Norway* 33 111 390 
Poland 1091 2647 2869 
Portugal 69 320 456 
Rumania 612 1980 1331 
Spain 787 2006 1263 
Sweden" 84 328 1070 
Switzerland* 43 31 152 
Turkey* 813 2074 5509 
United Kingdom 1283 2050 1869 
Yugoslavia 503 1073 1632 
Baltic Sea 25 48 88 
North Sea 59 114 207 
Atlantic Ocean 107 209 378 
Kola Karelia 238 490 355 
S t Petersburg 139 195 153 
Baltic Region 222 407 396 
Belorussia 203 364 371 
Ukraine 946 4120 2598 
Moldavia 106 272 180 
RSU 1139 5208 3955 
Europe 14036 35452 42264 
' Maximum abatement 
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6.3.4 Comparison of deposition levels 
The allocation reached by profitable guided permit trading and by non-guided 
permit trading can be compared with the pre-trade allocation in terms of environ-
mental quality.72 In the pre-trade allocation, the deposition target is exceeded at 
88 receptors (of a total of 483 receptors). In the non-guided trade allocation, the 
deposition target is exceeded at 109 receptors, whereas in the guided trade 
allocation, the deposition target is only exceeded at 46 receptors (see Figure 6.8, 
section 6.3.2). 
A point of interest concerns the relative exceedance of deposition targets. In 
general, the smaller the relative exceedance the less environmental damage occurs. 
Figure 6.9 illustrates the relative exceedance of deposition targets in the pre-trade 
allocation, the post non-guided trade allocation and in the post-guided trade 
allocation. In this figure, the relative exceedance is expressed on the x-axis and 
the number of permits is measured along the y-axis. For example, the first bar in 
Figure 6.9 indicates that in the pre-trade allocation the deposition target is 
exceeded by 5% at 17 receptors. The second bar indicates that in the non-guided 
trade allocation, the deposition target is exceeded by 5% at 10 receptors and the 
third bar indicates that in the guided trade allocation; this exceedance of 5% 
occurs at 12 receptors. 
Figure 6.9 indicates that the guided trade allocation causes the lowest environ-
mental damage. The guided trade allocation clearly shows an environmental 
improvement compared to the pre-trade allocation. The environmental damage 
caused by non-guided permit trading is the largest. The non-guided trade alloca-
tion results in relative exceedances of more than 50% at 35 receptors. The guided 
trade allocation only results in relative exceedances of maximum 35%. 
6.3.5 Distribution of abatement costs 
A final issue for comparison concerns the distribution of abatement costs. 
Generally, distribution issues are most important to policy makers. In Table 6.9 an 
overview of abatement costs is presented for several abatement allocations. First 
7 2 Both the 'cost-effective' allocation and the '66% uniform emission reduction' allocation are 
excluded in this comparison since deposition targets are fully met by these allocations. 
174 Chapter 6 
Figure 6.9 Relative exceedance of deposition targets for the pre-trade, 
non-guided trade and the guided trade allocation. 
the abatement costs in the cost-effective allocation are represented. Second, the 
abatement costs of a 66% uniform emission allocation are presented. Third, the 
abatement costs of the initial permit allocation are represented. The fourth column 
of Table 6.9 represents the abatement costs after profitable guided bilateral permit 
trading. Permit trading not only affects abatement costs, but sources are also faced 
with costs or benefits of buying c.q. selling permits. These distributional effects 
are represented in the last column, indicated with total net costs after trade. For 
example, the abatement costs for Luxembourg after trade amount to 27 million 
DM. However, Luxembourg bought 1 permit at a price of 10 million DM. There-
fore the total costs for Luxembourg, as represented in the fifth column amount to 
37 million DM. Obviously, for sellers of emission permits, the total costs 
decrease. For example, the United Kingdom sells permits to Greece, Albania and 
St. Petersburg, causing an increase in abatement costs from 825 to 1040 million 
DM. However, the proceeds raised by selling permits exceeds this increase in 
abatement costs. As a result, the total costs for the UK decrease from 825 to 735 
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million DM. The total European net costs after trade equal the total costs in the 
trade allocation because the aggregate benefits for selling sources equal the 
aggregate costs for buying sources. 
Generally, the 66% uniform reduction allocation results in the highest abatement 
costs. However, for some countries the cost-effective allocation corresponds to 
higher abatement costs. This is so for Denmark, former East Germany, Ireland 
and the Baltic Sea. In the cost-effective allocation, these countries have to reduce 
their emissions by more than 66%. Since the uniform emission reduction allocati-
on is based on a reduction of 66%, it is obvious that the initial permit allocation, 
which only requires a uniform reduction of 42%, results in fewer abatement costs. 
Since countries will only trade permits if this is profitable, the total cost trade 
allocation corresponds to lower (or equal) costs compared to the initial permit 
allocation. 
It is an ambiguous task to define who benefits from permit trading. The benefits 
strongly depend on the point of departure. With the exception of former East 
Germany, the trade allocation results in lower abatement costs compared to the 
66% uniform reduction allocation for all countries. Compared to the cost-effective 
allocation, the trade allocation results in higher abatement costs for Albania, 
Czechoslovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldavia and the Remaining Soviet 
Union. Considering the total cost of the trade allocation (in this case including the 
revenues or costs of selling or as the case may be buying permits) it follows that 
Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland, Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Belorussia and the Remaining Soviet 
Union suffer from higher costs than in the cost-effective allocation. Notably, all 
these countries are buyers of emission permits. 
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Table 6.9 Overview of abatement costs (million DM.) for four emission 
allocations and total net costs after trade. 
Abatement Costs 
Country Cost-
Effective 
Allocation 
66% 
Uniform 
Reduction 
Allocation 
Initial 
Permit 
Allocation 
Post Trade 
Allocation 
Total Net 
Costs after 
Trade* 
Albania 0 85 44 4 40 
Austria 537 920 701 537 625 
Belgium 712 999 575 575 575 
Bulgaria 251 354 48 48 48 
Czechoslovakia 423 1309 736 717 734 
Denmark 790 671 467 467 467 
Finland 916 1147 692 692 692 
France 461 938 382 382 382 
West Germany 3914 5659 3747 3747 3747 
East Germany 2437 457 0 1239 -1496 
Greece 212 543 371 212 358 
Hungary 290 800 240 259 147 
Ireland 234 219 147 147 147 
Italy 1384 1828 1096 1105 1096 
Luxembourg 27 121 46 27 37 
Netherlands 716 992 649 649 649 
Norway 379 390 390 379 385 
Poland 1782 2869 1585 1585 1585 
Portugal 69 456 317 69 257 
Rumania 844 1331 834 834 834 
Spain 496 1263 607 607 607 
Sweden 979 1070 725 725 725 
Switzerland 16 152 152 16 90 
Turkey 0 5509 3692 587 2343 
United Kingdom 2533 1869 825 1040 735 
Yugoslavia 819 1632 1027 819 969 
Baltic Sea 101 88 101 101 101 
North Sea 238 207 238 238 238 
Atlantic Ocean 0 378 0 0 0 
Kola Karelia 463 355 209 324 138 
St. Petersburg 61 153 62 61 62 
Baltic Region 317 396 192 192 192 
Belorussia 72 371 199 72 175 
Ukraine 1988 2598 2044 2044 2044 
Moldavia 89 180 122 122 122 
RSU 1320 3955 2743 1879 2651 
Eurone 25870 42264 26005 22501 22501 
* after including revenues from permit selling or expenditures for permit buying 
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6.4 Variant 1: excluding current reduction plans 
In this section I examine the possibility of achieving the emission allocation with 
absolute lowest abatement costs. In contrast to the Base Case, current reduction 
plans are not taken into account in calculating the cost-effective abatement 
allocation. Thus, the constraint that countries should reduce a minimum amount 
of emission according their CRP is released in calculating the cost-effective 
emission allocation. The deposition targets used for this variant are those 
resulting from the 60% gap closure. The cost-effective emission allocation is 
calculated for the year 2000, taking into account the official energy pathway 
when calculating the unabated emissions and the abatement-cost functions. The 
resulting abatement allocation reflects the cheapest way of reaching the deposition 
target of 60% gap closure. It is assumed that the ship emissions are also reduced 
according to this cost-effective emission allocation, although ship emissions are 
excluded from permit trading. 
Given this cost-effective emission allocation which has to be reached by means 
of permit trading, an appropriate number of emission permits has to be first 
distributed. As in the Base Case, the initial permit distribution is based on a 
uniform reduction of the emission level of 1990. The reduction percentage 
amounts to 34% percent compared to 42% in the Base Case. Next, the trade 
vector follows from the difference between the initial distribution of permits and 
the cost-effective emission allocation. Table 6.10 gives an overview of the cost 
effective emissions, the initial permit distribution and the trade vector.73 
The initial distribution derived in this way implies lower total abatement costs 
than the abatement costs in the cost-effective allocation (see Table 6.11). This cost 
difference is explained by the fact that the initial distribution of emission permits 
is based on a uniform reduction percentage, and does not take the emission 
location into account. As a result deposition targets are violated. 
"The initial distribution of permits again involves a problem. According to the initial distribution 
of permits, Switzerland has to abate 35 kt S 0 2 , but the maximum technically feasible abatement of 
Switzerland only amounts to 31 kt S 0 2 . For Switzerland it is assumed that 4 permits can be obtained 
(bought) from the seller with lowest costs (East Germany), before the trade process starts. 
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Table 6.10 Variant 1. Overview of S0 2 emission data: cost-effective emissions, 
initial distribution and the trade vector (kt SO-j). 
Country Cost-Effective Initial Trade Vector 
Emissions Distribution (buyer +; seller -) 
Albania 132 92 40 
Austria 219 64 155 
West Germany 670 618 52 
Greece 862 487 375 
Luxembourg 14 11 3 
Portugal 294 134 160 
Switzerland 64 43 21 
Turkey 2752 959 1793 
Yugoslavia 990 973 17 
Belorussia 546 392 154 
Ukraine 3122 1829 1293 
Moldavia 334 206 128 
Russia 5456 2202 3254 
Belgium 132 272 -140 
Bulgaria 794 832 -38 
Czechoslovakia 853 1606 -753 
Denmark 58 121 -63 
Finland 125 171 -46 
France 675 828 -153 
East Germany 391 3155 -2764 
Hungary 521 664 -143 
Ireland 53 110 -57 
Italy 1019 1433 -414 
Netherlands 78 136 -58 
Norway 33 36 -3 
Poland 1823 2110 -287 
Rumania 946 1183 -237 
Spain 1486 1523 -37 
Sweden 88 111 -23 
United Kingdom 1000 2481 -1481 
Kola Karelia 157 461 -304 
S t Petersburg 105 296 -164 
Baltic Region 149 429 -280 
Baltic Sea 18 18 -
North Sea 42 42 -
Atlantic Ocean 317 317 -
Europe 26317 26317 -
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Table 6.11 Variant 1. Overview of abatement costs in the pre-trade allocation 
and in the cost-effective allocation (million DM/yr). 
Country Pre-Trade Cost-Effective Allocation 
Albania 35 0 
Austria 639 147 
Belgium 496 1079 
Bulgaria 0 0 
Czechoslovakia 579 1268 
Denmark 411 722 
Finland 613 850 
France 301 461 
West Germany 3373 3187 
East Germany 0 1400 
Greece 316 0 
Hungary 199 290 
Ireland 131 234 
Italy 974 1380 
Luxembourg g 2 
Netherlands 581 921 
Norway 357 390 
Poland 1298 1641 
Portugal 288 69 
Rumania 709 929 
Spain 467 496 
Sweden 568 971 
Switzerland 152 9 
Turkey 2542 3 
United Kingdom 613 2428 
Yugoslavia 835 807 
Kola Karelia 171 463 
St, Petersburg 37 196 
Baltic Region 143 532 
Belorussia 144 1 
Ukraine 1901 1097 
Moldavia 106 21 
Russia 2488 338 
Europe 21474 22332 
The cost-effective allocation, however, requires some countries to reduce much 
more emission. This results in a considerable increase in abatement costs. The 
180 Chapter 6 
most apparent example is Czechoslovakia. According to the initial distribution, 
Czechoslovakia is allocated with 1606 kt S0 2 . The cost-effective allocation, 
however, allows Czechoslovakia to emit only 853 kt S0 2 . By way of comparison, 
in the Base Case Czechoslovakia's cost-effective emissions amount to 1792 kt 
so2. 
Table 6.11 gives an overview of the abatement costs corresponding to the initial 
permit distribution and the abatement costs in the cost-effective emission alloca-
tion. Although the total post-trade costs are higher than the total pre-trade costs, a 
number of profitable trade transactions will take place, if countries behave 
rationally. Table 6.12 gives an overview of the sequence of profitable trades, 
assuming that the trade with the greatest profit will take place first. 
Table 6.12 Variant 1. Sequence of profitable trades 
Seller Buyer Traded Profit Market Permit Price Implicit Permit 
Quantity (million (million DM/kt SOj) Price (million 
(kt SOJ DM) DM/kt SOj) 
GDR TOR 1171 1895 0 0.98 
GDR AUS 155 383 0.71 1.95 
HUN FRG 52 159 0.53 2.05 
BUL SWI 21 143 0 3.40 
GDR POR 160 104 0.71 1.04 
GDR RSU 709 103 0.71 0.79 
GDR GRE 375 49 0.71 0.78 
KOL BYE 102 35 0.70 0.88 
BUL YUG 17 29 0 0.85 
HUN ALB 40 13 0.53 0.71 
HUN LUX 3 4 0.53 1.27 
HUN BYE 7 1.2 0.53 0.66 
ROM BYE 5 0.1 0.70 0.69 
As in the Base Case, the first seller of emission permits is the former East 
Germany. Since the number of initially distributed emission permits exceeds the 
level of unabated emissions in the year 2000, former East Germany can sell the 
first permits at zero costs. Turkey on the other hand, planned an increase of 
emissions in 2000 whereas the number of permits is based on 1990-emissions. 
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Consequently Turkey has to buy a large amount of permits. The profit generated 
by the first trade transaction is observably large. The quantity of permits traded in 
the first transaction is also remarkably large compared to the other trade transac-
tions. The total profit generated by permit trading amounts to 2.9 billion DM and 
is about the same size as the generated total profit in the Base Case. The number 
of permits traded in this variant is also about the same size as the number of 
permits traded in the Base Case. 
After all profitable trades have taken place, many permits still have to be traded 
to reach the cost-effective emission allocation. Since these transactions are no 
longer profitable, a kind of side payment has to be introduced. However, since the 
total abatement costs in the cost-effective allocation exceed the total abatement 
costs in the pre-trade allocation, there are no funds for paying side payments. 
The allocation reached by profitable permit trading (post-trade allocation) can 
be compared with the pre-trade allocation with respect to environmental quality. 
In the pre-trade allocation, the deposition target is exceeded at 119 receptors. In 
the post-trade allocation, the deposition target is exceeded at 84 receptors. Figure 
6.10 illustrates the relative exceedance of deposition targets in the pre-trade and 
post-trade allocation. Figure 6.10 illustrates that both the number of receptors 
where the deposition target is exceeded and the relative exceedance of deposition 
targets are reduced by permit trading. However, if we compare this variant with 
the Base Case, both the number of receptors and the relative exceedance of 
deposition targets has increased. An obvious explanation for this lower environ-
mental benefit is that there is an increase in the total emissions in the cost-
effective emission allocation not taking into account CRP. 
6.5 Variant 2. The Second SO rProtocol 
This variant examines whether guided bilateral permit trading, starting from the 
actual S0 2 Protocol can improve the cost-effectiveness of emission abatement. 
The difficulty of getting concerning political agreement on the initial distribution 
of permits is generally regarded as a major drawback to a system of permit 
trading. By using the emission distribution of the actual S0 2 Protocol as a starting 
point for permit trading, this drawback is met. 
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It should be noted that not all European countries signed the 1994 SOz Protocol. 
Therefore I have assumed here that only those countries who have signed the 
Protocol will participate in a system of guided bilateral permit trading. Table 6.13 
gives an overview of the signatory countries, their committed emission ceilings 
for the year 2000 and the accompanying abatement costs according to the RAINS 
model. 7 4 , 7 5 The main countries who did not sign the Protocol were Albania, 
Rumania, Turkey and the Baltic Region. 
Although the S0 2 Protocol in principle aimed at the deposition target corres-
ponding to 60% gap closure, the actual deposition resulting from the protocol will 
not reach this deposition target at all receptors. There are two reasons for this. 
'"Canada, not included in Table 6.12, signed the Protocol as well. 
7 5 The Protocol data have been adapted to fit the country classification of the RAINS model. 
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Table 6.13. Sulphur emissions according to the 1994 S0 2 Protocol and the 
accompanying abatement costs. 
Country Emissions (kt S 0 2 ) Abatement Costs (million DM) 
Austria 78 537 
Belgium 248 555 
Bulgaria 1374 0 
Czechoslovakia 1465" 697 
Denmark 90 536 
Finland 116 866 
France 868 269 
West Germany 1019" 1940 
East Germany 281 1768 
Greece 595 212 
Hungary 898 76 
Ireland 155 72 
Italy 1330 1049 
Luxembourg 10 27 
Netherlands 106 716 
Norway 34 377 
Poland 2583 759 
Portugal 304 59 
Spain 2143 163 
Sweden 100 688 
Switzerland 60 16 
United Kingdom 2449 637 
Yugoslavia 1378 e 167 
Belorussia 456 72 
Ukraine 2310 1602 
RSU 4440 836 
Total 24890 14696 
a Czech Republic: 1128 kt S 0 2 and Slovakia: 337 kt S 0 2 
b Germany committed itself to emit 1300 kt SCy However, the RAINS model distinguishes West 
Germany from East Germany. The emission distribution has been chosen so that total abatement 
costs for both West and East Germany are minimal. 
c Only Croatia (133 kt SOJ and Slovenia (130 kt SOJ signed the Protocol. It is assumed that the 
Republic o f Yugoslavia emits according to CRP. 
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Firstly, some countries did not sign the protocol76 and secondly, some countries 
did not commit themselves to a reduction of as many emissions as were necessary 
to achieve this deposition target. Therefore, a new deposition target was formu-
lated to simulate guided bilateral permit trading based upon the S0 2 Protocol. 
This new deposition target is as follows. First, the deposition resulting from the 
S0 2 Protocol is calculated, assuming that the non-signatory countries act accor-
ding to their CRP. Next, the deposition at every receptor is compared to the 60% 
gap closure deposition target. For receptors where this deposition target is 
exceeded, the deposition target is adapted to the deposition resulting from the S0 2 
Protocol. For receptors where the deposition is below or equal to the 60% gap 
closure deposition target, this target is maintained. Moreover, deposition targets 
are only formulated for receptors in the countries that signed the protocol. 
Next, given this new deposition target, a cost-effective emission allocation can 
be calculated. This cost-effective emission allocation meets the adapted deposition 
targets at minimum abatement costs for the countries signing the S0 2 Protocol, 
given the CRP emissions of the non-signatory countries. Table 6.14 gives an 
overview of emissions and abatement costs in the cost effective emission allocati-
on. Table 6.14 indicates that the deposition target based upon the S0 2 Protocol 
can be achieved at lower abatement costs compared to the abatement costs 
resulting from the S0 2 Protocol. The difference amounts to 1211 million DM. 
Once the initial allocation of emission permits and the cost-effective allocation 
of emissions have been established, the trade vector can be derived. The problem 
is that the sum of emissions in the cost-effective allocation exceeds the initial 
amount of allocated emissions. In other words, the total number of permits for all 
countries that may be bought exceeds the total number of permits for all countries 
that may be sold. To deal with this problem I have introduced an additional seller, 
the Trade Coordinating Institute which can sell an additional amount of permits. 
Table 6.15 shows the resulting trade vector. 
'I have assumed that those countries have acted according to their own CRP. 
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Table 6.14 Variant 2. Emissions and abatement costs in the cost-effective 
emission allocation for countries signing the S0 2 Protocol. 
Country Emissions (kt SOJ Abatement Costs (million DM) 
Austria 106 418 
Belgium 250 550 
Bulgaria 794 0 
Czechoslovakia 1346 797 
Denmark 98 504 
Finland 116 863 
France 810 315 
West Germany 1025 1918 
East Germany 391 1400 
Greece 894 0 
Hungary 521 290 
Ireland 169 55 
Italy 1244 1114 
Luxembourg 14 2 
Netherlands 123 636 
Norway 41 275 
Poland 2541 805 
Portugal 304 59 
Spain 2148 162 
Sweden 110 578 
Switzerland 66 6 
United Kingdom 2235 793 
Yugoslavia 1398 141 
Belorussia 453 75 
Ukraine 2538 1460 
RSU 5607 269 
Total 25342 13485 
According to the trade vector, Finland and Portugal are not allowed to trade. 
The emission according to the S0 2 Protocol equals the cost-effective emission for 
these countries. Countries that should sell permits are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom and Belorussia. That is, these 
countries should further reduce their emissions. The Trade Coordinating Institute 
is allowed to sell 452 emission permits. The remaining 16 countries are allowed 
to buy permits. 
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Table 6.15 Variant 2. Overview of the cost-effective emission allocation, the 
initial emission distribution according to the S0 2 Protocol and the 
trade vector (kt S0 2). 
Country Cost-Effective Initial Emission Trade Vector 
Emissions Distribution (buyers +; 
sellers -) 
Austria 106 78 28 
Belgium 250 248 2 
Denmark 98 90 8 
West Germany 1025 1019 6 
East Germany 391 281 110 
Greece 894 595 299 
Ireland 169 155 14 
Luxembourg 14 10 4 
Netherlands 123 106 17 
Norway 41 34 7 
Spain 2148 2143 5 
Sweden 110 100 10 
Switzerland 66 60 6 
Yugoslavia 1398 1378 20 
Ukraine 2538 2310 228 
RSU 5607 4440 1167 
Bulgaria 794 1374 -580 
Czechoslovakia 1346 1465 -119 
France 810 868 -58 
Hungary 521 898 -377 
Italy 1244 1330 -86 
Poland 2541 2583 -42 
United Kingdom 2235 2449 -241 
Belorussia 453 456 -3 
Trade Coordinating Institute - 452 -452 
Finland 116 116 0 
Portugal 304 304 0 
Total 25342 25342 -
Once the initial distribution of emission permits and the trade vector are estab-
lished, guided bilateral permit trading can be simulated. As in the Base Case and 
in the modification on the Base Case, the sequence of trade transactions is based 
upon the profitability of the transactions. 
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The effect on trade of the selling of permits by the Trade Coordinating Institute 
depends upon the price of these permits. First I will assume that the TCI does not 
set a price but will receives half of the reduction in abatement costs of a country 
purchasing permits form the TCI. This reduction in abatement costs equals the 
profit generated by permit trading. The sequence of profitable trade transactions 
resulting from guided bilateral permit trading is shown in Table 6.16. For each 
transaction the seller, the buyer, the traded quantity, the profit and the implicit 
permit price is represented. 
Table 6.16 Variant 2A. Sequence of profitable trade transactions if the TCI 
receives half of the generated profit. 
Seller Buyer Traded Quantity Profit Revenue TCI Implicit Permit 
(kt S 0 2 ) (million 
DM) 
(million DM) Price (million 
DM/kt S 0 2 ) 
BUL GDR 110 368 - 1.67 
BUL RSU 470 296 - 0.32 
4 TCI GRE 299 212 106 0.35 
TCI AUS 28 118 59 2.12 
TCI SWE 10 110 55 5.46 
TCI NET 17 80 40 2.36 
TCI NOR 7 76 38 5.45 
TCI UKR 91 56 28 0.31 
HUN DEN 8 28 - 2.27 
HUN LUX 4 23 - 3.39 
HUN FRG 6 18 - 2.05 
HUN YUG 20 16 - 0.94 
HUN UKR 137 13 - 0.57 
HUN IRE 14 10 - 0.88 
HUN SWI 6 7 - 1.02 
HUN BEL 2 4 - 1.64 
Simulation results indicate that 16 profitable trade transactions will take place. In 
the first two, Bulgaria is involved. According to the cost functions of the RAINS 
model, Bulgaria is able to reduce emissions to 794 kt S0 2 at zero costs. Therefore 
Bulgaria is able to sell 580 permits at zero costs. Notably, the Trade Coordinating 
Institute sells all 452 permits. The total profit generated by permit trading 
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amounts to 1.4 billion DM. The TCI receives 0.326 billion DM by selling 
permits. After all profitable trade transactions have taken place, the cost effective 
emission allocation is not fully reached. 
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 illustrate the trade vector and the pre-trade marginal 
abatement costs as a graph. For trade to be profitable, the marginal abatement 
costs of the buyers have to exceed the marginal abatement costs of the sellers. 
The first buyer of emission permits, the former East Germany does not have the 
highest marginal abatement costs. But, since it is allowed to buy a substantial 
number of permits, the largest profit is generated. The buyer with the highest 
marginal costs, Luxembourg is only allowed to buy 4 emission permits and is 
therefore only the tenth buyer. Explaining the order of sellers is obvious. First the 
sellers with zero marginal costs sell permits. Then comes Hungary, the seller with 
the lowest marginal abatement costs. Since the marginal abatement costs of most 
buyers exceed the marginal abatement costs of the sellers, most of the trade vector 
is traded. After all profitable trades have taken place, only Spain and the Remain-
ing Soviet Union should buy 5 and 697 emission permits respectively in order to 
reach the cost-effective solution. 
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Figure 6.11 Variant 2A. Initial trade vector (buyers +; sellers -). 
Figure 6.12 Variant 2A. Marginal abatement costs in the pre-trade alloca-
tion. 
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The implicit price per permit the TCI receives varies considerably. A more 
reasonable assumption is that the TCI will sell permits to every buyer at the same 
price. It is also reasonable to assume that the TCI wants to sell all permits since 
this minimizes the total abatement costs. The permit price that involves the sale of 
all permits depends upon the marginal abatement costs. If the TCI wants to be 
sure of selling all permits, the permit price should equal the lowest marginal cost 
in the cost-effective allocation. This marginal cost amounts to 0.29 million DM/kt 
S0 2 . Table 6.17 shows the sequence of profitable trade transactions assuming this 
permit price. 
Table 6.17 Variant 2B. Sequence of profitable trade transactions if the price of 
the permits sold by the TCI amounts to 0.29 million DM/kt S0 2 . 
Seller Buyer Traded Quantity Profit Revenue TCI Implicit Permit 
(kt. SOj) (million DM) (million DM) Price (million 
DM/kt SOj) 
BUL GDR 110 368 - 1.67 
BUL RSU 470 245 - 0.26 
TCI GRE 267 135 77.43 0.29* 
TCI AUS 28 110 8.12 0.29* 
TCI SWE 10 107 2.9 0.29* 
TCI NET 17 75 4.93 0.29' 
TCI NOR 7 74 2.03 0.29* 
TCI UKR 123 41 35.67 0.29* 
HUN DEN 8 28 - 2.27 
HUN LUX 4 23 - 10.58 
HUN FRG 6 18 - 2.04 
HUN YUG 20 16 - 0.94 
HUN UKR 105 10 - 0.57 
HUN IRE 14 10 - 0.89 
HUN SWI 6 7 - 1.07 
HUN BEL 2 4 - 1.49 
fixed price 
By assuming that the TCI sells permits at a price of 0.29 million DM, the total 
profit generated by trade decreases and amounts to 1.27 billion DM. The TCI 
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sells all 452 permits. The revenue of the TCI decreases to 131 million DM. The 
number of permits that is traded has only decreased by 32. 
An interesting question that arose was to what extent the generated profit 
depends upon the assumed trade sequence. To answer this question the model 
was adjusted to simulate permit trading with an arbitrary trade sequence. This 
new model was then used to run 2500 simulations in which the trade sequence 
was randomly chosen. The simulation results indicate that the average profit 
generated amounts to 1.19 billion DM. The smallest profit amounts to 0.97 
billion and the largest profit amounts to 1.26 billion DM. Figure 6.13 shows the 
distribution of the generated profits for these 2500 simulations. The generated 
profit shows a fair stability. Only in one trade sequence does the profit generated 
amount to less than 1 billion DM. Most trade transactions generate a profit of 
between 1.15 and 1.25 billion DM, which indicates that the generated profit is 
not heavily sensitive to the trade sequence. 
0-1000 1000-1100 1100-11 SO 1160-1200 1200-1250 1250-1300 
Total Profit (million DM) 
Figure 6.13 Overview of generated profits caused by guided bilateral trade 
for 2500 different trade sequences. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have discussed simulated guided bilateral permit trading among 
European countries for S0 2 emissions. Since S0 2 is a non-uniformly mixing 
pollutant, permit trading has to be guided to take care of deposition targets. 
Obviously, this guiding limits trade opportunities and makes the system more 
complex than that of free trade in emission permits. The system of guided 
bilateral trade aims at reaching the cost effective emission allocation. For this 
purpose, the number of initially issued permits has to correspond to the emissions 
in the cost-effective abatement allocation. To be able, to reach the cost effective 
emission allocation by permit trading, trade has to be restricted according to the 
trade vector that indicates the number of permits countries are allowed to buy or 
sell. 
Guided bilateral permit trading was simulated for three variants. In the policy-
oriented Base Case, permit trading aimed at reaching the cost-effective emission 
allocation, given the Current Reduction Plans of the European countries. In 
Variant 1, the restriction of Current Reduction Plans was released. Variant 2 
examined guided bilateral permit trading starting from the SOz Protocol. The 
simulation results indicate that permit trading steers the trade process towards the 
cost-effective allocation of emission abatement, but the cost-effective allocation of 
emission abatement will not be fully reached by profitable trade transactions. In 
all three variants, the profit generated by guided bilateral permit trading is 
substantial. In the Base Case and in Variant 1, the cost saving of permit trading 
amounts to 13.5% of the total abatement costs. By excluding the Current 
Reduction Plans in Variant 1 the total abatement costs decreased but, since 
guided bilateral trade allows more initial emissions, this decrease in abatement 
costs occurred initially and the profit by permit trading did not increase. 
The simulation result of Variant 2 indicates that guided bilateral permit trading 
starting from the emission allocation in the S0 2 Protocol results is a cost saving 
of 7.8 % of total abatement costs. Given this result, I conclude that the S0 2 
Protocol does not result in highly excessive abatement costs, when given the 
deposition target, but that some cost-effective improvement is possible by guided 
bilateral permit trading. 
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Finally, the simulation results indicate that the trade sequence influences the 
generated profit. However, the simulations also show that the impact of the trade 
sequences on the profit level is small. As a result the trade coordinating institute 
only has to control whether countries trade according to the trade vector. No 
influencing is necessary to generate a certain trade sequence, since this has a 
minor impact on total profits. 
Having illustrated the consequences of guided bilateral permit trading, the 
question arises whether this system should be introduced in practice. This 
question can be answered by using the criteria to judge on policy instruments as 
introduced in Chapter 2. As far as economic efficiency and environmental 
effectiveness is concerned, guided bilateral trade is a suitable instrument because 
deposition targets are hardly exceeded and emission reduction takes place at 
minimum abatement costs. Other arguments in favour of guided bilateral permit 
trading are that the use of permits provides a continuous incentive to search for 
technology innovation and provides flexibility the way polluters want to comply 
with the environmental targets. Moreover, the system of guided bilateral permit 
trading can be introduced in accordance with the Second S0 2 Protocol, since this 
protocol provides the opportunity for two or more parties to implement the 
emission reduction obligations together. This opens up the opportunity for one 
party to decrease its emission reductions if another party increases it reductions. 
This thesis only takes the costs of emission reduction into account. It is difficult 
to estimate the cost of implementation of a guided bilateral permit trading system. 
There is no indication that the costs of this system will be substantially higher 
than the costs of other policy instruments, when non-violation of deposition 
targets is taken into account. Since the trade restrictions of guided bilateral permit 
trading are clear and rather simple to the polluters, the mode of operation of this 
system seems not very complex. The remaining criteria, integration in sectoral 
policies, distributional effects and political acceptability are difficult to judge 
without specific research on these criteria. In conclusion, on the basis of the 
applied criteria, guided bilateral permit trading seems to offer opportunities for 
cost savings and practical implementation. 

7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This study has examined the question of whether a system of tradeable emission 
permits can contribute to a cost-effective reduction of S0 2 emissions in Europe, 
taking into account prespecified deposition targets and what sort of system it 
should be. To deal with this question three research topics have been examined. 
(I) What are the main economic aspects of a European acid rain policy? 
(II) What are the advantages and the disadvantages of using a system of 
tradeable permits to implement a European acid rain policy? 
(III) What should a system of tradeable emission permits for a non-uniformly 
mixing pollutant look like in order to take deposition targets into account? 
This chapter summarizes and presents the conclusions of this research. First I 
present the conclusion on the efficacy of the different integrated assessment 
models in analysing the effects of emission reduction. I then summarize the 
conclusions on guided bilateral permit trading. Finally, I make several suggestions 
for further research. 
7.2 Economic theory of pollution control 
In this research I have followed the ecological approach to pollution control. This 
approach does not aim at optimal pollution control levels where marginal abate-
ment costs equal marginal benefits. Marginal benefits are usually too difficult to 
determine. Instead it aims at cost-effective abatement of pollutants to reach 
prespecified environmental targets. Since acid rain is an international environmen-
tal problem, cost-effective abatement needs to be considered in an international 
context. To achieve cost-effective international abatement it is necessary to have 
cooperation among countries. Although full cooperation results in minimized total 
costs for the cooperating countries, individual countries may, however, not act 
accordingly. This has been explained by the existence of the prisoner's dilemma. 
However, the assumptions underlying the prisoner's dilemma do not always hold 
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in reality, and in the real world, countries do have some incentives to cooperate. 
Moreover, side payments can be introduced to stimulate countries to participate in 
cooperative abatement strategies. 
Another issue I discussed is which policy instruments can be used to implement 
pollution control policy. A main distinction can be made between economic and 
non-economic instruments (regulation). A main advantage of economic instru-
ments is their cost-effective character because, unlike regulation, economic 
instruments result in minimum control costs. Moreover, they allow more flexibili-
ty to the polluters and provide a continuous incentive for developing and adapting 
new control technologies. This thesis has elaborated on the use of tradeable 
emission permits. 
7.3 Tradeable permits for non-uniformly mixing pollutants 
Environmental degradation by non-uniformly mixing pollutants depends not only 
on the amount of emission, but also on the location of that emission. Accordingly, 
the environmental aim I followed in this study was not to reach an emission 
target, but rather to reach deposition targets. This has main consequences for 
using a system of tradeable emission permits as this system, in principle, only 
regulates emissions. It does not take the resulting depositions into account. The 
implications of permit trading for non-uniformly mixing pollutants have been 
illustrated and the alternatives for taking emission location into account in permit 
trading, that were put forward in the literature were discussed in Chapter 3. 
It cannot be concluded in general that emission permits are a suitable instrument 
for controlling non-uniformly mixing pollutants. The use of emission permits 
results in a cost-minimum reduction of emissions, but the environmental implicat-
ions of this emission reduction are uncertain, as deposition may be unacceptably 
large at some locations. To what extent the resulting cost-effective emission 
allocation deviates from the cost-effective deposition allocation depends on the 
source-receptor relationships and the marginal control costs of controlling the 
sources. In the USA, however, tradeable emission permits are actually used for 
the non-uniformly mixing pollutant S0 2 . Nevertheless, one should be aware that 
this emission trading does not focus on reaching a deposition target, but is only 
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emission oriented. Environmental targets are taken care of by State Implement-
ation Plans in the USA. 
Deposition permits are an obvious alternative to emission permits for taking 
emission location into account. Theoretically, the use of tradeable deposition 
permits results in a cost-effective allocation that meets deposition targets. Accord-
ing to this system, sources have to own the appropriate number of deposition 
permits for each receptor affected. In this way authorities can control deposition 
targets. However, a disadvantage of this system is that it may result in an increase 
in emissions, which is politically delicate. Another argument against this system is 
the trading complexity that occurs because sources have to operate simultaneously 
in many different markets. 
Since the use of both emission and deposition permits is not considered to be a 
very suitable instrument, several alternatives permit systems for non-uniformly 
mixing pollutants have been proposed in the literature. Relatively simple alterna-
tives are permit trading within zones and the 'worst case' approach, but unfortu-
nately, these systems do not guarantee the non-violation of deposition targets. 
A promising permit trading system that does not violate deposition targets 
seems to be a more advanced one where the trading is subject to rules. Three 
variants are known: the pollution offset, the non-degradation offset and the 
modified pollution offset. All systems guarantee non-violation of deposition 
targets. The constraints on emissions and on deposition targets, however, differ 
between these systems. The pollution offset offers the largest trade opportunities, 
but allows for an increase in emissions. The non-degradation offset and the 
modified pollution offset are more restricting and consequently result in higher 
abatement costs. Which of the two has the lower cost cannot be shown on 
theoretical grounds. 
In judging permit trading systems, special attention has to be paid to the nature 
of the trading process. Although many studies implicitly assume a simultaneous 
trading process, it seems more reasonable to consider permit trading as a bilateral 
and sequential process. Combining permit trading subject to rules with the 
bilateral and sequential trading concept sheds new light on the cost-effectiveness 
of these permit trading systems. Empirical studies indicate that bilateral permit 
trading applying offset rules do not result in cost-effective abatement. However, 
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bilateral and sequential trading has only been recently applied to studies on permit 
trading, and has been examined further in this study. A main conclusion is that 
permit trading for non-uniformly mixing pollutants has to be restricted in some 
way if deposition targets are to be taken into account. What is needed are restric-
tions that result in non-violation of deposition targets, and at the same time, do 
not hamper the attainment of the cost-effective allocation. 
7.4 Integrated assessment models 
Integrated assessment models can be used for quantifying the consequences of 
abatement allocations. These models provide a scientific basis for evaluating 
alternative abatement allocations and are therefore a useful tool in policy making. 
Three integrated assessment models are available for Europe : (i) the Regional 
Acidification INformation and Simulation model (RAINS); (ii) the Abatement 
Strategies Assessment Model (ASAM) and (iii) the Coordinated Abatement 
Strategy Model (CASM). Integrated assessment models provide information on 
emissions, abatement costs, the atmospheric transport of emissions and the 
environmental effects of alternative abatement strategies. Since accurate monetari-
zation of environmental damage is very difficult and complex in practice, the 
environmental damage is expressed in physical terms. For acidification, the 
environmental damage is expressed in exceedance of critical loads. Given these 
targets, a cost-effective emission abatement policy can be found. This makes these 
models very useful for policy analysis. 
Among the European integrated assessment models, the RAINS model is the 
most complete and extensive. Although the RAINS model, the ASAM and the 
CASM are roughly similar, they diverge on various points as well. One difference 
is the number of acidifying compounds they take into account. Other differences 
are the optimization options that are implemented and the accuracy of the 
emission location. Finally, the data sources used differ in some submodels. The 
main benefit of the ASAM is its accuracy on emission locations and the resulting 
atmospheric transport. However, because of lack of data for this purpose, the 
intended accuracy is only partial. Model results show no significant differences 
caused by the grid to grid approach used. A serious drawback of this model is the 
lack of clarity of the procedure needed to derive the so called Best Economic 
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Environmental Pathway. The CASM is attractive because of its large number of 
optimization criteria. However, since policy aims at reaching certain deposition 
targets, optimization criteria to minimize environmental damage, given a budget 
constraint are not actually very useful for policy purposes. Comparison of the 
CASM and the RAINS model shows that the model results are broadly in line 
with each other. 
There are two reasons for the current status of acceptance of the RAINS model. 
First, the model is the most completely integrated assessment model for acidifi-
cation. The alternative integrated assessment models, the CASM and the ASAM 
do not substantially improve the RAINS model. Second, RAINS was developed 
by scientists of various disciplines at an international "East-West" institute. This 
aspect mainly played a role in the acceptance of RAINS in international policy 
making (Hordijk, 1991, 1995). Acid rain models have substantially increased 
knowledge of the acid rain problem and have provided useful information for 
assisting and improving policy making. In this research I used the RAINS model 
for calculations. The reasons for this choice were those given above: (i) the model 
is the most complete one for acidification and (ii) the model is widely accepted 
and was used in the international negotiations on the Second Sulphur Protocol. 
7.5 Guided bilateral trade 
7.5.1 Theory 
Research has shown that in case of non-uniformly mixing pollutants, permit 
trading has to be constrained if a cost-effective emission allocation is to be 
attained. It has been argued that if permit trading is constrained, it is necessary to 
consider permit trading as a bilateral process. In Chapter 5 I developed a new 
system for bilateral permit trading describing it as guided bilateral trade. The aim 
of this system is to provide large trade opportunities while at the same time 
preventing the violation of deposition targets. However, it is not necessary to 
require that every trade transaction meets the deposition targets. A subsequent 
trade transaction might compensate for the deposition exceedance at a receptor 
brought about by a previous trade transaction. To be able to take care of the 
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deposition targets, the guided bilateral trade system restricts trading by a trade 
vector which indicates the number of permits sources are allowed to sell or buy. 
Guided bilateral permit trading achieves a cost-effective allocation if all trade 
transactions that are in accordance with the trade vector are profitable. A draw-
back of guided bilateral permit trading is that trade transactions are not necessarily 
profitable. Whether this is so depends on the source-receptor relationships, the 
abatement cost functions, the deposition targets and the initial permit distribution. 
To reach the deposition targets ultimately, non-profitable trade transactions need 
to be compensated in some way. Before trade transactions can be guided to the 
cost- effective emission allocation, this allocation has to be known. Therefore full 
information is required by the trade institution in order to establish the trade 
vector. Unfortunately, this cancels out one of the characteristics of tradeable 
permits, namely that full information is not needed. Knowledge on the cost-
effective emission allocation by policy makers might cause the guided bilateral 
permit system to become unnecessary. However, knowing this allocation does not 
by definition imply that it will be agreed upon at once, as can be seen from the 
Second Sulphur Protocol. In that case, a suitable instrument for achieving further 
cost savings is a system of guided bilateral trade. 
The term guided bilateral trade indicates that the permit market as such is not 
able to generate the desired outcome. The trade process has to be guided by a 
trade institution that takes care of the number of traded permits. However, any 
trading system that takes deposition targets into account will need some kind of 
control. The main advantage of the guided bilateral trade system is that the cost-
effective emission abatement allocation can be achieved if all trade transactions 
are profitable, or, if not, when non profitable transactions are subsidized. In the 
past, achieving the cost-effective allocation was thought to be possible by means 
of a simultaneous trade process. However, as I indicated in section 5.3, the 
practical functioning of such a trade system is a black box. This box can be 
opened by means of the system of guided bilateral trade. 
7.5.2 Simulation results 
To examine to what extent the guided bilateral trade system results in a cost-
effective reduction of S0 2 emissions in Europe, taking into account deposition 
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targets, I used the RAINS model to simulate guided bilateral permit trading 
among European countries for S0 2 emissions. In calculating the cost-effective 
emission allocation, emission is measured at national level. Accordingly, guided 
bilateral permit trading only allocates emission reduction between countries. The 
way in which countries meet their emission reduction is a next step. For the sake 
of completeness it should be noted that the European abatement allocation is only 
cost-effective if all individual countries also reduce their national emissions in a 
cost minimum way. I simulated guided bilateral permit trading for three cases. In 
the policy oriented Base Case, permit trading aimed at the cost-effective emission 
allocation, given the Current Reduction Plans of the European countries. In 
variant 1 the restriction of Current Reduction Plans was released. Variant 2 
examined guided bilateral permit trading, starting from the S0 2 Protocol. 
The simulation results indicated that permit trading steers the trade process 
towards the cost-effective allocation of emission abatement, but the cost-effective 
allocation of emission abatement will not be fully reached by profitable trade 
transactions. In all three cases, the profit generated by guided bilateral permit 
trading was substantial. In the Base Case and in variant 1, the cost saving of 
permit trading amounted to 13.5% of the total abatement costs. From a policy 
point of view, variant 2 is very interesting since it draws heavily on the actual 
situation in Europe. The simulation result of Variant 2 indicated that guided 
bilateral permit trading, starting from the emission allocation in the Second S0 2 
Protocol, results is a cost saving of 7.8% of the total abatement costs. Given this 
result, we may conclude that, compared to the S0 2 Protocol, some cost-effective 
improvement is possible by guided bilateral permit trading. However, it should be 
noted that the simulation results excluded transaction costs. Therefore, the 
indicated cost savings can be regarded as the upper limit of possible savings. 
The simulation results indicated that the trade sequence influenced the generated 
profit. However, the simulations showed that the impact of trade sequences on the 
profit level was small. This suggests that a trade coordinating institute does not 
have to play an active role in the matching of trade partners, but only has to 
control whether countries trade according to the trade vector. 
Having discussed the main aspects of this study I now want to turn to the third 
research question. By developing the guided bilateral permit trading system I have 
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shown how a permit trading system for non-uniformly mixing pollutants could be 
formulated that takes deposition targets into account. The main drawback of this 
system is that full information on the cost-effective allocation is needed by the 
environmental authorities if such a trading system is to be successfully implemen-
ted. But, it should also be realized that in the current practice this information has 
already been used: in the negotiations on the Second Sulphur Protocol the infor-
mation on the cost-effective emission allocation provided by the RAINS model 
served as a guideline for the agreed emissions reduction. Since countries agreed 
upon the emission reductions in the Second Sulphur Protocol, they might agree on 
a permit trading system that is based on the same information. 
7.6 Guided bilateral trade revisited 
In this study I have been extensively illustrated that aiming at deposition targets 
for acidification while minimizing abatement costs is a complex matter. It depends 
on three factors: the source receptor relationships, the deposition targets and the 
differences in marginal abatement costs. Obviously, a policy instrument that is 
designed to generate a cost-effective abatement allocation needs to deal with this 
complexity. After having analysed the system of guided bilateral trade for S0 2 
emissions in Europe thoroughly, the final question that has to be looked at is 
whether this system would be suitable for implementation in practice and how it 
could be introduced. This question is discussed in this section, paying attention to 
cost effectiveness, innovation, international agreements, implementation costs, 
distributional effects and practical implementation. 
The system of guided bilateral permit trading succeeds in reaching the cost-
effective abatement allocation if all allowed trade transactions are profitable. If 
not, the cost-effective allocation will only be fully reached if the trade transactions 
needed to reach this cost-effective allocation are subsidized. This will be difficult 
since it is necessary to prune away profits from profitable trades to generate funds 
for subsidizing. However, the simulation results of guided bilateral permit trading 
indicate that the violation of deposition targets is only very moderate if the cost-
effective allocation is not fully reached by guided bilateral permit trading. 
Therefore it can be stated that guided bilateral permit trading is sufficient for the 
cost-effectiveness criterion. Arguments generally favouring the use of tradeable 
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emission permits are that the use of permits provides a continuous incentive to 
search for technology innovation and provides flexibility to polluters in the way 
they want to comply with the environmental targets. Guided bilateral trade 
provides this incentive and flexibility as well. 
An important aspect in judging the suitability of guided bilateral permit trading 
is the conformity with international agreements. In this thesis I have shown that 
given the Second Sulphur Protocol, guided bilateral permit trading can improve 
the cost-effectiveness of emission abatement. Whether a system of guided bilateral 
permit trading will really be successful will largely depend on the willingness of 
the European countries to accept the specified trade rules and the initial distributi-
on of permits. A disadvantage for negotiating countries may be that emission 
permits, by definition, put a price on pollution that was previously free. To make 
permits acceptable, countries first have to receive permits for free. In this thesis it 
was suggested that the agreed emission levels from the Second Sulphur Protocol 
could serve as a guideline for the initial distribution of permits, since countries 
have already committed themselves to these amounts. In fact, given the current 
sulphur protocol, the guided bilateral permit trading system provides a 'recipe' for 
reaching the cost-effective sulphur dioxide allocation in Europe. Since the sulphur 
protocol is an agreement among national governments, permit trading among these 
governments is an obvious succession. However, alternatively, a system could be 
implemented in which permit trading could take place among firms (see section 
7.7). 
The costs of implementation of a guided bilateral permit trading system have 
not been studied in this research and it is therefore difficult to judge the system 
on this criterion. However, compared to the current international practice of 
negotiations, there seems to be no indication so far that the costs of this trading 
system will be substantially higher. Neither the distributional aspects of guided 
bilateral permit trading have been dealt with extensively. In general, no country 
will be worse off with permit trading, since a country will only trade permits if 
this results in a profit, resulting in a Pareto improvement. A country selling 
permits will only sell permits if the permit price exceeds the marginal abatement 
costs, and a country will only buy permits if this is cheaper than emission 
abatement. So, in so far as the abatement costs of countries change as a result of 
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permit trading, this change is always compensated by the buying or selling of 
permits. Therefore, guided bilateral permit trading will only result in very 
moderate distributional effects. 
The most obvious way for practical implementation of guided bilateral permit 
trading is to extend the Second Sulphur Protocol with a guided bilateral permit 
trading scheme in an additional annex, in accordance with annex II in which the 
current committed emission reductions are stated. Currently, countries are obliged 
to report the annual levels of sulphur emissions to the Executive Body of the 
Convention each year. Likewise, countries could be obliged to report their trade 
transactions annually. I suggest that it is better to include a trade scheme in the 
protocol rather than the trade vector, since a trade scheme as presented in Table 
6.15 or 6.16 results in the largest cost savings. Furthermore, by presenting a trade 
scheme, countries do not have to search for their trading partner. This form of 
implementation does not require the establishment of a new agency since it fits 
into the current international negotiation arrangement on acidification, through the 
Convention under the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations. 
In this section I have indicated that guided bilateral permit trading principally 
offers a suitable supplement to the sulphur protocol for reaching a cost-effective 
emission allocation. I have also indicated how such a trading system could be 
implemented. Remembering that the simulation results showed that guided 
bilateral permit trading may generate a cost saving of 143 million DM, this 
system can be taken as a suitable policy instrument for reducing sulphur dioxide 
emissions. Whether it can really be successfully implemented largely depends on 
the political willingness of countries to accept such a trading scheme. 
7.7 Suggestions for further research 
Many aspects on tradeable emission permits have been examined in the literature. 
In this thesis I have emphasized the application of such permits to non-uniformly 
mixing pollutants for which a bilateral and sequential permit trading has been 
developed. This research could be extended to include topics such as banking of 
permits or market power. Additional suggestions for further research include (i) 
the aggregation in permit trading, (ii) the enlargement of permit trading to total 
acidification and its relation to other environmental problems, (iii) permit trading 
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in relation to other environmental problems ensuing from common sources and 
(iv) the implementation of guided bilateral permit trading where there is no 
protocol. 
(i) In this study I have assumed permit trading takes place among national 
governments. One justification for this is that a permit trading system has a fair 
chance of being accepted if it is close to the current multiparty negotiations that 
assign targets to nations, as in the sulphur protocols. An alternative would be that 
emission permits be distributed to and traded by firms. Arguments in favour of 
this are that national governments lack experience and lack knowledge about 
operations and compliance options at the firm level. The question is what guided 
bilateral permit trading would look like if trading took place among firms. 
Although the general methodology of guided bilateral permit trading needs no 
modification, if trading is taking place among firms rather than among countries, 
its implementation requires additional research. To simulate permit trading among 
firms, additional data are needed. The source receptor matrix has to be adapted 
since it is the location of firms that matters now. The source receptor matrix has 
to link the firm's emissions to deposition. Moreover, abatement costs have to be 
specified at the firm level. The current RAINS-Europe model does not contain 
these necessary data and refinements. However, the RAINS-Asia model, a policy-
oriented model which provides a framework for integrated assessment of acid 
deposition in Asia, does already provide an analysis for large point sources. In 
this model, the emissions of 355 large point sources are linked to deposition at 
l°x 1° grid cells (Foell et al., 1995). 
Alternatively, permit trading between firms could be analysed by a 'two-stage 
method'. This method, which needs no modification of the source receptor matrix, 
consists of first selecting two trading countries and next of selecting the firms 
with the lowest and the highest marginal control costs within these countries. 
Obviously, the firm with the lowest marginal costs is selected for the country 
selling permits and the firm with the highest marginal costs for the country 
buying permits. The next trade would be between the firms with the second 
highest and the second lowest costs, and so on. 
(ii) Acidification is not only caused by sulphur dioxide emission, but also by 
nitrogen oxides and ammonia. Instead of analysing trade in of sulphur permits, as 
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I have done in this thesis, it would be interesting to study the opportunities for the 
use of tradeable permits for total acidification. This multipollutant approach is in 
accordance with the ongoing negotiations on a following protocol on acidification. 
However, it requires additional research, including the following topics. Firstly, 
the three pollutants contribute in a different way to acidity. This would lead to 
possible substitution of emission reduction. Further, spatial patterns of emission 
and deposition differ, and abatement-cost functions show differences. These 
differences imply that permit trading for total acidification will be complex, but 
considering all acidifying emissions simultaneously may provide additional cost 
savings. An interesting topic to analyse in this context is how to allocate the 
emission reductions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides as the latter contribute 
both to acidification and to tropospheric ozone. The role of nitrogen oxides in 
acidification has been discussed in Chapter 1. Tropospheric ozone is formed by 
complex chemical reactions of volatile hydrocarbons (VOC) and nitrogen oxides. 
The ratio of VOC and NOx, and not merely their total amounts, is important for 
' ozone formation. This implies that when the ratio of VOC to NO x is very small, 
reduction of NO x can actually increase ozone formation. In general, the abatement 
of nitrogen oxide is more expensive than the abatement of sulphur dioxide. This 
implies that a shift from nitrogen oxides to sulphur dioxide emission reduction 
would result in cost savings. However, as nitrogen oxides contribute to tropo-
spheric ozone, preventing high ozone concentrations might, in some cases, 
prohibit the reduction of nitrogen oxides. An additional restriction on NO x 
emissions would be needed to take this into account in a permit trading system . 
(iii) A third extension of guided bilateral permit trading for sulphur dioxide 
emission would be to link sulphur dioxide emission to climatic change. The 
rationale for this is that both problems have a common source, that is, energy use. 
In the RAINS model for Europe which was used for this study, only end-of-pipe 
technologies are available for reducing emissions. However, changes in energy use 
may be of benefit to both acidification and climatic change. To analyse the effect 
of changes in energy use for sulphur dioxide emissions the RAINS model should 
be extended with an accurate energy scenario module. The RAINS-Asia model is 
already equipped to generate energy scenarios. The so called energy scenario 
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generator in this model estimates energy consumption contributing to S0 2 
emissions (Foell et al., 1995). 
(iv) A final topic for further research is how to implement a system of guided 
bilateral permit trading if a protocol had not yet been signed. Given an agreed 
initial permit allocation and given the restriction of the trade vector, it would be 
obvious to provide the opportunity to trade emission permits. Countries will have 
a strong incentive to trading since this is beneficial in terms of costs. If it 
appeared that countries would not trade, this could be an indication that transacti-
on costs are too high. If transactions costs exceeded the indicated cost savings, 
permit trading would not take place, and countries would comply with the 
emission reduction without trading. 
It has become clear that research on tradeable emission permits for sulphur 
dioxide emissions is an interesting topic that needs further investigation. Extend-
ing the research by the suggested options may provide new insights into how to 
achieve emission reductions at minimum abatement costs. Especially growing 
economies, such as those in Asia and Latin America, that will suffer from sulphur 
dioxide emissions and deposition in the near future, can benefit from a better 
insight into tradeable emission permits for reaching cost-effective reductions. 

APPENDIX I 
This appendix presents the simulation model for guided bilateral permit trading as 
formulated in the OMP modelling language. 
•Model voor het berekenen van de volgorde van handel in S02 emissie rechten 
* 
Scenario = basecase 
* 
MAX profit 
* 
SET = BUYER: ALB AUS CZE GRE LUX NOR POR SPA SWI TUR YUG 
S_PET BYE UKR MOL RSU 
SET = SELLER: BEL BUL DEN FIN FRA F R G W FRGE HUN IRE ITA 
NET POL ROM SWE UK KOL BAL 
SET = N: 1 TO 21 
SET = TIME: Tl T2 
* 
REL = STEPS, SET = TAU.SELLER(&).N(&), DATA = TRAJECTS 
REL = STEPB, SET = TAU.BUYER(&).N(&) , DATA = TRAJECTB 
* 
X=COST.BUYER(&)=C 
X=COST.SELLER(&)=C 
X=TAU.BUYER(&).N(&)=C 
X=TAU.SELLER(&).N(&)=C 
X=ABATEMENT.BUYER(&) = C >-INF 
X=ABATEMENT. SELLER(&) = C >-INF 
X=TRADE.SELLER(&).BUYER(&).TIME(&) = C 
X=HELP.SELLER(&).BUYER(&).TIME(1) = B 
X=PROFIT=C >-INF $ 
X=SUMCOST = C 
* 
C= P = PROFIT = 22188.5 - COST.BUYER(S&) - COST.SELLER(S&) 
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C=SUMC = SUMCOST = COST.SELLER(S&) + COST.BUYER(S&) 
C=AB. SELLER(&)= ABATEMENT. SELLER(&)= 
+ /HS/ * TAU.SELLER(&).N(S&) 
C=AB.BUYER(&) = ABATEMENT.BUYER(&) = 
+ /HB/ * TAU.BUYER(&).N(S&) 
C=C.SELLER(&) = COST.SELLER(&) = 
+ /ZS/ * TAU.SELLER(&).N(S&) 
C=C.BUYER(&) = COST.BUYER(&) = 
+ IZBI * TAU.BUYER(&).N(S&) 
C=HULP1.SELLER(&) = TAU.SELLER(&).N(S&) = 1 
C=HULP2.BUYER(&) = TAU.BUYER(&).N(S&) = 1 
C = A.SELLER(&) = ABATEMENT.SELLER(&) = /1N_EMS/ - /TN_EPS/ 
+ TRADE.SELLER(&).BUYER(S&).TIME(1) 
C = A.BUYER(&) = ABATEMENT.BUYER(&) = /IN_EMB/ - /IN_EPB/ 
- TRADE.SELLER(S&).BUYER(&).TIME(1) 
C = MAX.BUYER(&) = TRADE.SELLER(S&).BUYER(&).TIME(S&) > IBl 
C = MAX.SELLER(&) = TRADE.SELLER(&).BUYER(S&).TIME(S&) < /S/ 
C = H V W 1 . S E L L E R ( & ) . B U Y E R ( & ) . T I M E ( 1 ) = 
TRADE. SELLER(&).BUYER(&).TIME( 1) 
< /MBS/ * HELP.SELLER(&).BUYER(&).TIME(1) 
C = HVW2 = HELP.SELLER(S&).BUYER(S&).TIME(1) =1 
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DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
DATA= 
1NEMS, 
INEMB, 
1N_EPS, 
1N_EPB, 
S, 
«, 
MBS, 
=HS, 
« B , 
ZS, 
ZB, 
TRAJECTS, 
TRAJECTB, 
FILE=rNEMSO.WK1, L= 
FILE=rNEMBO.WKl, L-
FILE=rNEPS-V.WKl, L= 
FILE=INEPB-V.WK1, L= 
FILE=MVERK0.WK1, L= 
FILE=MKOOPO.WK1, L-
FJLEHV1TNBS0.WK1, L= 
FILE=HS0.WK1, L= 
FILE=HB0.WK1, L= 
FILE=ZS0.WK1, L= 
FILE=ZB0.WK1, L= 
FILE=SELLERO. WK1, L-
FILE=BUYER0.WK1, L-
=SELLER(&), O 
=BUYER(&), O 
=SELLER(&), O 
=BUYER(&), O 
=SELLER(&), O 
=BUYER(&), O 
=SELLER(&), O 
=SELLER(&), O 
=BUYER(&), O 
=SELLER(&), C 
=BUYER(&), O 
=SELLER(&), O 
=BUYER(&), O 
=EMISSIE 
=EMISSIE 
=RECHT 
=RECHT 
=MVERK 
=MKOOP 
=BUYER(&) 
=N(&) 
=N(&) 
=N(&) 
=N(&) 
=N(&) 
=N(&) 

APPENDIX II 
This appendix gives an overview of the maximum (no emission reduction) and 
minimum (maximum emission reduction) S0 2 emissions and the maximum reduc-
tion percentage according to the RAINS abatement cost functions based on the 
Official Energy Pathway 2000. 
Country Maximum 
Emissions (kton SOj) 
Minimum 
Emissions (kton SO^ 
Percentage Maximum 
Emission Reduction 
Albania 138 32 77 
Austria 352 43 88 
Belgium 722 53 93 
Bulgaria 816 71 91 
Czechoslovakia 2346 631 73 
Denmark 370 37 90 
Finland 604 68 89 
France 1309 117 91 
Germany-West 2272 224 90 
Germany-East 2363 226 90 
Greece 906 73 92 
Hungary 1076 369 66 
Ireland 234 19 92 
Italy 3001 171 94 
Luxembourg 16 1 94 
Netherlands 425 43 90 
Norway 144 33 77 
Poland 3739 499 87 
Portugal 389 21 95 
Romania 2595 338 87 
Spain 2793 161 94 
Sweden 412 84 80 
Switserland 75 44 41 
Turkey 2887 814 72 
United Kingdom 3334 387 88 
Yugoslavia 1577 160 90 
Baltic Sea 74 18 76 
North Sea 174 42 76 
Atlantic Ocean 317 76 76 
Kola-Karelia 728 103 86 
St. Petersburg 334 34 90 
Baltic Region 629 67 89 
Belarus 567 48 92 
Ukraine 5066 604 88 
Moldavia 379 40 89 
RSU 6348 703 89 

APPENDIX HI 
This appendix gives an overview of the abbreviatons for country names as used in 
this study. 
Country Abbreviation 
Albania ALB 
Austria AUS 
Belgium BEL 
Bulgaria BUL 
Czechoslovakia CZE 
Denmark DEN 
Finland FIN 
France FRA 
West Germany FRG 
East Germany GDR 
Greece GRE 
Hungary HUN 
Ireland IRE 
Italy ITA 
Luxembourg LUX 
Netherlands NET 
Norway NOR 
Poland POL 
Portugal POR 
Romania ROM 
Spain SPA 
Sweden SWE 
Switzerland SWI 
Turkey TUR 
United Kingdom UK 
Yugoslavia YUG 
Baltic Sea BAS 
North Sea NOS 
Atlantic Ocean ATL 
Kola Karelia KOL 
St. Petersburg S-PET 
Baltic Region BAL 
Belorussia BYE 
Ukraine UKR 
Moldavia MOL 
Remaining Soviet Union RSU 
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SAMENVATTING 
Inleiding 
Verzuring is een grensoverschrijdend milieuprobleem dat veroorzaakt wordt door 
de emissie van zwaveldioxide (S0 2), stikstofoxiden (NOx) en ammoniak (NH3). In 
deze Studie beperken we ons tot SOz. Voor een effectieve reductie van S0 2 is een 
intemationaal reductiebeleid nodig. In Europa zijn reeds twee protocollen afgeslo-
ten waarin landen zieh verplichten tot het terugdringen van S0 2 emissie. Het 
eerste protoeol gaat uit van een uniforme emissiereduetie; het tweede protoeol is 
gericht op het bereiken van bepaalde depositiedoelstellingen. Dit huidige protoeol 
implieeert echter geen kosteneffectieve emissiebestrijding. 
Deze Studie handelt over de vraag of een systeem van verhandelbare emissie-
rechten kan bijdragen aan een kosteneffectieve bestrijding van zwaveldioxide 
emissie in Europa, gegeven bepaalde depositiedoelstellingen, en hoe zo'n systeem 
er uit zou moeten zien. Deze centrale vraag wordt behandeld aan de hand van drie 
onderzoeksonderwerpen: 
(I) Wat zijn de belangrijkste economische aspecten van een Europees ver-
zuringsbeleid? 
(II) Wat zijn de voor- en nadelen van het gebruik van verhandelbare emissie-
rechten om het Europese verzuringsbeleid gestalte te geven? 
(III) Hoe zou een systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten voor niet uniform 
verspreide vervuiling er uit moeten zien, indien rekening wordt gehouden 
met gegeven depositiedoelstellingen? 
Deze onderzoeksonderwerpen komen achtereenvolgens aan de orde. 
Economische aspecten van vervuilingsbestrijding 
Idealiter is het streven gericht op een optimale emissiebestrijding waarbij de 
marginale kosten van emissiebestrijding gelijk zijn aan de marginale baten 
daarvan. Immers deze optimale bestrijdingsomvang implieeert nutsmaximalisatie. 
Echter, omdat de marginale baten van emissiebestrijding in praktijk moeilijk zijn 
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vast te stellen, wordt in deze Studie uitgegaan van kosteneffectieve emissie-
bestrijding gegeven bepaalde depositiedoelstellingen. De kosteneffectieve bestrij-
dingsallocatie is gedefinieerd als die allocatie van emissiebestrijding waarbij 
gegeven milieudoelstellingen tegen de laagst mogelijke kosten worden ge-
realiseerd. Omdat verzuring een internationaal milieuprobleem is, moet kosten-
effectieve emissiebestrijding ook in een internationaal kader worden beschouwd. 
Om een internationale kosteneffectieve emissiereductie te bewerkstelligen, is 
samenwerking tussen landen onontbeerlijk. Hoewel volledige samenwerking tot 
een internationale kosteneffectieve emissiereductie kan leiden, handelen individu-
ele landen echter niet altijd conform een coöperatieve bestrijdingsstrategie. Dit 
verschijnsel kan worden verklaard door het bestaan van 'prisoners dilemma' 
situaties. In de praktijk zijn de veronderstellingen die ten grondslag liggen aan het 
bestaan van het prisoners dilemma echter niet altijd aanwezig en bestaan er wel 
degelijk motieven voor landen om samen te werken. Bovendien kan gebruik 
worden gemaakt van side-payments om landen te stimuleren deel te nemen aan 
coöperatieve bestrijdingsstragie8n. 
Voorts wordt ingegaan op de vraag welke beleidsinstrumenten ingezet zouden 
kunnen worden om emissiereductie te realiseren. Een belangrijk onderscheid kan 
gemaakt worden tussen economische en niet-economische instrumenten (regule-
ring). Het grootste voordeel van economische instrumenten is dat ze in theorie tot 
een kosteneffectieve bestrijding leiden. In tegenstelling tot regulering leidt het 
gebruik van economische instrumenten tot een minimalisatie van bestrijdingskos-
ten. Bovendien bieden economische instrumenten meer flexibiliteit aan vervuilers 
en zorgen ze voor een voortdurende prikkel voor de ontwikkeling en toepassing 
van nieuwe bestrijdinstechnologieen. In deze Studie wordt het gebruik van 6en van 
de economische instrumenten, namelijk verhandelbare emissierechten, voor de 
emissie van zwaveldioxide in Europa nader geanalyseerd. 
Verhandelbare emissierechten voor niet uniform verspreide vervuiling 
De aantasting van het milieu door niet uniform verspreide vervuiling, zoals 
zwaveldioxide, hangt niet alleen af van de hoeveelheid geSmitteerde vervuiling 
maar ook van de locatie van emissie. In overeenstemming hiermee is de milieu-
doelstelling die in deze Studie gehanteerd wordt niet uitgedrukt in een emissie-
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doelstelling maar in een depositiedoelstelling. Dit heeft belangrijke gevolgen voor 
het gebruik van een systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten omdat een systeem 
van vrij verhandelbare emissierechten alleen de totale emissie van verontreinigen-
de Stoffen reguleert. De depositiedoelstellingen worden daarbij niet in beschou-
wing genomen. De implicaties van het gebruik van verhandelbare emissierechten 
voor niet uniform verspreide vervuiling en de alternatieven die zijn aangedragen 
in de literatuur om rekening te houden met depositiedoelstellingen, worden 
uitgebreid behandeld. 
In het algemeen kan niet worden geconcludeerd dat emissierechten een geschürt 
Instrument zijn voor het bestrijden van niet uniform verspreide vervuiling. Het 
gebruik van volledig vrij verhandelbare emissierechten leidt tot een emissiereduc-
tie tegen minimale bestrij dingskosten, maar de gevolgen voor de aantasting van 
het milieu zijn onzeker omdat de depositie op bepaalde iocaties onaanvaardbaar 
hoog kan worden. 
Om rekening te houden met depositiedoelstellingen zijn depositierechten een 
mogelijk alternatief voor emissierechten. In theorie leidt het gebruik van verhan-
delbare depositierechten tot een kosteneffectieve allocatie waarbij aan de deposi-
tiedoelstellingen wordt voldaan. Bij een systeem van verhandelbare depositie-
rechten moeten emissiebronnen over de juiste hoeveelheid depositierechten 
beschikken voor iedere receptor die ze bei'nvloeden. Op deze manier kan de 
overheid bewerkstelligen dat de depositiedoelstellingen worden bereikt. Een nadeel 
van verhandelbare depositierechten is dat de totale emissies in principe kunnen 
toenemen en dit is een politiek gevoelig aspect. Een ander nadeel dat in de 
literatuur naar voren wordt gehaald is dat handel in depositierechten complex is 
omdat bronnen simultaan in een groot aantal verschillende markten moeten 
opereren. 
Omdat het gebruik van zowel emissie- als depositierechten op bezwaren stuit, 
zijn in de literatuur verschillende alternatieve Systemen van verhandelbare rechten 
ontwikkeld. Het gemeenschappelijke kenmerk van deze Systemen is dat de handel 
in emissierechten niet meer volledig vrij is. Relatief eenvoudige Systemen zijn de 
"worst case" benadering en de situatie waarin de handel in emissierechten slechts 
in een bepaalde zones mag plaats vinden. Echter, deze Systemen garanderen niet 
dat depositiedoelstellingen gehaald worden. 
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Complexere Systemen van verhandelbare emissierechten, waarbij handel gebun-
den is aan regels, leiden niet tot een overschrijding van depositiedoelstellingen. Er 
bestaan drie Varianten: (i) pollution offset, (ii) non degradation offset en (iii) 
modified pollution offset. De emissie- en depositierestricties in deze Systemen 
variSren, maar al deze Varianten garanderen het realiseren van depositiedoelstellin-
gen. Het pollution offset systeem biedt de meeste handelsmogelijkheden doordat 
de totale emissie mag toenemen, mits aan de depositiedoelstellingen wordt 
voldaan. De handelsmogelijkheden in de non degradation en de modified pollution 
offset Systemen zijn beperkter en deze Systemen leiden daardoor tot hogere bestrij-
dingskosten. 
Bij het beoordelen van Systemen van verhandelbare emissierechten is het van 
belang om rekening te houden met de aard van het handelsproces. Veel studies 
veronderstellen impliciet dat handel in emissierechten een simultaan en multilate-
raal proces is. Echter, in afwezigheid van een veiling is het aannemelijker om te 
veronderstellen dat handel bilateraal en sequentieel plaats vindt. De resultaten van 
empirische studies geven aan dat bilaterale en sequentiele handel, waarbij handel 
aan regels gebonden is, niet tot kosteneffectieve emissiebestrijding leidt. 
Een belangrijke conclusie is dat een systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten 
voor niet uniform verspreide emissie op 66n of andere manier gerestricteerd dient 
te worden om rekening te houden met depositiedoelstellingen. Deze restricties 
moeten depositiedoelstellinge garanderen maar tegelijkertijd het bereiken van de 
kosteneffectieve emissie allocatie niet in de weg staan. 
Guided bilateral trade: theorie 
In deze Studie is een nieuw systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten ontwikkeld, 
genaamd "guided bilateral trade" dat ruime handelsmogelijkheden biedt waarbij 
depositiedoelstellingen niet overschreden worden. Een centrale gedachte in het 
systeem van guided bilateral trade is dat niet iedere bilaterale handelstransactie 
hoeft te voldoen aan de depositiedoelstellingen, maar dat moet worden voldaan 
aan de depositiedoelstellingen nadat alle bilaterale transacties hebben plaats 
gevonden. Immers, overschrijding op een willekeurige receptor kan door een 
volgende handelstransactie ongedaan worden gemaakt. Om rekening te houden 
met depositiedoelstellingen is de handel volgens het guided bilateral trade systeem 
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gerestricteerd door een handelsvector die aangeeft hoeveel emissierechten emissie-
bronnen mögen aankopen dan wel mögen verkopen. Deze handelsvector is 
berekend als het verschil tussen de initieel aan landen toegekende rechten (emis-
sie) en de hoeveelheid emissie in de kosteneffectieve emissieallocatie. 
Guided bilateral trade leidt tot de kosteneffectieve allocatie indien alle handels-
transacties die voortvloeien uit de handelsvector winstgevend zijn. Een nadeel van 
guided bilateral trade is dat deze handelstransacties niet per definitie winstgevend 
zijn. Of hiervan sprake is hangt af van de verspreidingsmatrix, de bestrijdingskos-
ten nineties, de depositiedoelstellingen en de initiele verdeling van emissierechten. 
Om de kosteneffectieve allocatie te bereiken, zouden in sommige gevallen 
verliesgevende handelstransacties op 6en of ander manier moeten worden gesubsi-
dieerd. 
Om de emissies naar de kosteneffectieve allocatie te leiden, moet deze allocatie 
bekend zijn. Daarom moet het instituut dat de handel coördineert over volledige 
informatie beschikken teneinde de handelsvector te kunnen vaststellen. De term 
"guided bilateral trade" geeft aan dat de markt als zodanig niet in staat is het 
gewenste resultaat te bewerkstelligen. Het handelsproces moet geleid worden door 
een instituut dat toeziet op de verhandelde hoeveelheid emissierechten. 
Guided bilateral trade: simulatie 
Om na te gaan in hoeverre guided bilateral trade tot een kosteneffectieve allocatie 
van S0 2 reductie in Europa leidt, is guided bilateral trade voor S0 2 emissies 
tussen Europese landen gesimuleerd. Voor het bepalen van de kosteneffectieve 
allocatie is gebruik gemaakt van het RAINS model. Om handel in emissierechten 
te simuleren is een simulatiemodel ontwikkeld. 
Guided bilateral trade is gesimuleerd voor drie situaties. In de Base Case is de 
kosteneffectieve allocatie berekend rekening houdend met de huidige reductievoor-
nemens van de Europese landen. De initiele verdeling van emissierechten is 
gebaseerd op historische emissies. In variant 1 is de restrictie betreffende de 
huidige reductievoornemens losgelaten. Variant 2 simuleert guided bilateral trade 
startende vanuit het tweede zwavelprotocol. 
De simulatieresultaten tonen aan dat het handelsproces de emissieallocatie in de 
richting van de kosteneffectieve oplossing stuurt. De kosteneffectieve oplossing 
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wordt echter niet volledig bereikt indien alleen de winstgevende handelstransacties 
plaats vinden. 
In alle Varianten wordt een substantiele kostenbesparing gerealiseerd. In de Base 
Case en in variant 1 bedraagt de kostenbesparing 13,5 % van de totale bestrij-
dingskosten. Vanuit beleidsoogpunt is variant 2 bijzonder interessant omdat deze 
variant de huidige afspraken omtrent emissiereducties in Europa als uitgangspunt 
neemt voor handel in emissierechten. De simulatieresultaten van variant 2 geven 
aan dat guided bilateral permit trading, startende vanuit de emissie allocatie van 
het tweede zwavelprotocol tot een kostenbesparing leidt van 7,8 % van de totale 
bestrijdingskosten. Gegeven deze uitkomst mögen we concluderen dat, vergeleken 
met het tweede zwavelprotocol, guided bilateral trade tot kosteneffectiviteitsverbe-
tering leidt. Overigens moet worden opgemerkt dat transactiekosten in deze Studie 
buiten beschouwing zijn gelaten. 
Voor wat betreft de handelsvolgorde geven de simulatieresultaten aan dat de 
volgorde waarin de bilaterale handelstransacties plaats vinden invloed heeft op de 
gerealiseerde kostenbesparingen. Uit de simulaties blijkt echter dat dit effect 
gering is. 
Het systeem van guided bilateral trade laat zien hoe een systeem van verhandel-
bare emissierechten voor niet uniform verspreide vervuiling, rekening houdend 
met depositiedoelstellingen, vorm kan worden gegeven. Een nadeel van het 
systeem is dat de coördinerende instantie volledige informatie nodig heeft voor het 
vaststellen van de kosteneffectieve emissie allocatie teneinde een systeem van 
guided bilateral trade succesvol te kunnen invoeren. Men moet zieh echter 
realiseren dat bij de tot standkoming van het huidige zwavelprotocol, de kostenef-
fectieve allocatie, berekend met het RAINS model, ook al als een richtlijn heeft 
gediend. 
Hoewel een systeem van 'guided bilateral trade' enige praktische complicaties 
kent, zou het grotere flexibiliteit opleveren en substantiele kostenbesparing moge-
lijk maken. Of een dergelijk systeem daadwerkelijk succesvol ge'fntroduceerd zou 
kunnen worden hangt in belangrijke mate af van de politieke bereidheid van 
landen om een dergelijk handelssysteem te aeeepteren. 
De toepassing van verhandelbare emissierechten voor zwaveldioxide vormt een 
complex en breed aandachtsgebied. Het onderzoek hiernaar is met deze Studie niet 
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ten einde. Perspectiven voor verder onderzoek liggen onder andere op het terrein 
van het analyseren van verhandelbare emissierechten tussen bedrijven in plaats 
van tussen landen, het analyseren van verhandelbare emissierechten voor totale 
verzuring, de interactie van verhandelbare emissierechten voor zwaveldioxide met 
andere milieuproblemen zoals het broeikaseffect en het implementeren van guided 
bilateral trade in afwezigheid van een bestaande protocol. 
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